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ABSTRACT 
Schools have an undeniably crucial role in influencing the ways in which well-being 
is perceived. They are also instrumental in promoting or frustrating opportunities 
whereby people may come to appreciate the significance of alternative courses of 
action as well as providing an understanding of ways in which these might be 
pursued. It is thus incumbent upon teachers to appreciate the nature of freedom and 
its place within an overall theory of personal well-being. This thesis is meant to 
contribute to a clarification of some of the complexities involved. 
Its aim is twofold. Firstly, it attempts to refute accounts of freedom and personal 
well-being which rely on desire-satisfaction as a criterion of rational choice. Such 
accounts are shown to be defective in that they are ultimately subjective and result in 
consequences which are at once paradoxical and disturbing. 
The value we attach to freedom - as something having as much to do with the 
capacity to choose from a range of significant alternatives as being unencumbered by 
constraints - is in virtue of its importance in the kind of life appropriate for persons, 
namely that which is compatible with flourishing or personal well-being. If there 
were no more to freedom than the removal of relevant constraints it is difficult to see 
why we should attach such importance to its promotion and preservation. Alternative 
possibilities are identified in a variety of ways but their criteria of significance are a 
function of something altogether less subjective than the fact that they are desired. 
Desire-satisfaction accounts of freedom and well-being derive their support from a 
familiar and widely held position within philosophical psychology in spite of the fact 
that it is based on little more than Humean dogma. It grants logical priority to desire 
over value and is thus unable to account for human interests and well-being in 
anything other than subjective terms. 
It is the second principal task of the thesis to reverse this order of priority and 
thereby to account for well-being by reference to a conception of human nature based 
on real-interests, the absence of which are likely to result in persons being harmed. 
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If it succeeds in this it is possible to conceive of well-being in more objective terms 
while at the same time accommodating widely differing conceptions of flourishing in 
accordance with individual and freely chosen lives. 
Compulsory schooling is seen to merit justification largely in terms of the extent to 
which it succeeds in promoting the freedom and well-being of those destined for 
citizenship in a democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A system of schooling may be designed for many reasons, not all of which are 
morally acceptable. Children have been forced to attend schools whose specific 
intentions included producing Christian gentlemen or committed communists where 
any reference to the potentially liberating possibilities afforded by schooling have met 
with incomprehension or hostility. Those who have wished to indoctrinate the young 
into particular conceptions of well-being have all too frequently found schools willing 
to accommodate them. 
The reaction against such systems has been accompanied by an unwarranted 
scepticism concerning the role of teachers in assisting children with the task of 
determining where their well-being might lie. This is in no small part due to the 
contemporary moral and political climate which derives support from subjectivism 
and individualism. Those teachers who see their job as having something to do with 
helping pupils appreciate the implications of, and values associated with, certain 
forms of life (especially if this is seen in terms of something more than either merely 
equipping them with the capacity to decide for themselves the values by reference to 
which their decisions are determined, or with helping them to formulate strategies for 
satisfying their desires) may well leave themselves open to the charge of 
indoctrinating others with their own, subjectively chosen, Weltanschauungen. And 
even where it is acknowledged that education can and should make a substantial 
contribution to social freedom, this in turn is widely perceived as being no more than 
the removal of constraints on people's attempts to satisfy their desires. If true, the 
implications for the aims of education, the curriculum and classroom practice are 
profound. 
Whatever it is that we are aiming to achieve through compulsory schooling and 
whatever curriculum is considered appropriate as a means to such achievement, we 
have to acknowledge that some conception or other of what is good for both 
individuals and society at large - what, in other words, it is to flourish as persons and 
as citizens - underpins all that we do. It is all too easy to despair of providing an 
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acceptable theoretical underpinning to educational practice with any claims to 
objectivity in terms of which charges of indoctrination or perfectionism may plausibly 
be rebutted, but it is the result of a long-standing deep dissatisfaction with the 
subjectivism on which so many accounts of freedom and well-being appear to rely 
which has provided the impetus behind the search for such an alternative. 
Subjectivism accepts that values are self-chosen and ultimately a matter of individual 
preference. Accordingly, the significant alternatives by reference to which a person 
or society may be said to be free are themselves a function of such preferences and 
thus without objective foundation. Similarly, individual or collective flourishing on 
this view amounts to nothing more than success in providing coherence and a 
hierarchical structure to one's desires, it being an impertinence to suggest that one 
could both succeed in this enterprise and fail to achieve personal well-being. What 
is of importance to one is whatever it is to which one ascribes significance; all talk 
of error or misjudgement in this regard being so much clap-trap. 
Associated with subjectivism is a variety of individualism the consequences of which 
have come to haunt us all. The more individuals there are for whom constraints to 
desire-satisfaction have been removed the greater will be the extent of freedom and 
well-being enjoyed. We live in an age where the very idea of human-nature is 
suspect and where reference to what people are supposed to need or have a genuine 
stake in promoting or securing is condemned as authoritarian; the possibility that 
people might fail to discover, as opposed to simply choosing the direction in which 
their well-being might lie being little more than incredible. 
This essay exposes the shortcomings of both subjectivism and individualism in so far 
as they have a bearing on freedom and well-being. It does so by trying to make sense 
of the value we attribute to being able to live a free life and in so doing is not 
particularly concerned with free agency as such where actions are seen in isolation 
from the life of which they are a part. It is also concerned with the sorts of thing 
required of a life appropriate to persons by reference to which they may be said to 
live well or flourish. The fact that most of us are prepared to adopt a different stance 
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to the taking of animal life, or the lives of those in an incurably vegetative state, than 
we would towards killing those who are indisputably persons, bears witness to the 
value we attach to a life lived in accordance with hopes, memories, goals and the 
like. A person's life is made up of actions, beliefs and relationships, all of which 
cannot be reduced to a series of unrelated moments in time. A life lived without 
reference to a temporal perspective would not merit the same respect as that rightly 
accorded to persons. But a free life presupposes a range of alternative possibilities. 
Where these are non-existent - or, where if they do exist, our limitations in regard 
to knowledge, understanding, imagination and strength of will are such that we are 
incapable of recognising them for what they are, so that to all intents and purposes 
they are not genuine alternatives - it is not possible to live the kind of life that in 
significant respects distinguishes my life from yours. Without freedom I should be 
incapable of living my life and would be other-determined in that any self-referential 
concepts of the kind suggested would be part of a biography of which I was not the 
author and whose hopes and aspirations would be confined to an existence in which 
I was trapped or enslaved. The value we attach to individual lives is a function of 
their being lived in accordance with life-plans which are self-determined and not 
hopelessly attenuated or derivative versions of other people's. 
There is more to a free life than not being subject to certain constraints, important as 
this undoubtedly is. The free person, it is argued, is free from relevant constraints 
to do, be or become something in particular. For some philosophers this amounts to 
no more than being able to satisfy one's desires. Such a view will be shown to be 
unacceptable and an alternative position relying on choices between alternatives which 
are rational to the extent that they do nothing to undermine one's future well-being 
will be defended after objections to so-called negative-freedom - a concept which 
relies on the removal of constraints and nothing more - have been rehearsed in 
Section 1. The appropriate candidates for constraint are considered in Section 2 and 
their number and variety shown to be greater than negative-libertarianism would 
allow. 
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Attempts to account for either freedom or well-being in terms of desire-satisfaction 
are shown to be no more than prima facie. They all too frequently take it for granted 
that authentic desires are easily identifiable and that these are the same as those 
desires with which one most readily identifies. However we go about identifying 
those things which we may be said to 'really' want, they will be seen to hinge on 
something over and above desires themselves. Desire-satisfaction accounts of both 
freedom and well-being are inclined to attach special status to 'higher-order' desires, 
but if any special status is to be granted to such desires it has nothing to do with their 
being 'higher', in the sense that they are at least one stage removed from what are 
generally referred to as 'first-order' desires, but rather it is in consequence of 
evaluating some things more favourably than others. A mere preference is one thing 
but the judgement that something is preferable to something else is quite different. 
Reasons may be provided for the latter in ways which would not make sense when 
applied to simple preferences and the nature of the reasoning involved relies on the 
idea of self-satisfaction as opposed to desire-satisfaction, which in turn presupposes 
some means or other for ordering desires according to their priority within one's 
scheme of things that cannot themselves be reducible to desires. An explication of 
what this entails is provided in Section 3 but its significance, which cannot be over 
estimated, requires mention here. One's freedom has more to do with the nature and 
value of the alternatives available than with the extent to which they are adopted on 
the basis of desire-satisfaction. If there were no more to freedom than this one would 
be forced into accepting unacceptable and counterintuitive conclusions such as 
according the status of 'free' to those with no alternatives whatsoever as long as they 
were doing what they really wanted, and reducing freedom to something as variable 
and subjective as desires themselves. 
Recent accounts of well-being are bedeviled with a tenacious attachment to the 
importance of desire-satisfaction, albeit in a variety of guises. John White is a 
particularly distinguished philosopher of education in whose recent work the idea of 
well-being has been cashed out in this way. His Aims of Education Restated 
published a decade ago invokes the notion of what he calls 'post-reflective-desire-
satisfaction' while his more recent Education and the Good Life relies on the more 
10 
familiar 'informed-desires' . Section 4 is an attempt to cast serious doubt on such an 
enterprise. It does so, firstly, by questioning his account of what is involved in 
serious reflection about the sort of person one is and the plans and projects to which 
one attaches importance; secondly, by showing how the culmination of such reflection 
is as likely to result in important discoveries about oneself and one's values as it is 
about the kinds of things one really wants, as well as how sensitivity to what is 
involved here provides hope for those of us who believe that practical knowledge is 
more than a pipe-dream; and thirdly, by questioning the assumed relationship between 
desire on the one hand and value on the other. This is a particularly contentious issue 
in moral philosophy but, after an all too brief critique of that account of rational 
agency whereby desire-satisfaction is seen as a necessary condition and concerned 
only with means (ends being illegitimate candidates for rational assessment), Section 
5 provides some support for the idea of value having at least logical priority over 
desire. In doing so it seriously undermines moral non-cognitivism by providing some 
values with some kind of objective status. States of affairs are evaluated and 
characterized accordingly and it is in virtue of such that some are judged to be more 
valuable than others and in accordance with which we may be said to have a prima-
facie reason for deciding in their favour. What first appears as an unnecessary 
digression into the status of value judgements is really a pre-requisite for the 
justification of the alternative model of rationality upheld. 
The objectivity of value judgments is perfectly compatible with the fact that one's 
concern with one's own well-being entails acknowledging the necessity for individual 
and independent assessment of the implications for what we should do in the light of 
our evaluation of a specific set of circumstances; this being the direct consequence 
of the fact that people and their circumstances vary. Our interests do not necessarily 
coincide and for this reason there is no one summum bonum to which all rational 
agents should aspire. But unless we acknowledge the existence of those features of 
our lives the negligence of which undermines the capacity to function properly as 
persons, we shall find ourselves suffering serious harm. What these amount to is 
notoriously difficult to specify but in Section 6 it is suggested that an understanding 
of what is involved in harm and its avoidance goes some way towards overcoming 
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some of the difficulties involved. A person may be said to suffer harm if he fails to 
secure what he needs or, what amounts to the same thing, that in which he has a real-
interest - not for merely instrumental purposes but in order to provide himself with 
the opportunity to live a recognisably human life. 
It is doubtful that a definitive list of the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for 
such a life could be compiled but there is some attempt in Section 6 to impose 
limitations beyond which it is senseless to presume that a person could flourish even 
from a subjective point of view. One condition which receives prominent attention 
is that of personal autonomy which, it is argued, has a special place within the 
conception of well-being developed in that without it a person may be said to lack 
dignity and justifiable self-respect. To paraphrase Mill, what is of importance is not 
only the things that people do but the kinds of people that do them. 
Important as autonomy undoubtably is within an acceptable theory of well-being it is 
not something that develops willy-nilly. We learn, in a variety of social contexts, 
how to become autonomous which in turn requires the existence of others who are 
themselves autonomous. Moreover, an autonomous life requires a measure of 
freedom which is to say that relevant constraints do not exist and that alternative 
possibilities are readily available. And this is quite compatible with the claim, to be 
defended in the seventh and final section, that constraints in the form of compulsory 
schooling may legitimately be imposed on children in order that their autonomy might 
be enhanced or secured. The age criterion will be shown to be less arbitrary than 
might at first appear and the case for non-voluntary attendance will be made by 
appealing to the importance of being able to live a free life the 'content' of which one 
is prepared autonomously to endorse. Some restrictions on children's freedom of 
choice - especially where such choices are at the expense of failure to acquire 
knowledge, skills and the general wherewithal to enable them to recognise and, where 
necessary, resist both the pressure to conform as well as those desires which all too 
frequently threaten to engulf them - is essential if they are to fare well in the 
formidably difficult task of discovering for themselves which freedoms are important 
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and in which direction their well-being might lie. The essay concludes with some 
brief remarks concerning the curriculum appropriate to such a task. 
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1. FREEDOM: ONE CONCEPT OR TWO? 
1.1 	 Negative and Positive Freedom 
If not the earliest, certainly one of the clearest statements to the effect that there are 
two distinct concepts of freedom is to be found in a lecture given by the nineteenth 
century Hegelian T.H. Green, entitled 'On the Different Senses of "Freedom" as 
Applied to Will and the Moral progress of Man') In this lecture, which is 
principally concerned with freedom of the will, he makes a distinction between what 
he calls 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, believing the latter to encapsulate 
something more noble and elevating than mere absence of constraint or compulsion. 
What he means by positive freedom is more clearly stated in another lecture entitled 
`Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract'. 
`We do not mean merely freedom from restraint or compulsion. We 
do not mean freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is that 
we like .... When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly 
prized we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying 
something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we 
do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power which 
each man exercises through the help or security given him by his 
fellow-men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them ... there can 
be no freedom among men who act not willingly but under 
compulsion, yet on the other hand the mere removal of compulsion, 
the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution 
to true freedom ... the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power 
for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves 
'2 
Needless to say there is more to Green's account than this short extract would 
indicate and there are parts of it with which one could easily take issue if this were 
a critical exegesis of Green's political philosophy. 
My reason for quoting from this part of Green's lecture is because the spirit of 
Green's claims is something which I believe to be substantially correct and which I 
try to substantiate in much of this essay. I refer to the spirit of what is being claimed 
on freedom's behalf because there are a number of points which, if taken literally, 
are not strictly true. It is not quite true to say that enabling someone to do as he 
wishes is to contribute nothing towards his freedom. Whether it does or not depends 
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on a number of factors relating to the circumstances in which the desire was 
formulated and the alternatives available from which a course of action was selected. 
And of course, unless constraints of a relevant kind are removed, one's freedom to 
do one thing rather than another is necessarily restricted. But the point that Green is 
really making is that the removal of constraints is, in itself, insufficient as an 
entitlement claim to freedom. I may be completely unconstrained in so far as nobody 
is preventing me from doing as I wish, and yet in crucial respects I may well be 
unfree. While the absence of constraint is a condition of freedom (something that 
might be said to be a 'negative' requirement), it is far from being a sufficient 
condition. The very least additional requirement is, as Green says, 'a positive power 
or capacity' to exercise the freedom which I have hitherto been prevented from 
enjoying.' No doubt Green goes too far in suggesting that we are free only if we 
exercise such capacities for the purpose of doing something worthwhile, as though we 
could not legitimately complain of lack of freedom to engage in trivial pursuits. But 
as Benn and Weinstein remind us 'our concept of freedom is bounded by our notions 
of what might be worthwhile doing' ,4 there being something paradoxical in saying 
of someone that he is free to starve, cut off his ears or to die. Whether or not Green 
had this in mind is not my principal concern, but the fact remains that the whole point 
of removing constraints as a condition of liberation is to enable people to find a 
measure of self-satisfaction in being able to live well. And as Green recognised there 
is more involved in this than the mere removal of constraints to the performance of 
any action whatsoever. 
It goes without saying that there should be scope within the life of a free person to 
perform countless actions which are utterly inconsequential but unless he has the 
opportunity to do more than this, to pursue goals which are enriching and fulfilling 
and which provide his life with meaning and purpose, his freedom will not only count 
for very little it will also be significantly diminished. Any attempt to say what 
freedom is without at the same time providing some insight into why we should care 
about it is futile. Without an understanding of what it is to be a person, as well as 
an appreciation of the requirements for people to flourish as people, there would be 
no point in being concerned with any such principle. Indeed without a concept of 
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personhood and a recognition of what respect for such beings entails, it is difficult 
to see how any limitation could be imposed on the sort of thing that may legitimately 
be considered either a constraint, power or capacity. In delimiting the nature of 
constraints and opportunities we are, unavoidably, invoking a moral standpoint. 
It is to Green's credit that he not only recognised this (` ... the ideal of true freedom 
is the maximum power for all members of human society to make the best of 
themselves') but that unlike so many others within liberal political thought, he was 
aware of the social context within which individual freedom could be sustained. If 
freedom is something we care about and believe to be worth promoting in order that 
what Mill called 'the free development of individuals' as 'one of the leading essentials 
of well-being's may flourish, then it is not something that can be understood in 
purely individualistic terms. Not only is there an intimate relationship between 
individual freedom and well-being but their cultivation and preservation is bound up 
with the social context in which we live our lives. Green was aware of the fact that 
we are, in a very deep sense, social beings and that human nature is rooted in society 
and a particular tradition. The significance of this truism for freedom and human 
flourishing is taken up in Section 6. What is apparent from this section of Green's 
lecture is that he was aware of the futility of restricting freedom to a species of 
desire-satisfaction. Why this is inadequate as an account of either freedom or the 
nature of human flourishing will become evident as the essay proceeds. Suffice it 
to say that Green conceived of freedom in non-individualistic terms by acknowledging 
that freedom cannot be secured by the mere removal of constraints but also requires 
the existence of a society committed to empowering people for the mutual benefit of 
all. Any evaluation of the notion of positive freedom is not something that can easily 
be done outside the context of an exposure of the weaknesses of negative freedom. 
But before addressing this we need to examine more recent claims that there are 
indeed two concepts of freedom. 
The most celebrated and spirited recent defence of the view that there are two distinct 
concepts of freedom is to be found in the work of Sir Isaiah Berlin who argued in his 
Inaugural Lecture that the two concepts arose out of an attempt to answer different 
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questions. Negative freedom is supposed to be concerned with an answer to the 
question 'What is the area within which the subject - a person or persons - is or 
should be left to do or be, without interference from other persons?' Whereas 
positive freedom is construed as an attempt to answer the question 'What or who is 
the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this 
rather than that?' It is Berlin's purpose to explicate these 'two concepts' as well as 
to construct a defence of the former whilst hoping to show that the latter can and does 
lead to the worst acts of oppression. I intend to show that Berlin not only fails to 
distinguish two distinct concepts but that his critique of 'positive' freedom as rational 
self-mastery is misplaced and based on a false premise leading to groundless fears. 
Moreover, his analysis of freedom is not only faulty but if found to be socially 
acceptable could lead to just that kind of illiberal society which Berlin himself was 
so anxious to avoid. 
Berlin is not a philosopher to whom the label 'negative libertarian' can be attached 
with certainty or fairness. To begin with, his position changed in the decade after 
the delivery of the Inaugural Lecture and his views are frequently at variance with a 
number of philosophers more readily locatable within the negative tradition. And 
yet the fact remains that his position is in many respects in accordance with negative 
freedom. (As we shall see there are overwhelming objections to construing free 
people or a free society in wholly 'negative' terms and although I concentrate on 
those features of negative freedom which are particularly suspect - its restrictive view 
of the nature of constraints (Section 2) and the view of freedom as essentially a matter 
of want or desire-satisfaction (Section 3), we shall see that there are numerous aspects 
of negative freedom which are not only philosophically suspect and counterintuitive 
but also dangerously illiberal). 
Berlin is at one with negative libertarianism in (a) seeing freedom as an absence or 
lack (of obstacles to choice) in which nothing obstructs one,' (b) in his individualistic 
bias by reference to which freedom is seen as being primarily concerned with the 
removal of obstructions to individual choice,' (c) in assuming that rational 
deliberation is of means rather than ends and (d) that ultimate values or ends are self- 
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chosen.' He is also sceptical about there being any necessary connection between 
the degree of freedom enjoyed and the extent to which people are empowered -
although once again he is hardly the model of consistency.' Again he adopts a 
curiously reactionary position on the nature of threats and the extent to which they 
affect our freedom - he seems to accept with equanimity the view that a worker 
whose behaviour was explicable in terms of fear of losing his job would be no less 
free than one who had no such fear." Furthermore, he is so averse to what he takes 
to be the implications of positive freedom that he is inclined towards a greater degree 
of attachment to negative freedom than much of his thesis would warrant. His 
association of all references to a person's 'real will' with questionable metaphysical 
theories of selfhood lead him to the absurd position of finding nothing incompatible 
between freedom and autocracy - or at least with lack of democracy.' Finally, there 
is within negative libertarianism a naive conviction that freedom can only be 
understood by reference to lack of constraints. Questions relating to what people are 
free to do (when unconstrained) are seen to be unnecessary to a proper analysis of the 
expression 'X is free', it being sufficient to know what it is that X is free from. 
Much of what Berlin has to say is in accordance with this in that he sees nothing odd 
in the idea that a person may be quite clear about what it is from which he would 
rather be free without having any idea what he would like to do when rid of the 
constraint in question. No doubt the context in which the utterance 'I am free' is 
made is, as often as not, indicative of the kind of thing one is free to do, which may 
well make the question 'What are you free to do?' redundant even if it is not a 
logically redundant question. But even where the context does not clearly indicate 
the options available to one thus freed, the individual in question must have some idea 
(however minimal) of what he would like to do now that he is free even if his only 
desire is to distance himself as far as possible from his former constraints. 
The central idea of negative freedom is encapsulated in Berlin's claim that: 
`I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body 
of men interfere with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is 
simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.' 13 
In suggesting that freedom is no more than absence of obstacles to desire-satisfaction 
negative freedom certainly possesses the virtue of simplicity. Indeed, it is precisely 
this feature which other writers within the negative tradition have found so 
attractive.' Questions of the adequacy of this aside, it is a view with which Berlin 
became dissatisfied. As he was later to concede, if to be free is no more than not 
being prevented by others from doing whatever one wishes, then one way of attaining 
freedom is to extinguish one's wishes. 
`If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, 
I could increase freedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by 
satisfying them; I could render men (including myself) free by 
conditioning them into losing the original desires which I have decided 
not to satisfy.' 15 
In the more recent essay he says that: 
`The sense of freedom in which I use this term, entails not simply the 
absence of frustration ... but the absence of obstacles to possible 
choices and activities.' 
And these obstacles are of a certain sort, namely those resulting from alterable human 
practices.' 	 This is, quite properly, to reject the earlier insistence that lack of 
freedom involves the deliberate interference of others. Berlin accepts that all kinds 
of social practices, including economic and educational policies, can deny freedom 
as effectively as deliberate interference with people's goals and aspirations. What 
is important is the fact that those practices constitutive of unfreedom are alterable and 
not merely their having been deliberately devised with the intention of depriving 
sections of the community of particular freedoms.' 
William Parent rejects Berlin's later view that freedom properly conceived is the 
absence of obstacles resulting from alterable human practices to possible choices and 
activities on the grounds that illness, ignorance, bias and hatred often constitute 
obstacles to a person's acting in various ways, and they often result from alterable 
human practices. Yet, he says, 'we do not say that a person who is prevented from 
pursuing a given activity by illness, ignorance, bias or hatred resulting from alterable 
human practices has been rendered unfree in the political sense to do so.'19 Parent 
tells us why not. 'The terms "liberty" and "opportunity" have distinct meanings. 
19 
Depriving someone of the liberty to act is not the same thing as refusing him the 
opportunity to do so, and the problem of increasing and distributing freedom cannot 
be reduced to a question about the maximisation of opportunities.' Apart from the 
fact that Parent seems to be operating with a quaint and exceedingly restrictive notion 
of 'political', it is not at all self-evident that the distinction between 'opportunity' and 
`liberty' is as easy to maintain as Parent would have us believe. 
As to whether Berlin would distinguish between the two is not entirely clear. He 
says in one place that freedom 'is the opportunity to act, not action itself' .21 While 
on the very next page we are told that: 
`It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of 
its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to 
make use of his legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon 
him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated. 	 The 
obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of 
living, to provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and the 
sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or 
arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not 
necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to the 
conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to values which 
may be independent of it. And still liberty is one thing and the 
conditions for it are another. '22 
Whatever one concludes about Berlin's apparent lack of consistency it is important 
to realise that opportunities do not exist out there, as it were, as something totally 
divorced from those who would make use of them. Unless I am in a position to 
take advantage of a set of circumstances, which presupposes possession of the 
requisite wherewithal, then it is idle to pretend that I enjoy any such opportunity. 
What sense does it make to tell a semi-literate or a child that countless educational 
or career opportunities are open to him if he lacks the basic requisites which such 
routes demand? One of the major difficulties with negative libertarianism is that it 
all too readily assumes that as long as there are no (external) constraints on a course 
of action then freedom of opportunity exists. In the next section I attempt to show 
what is wrong in this by indicating the shortcomings of that view of constraint which 
sees it as primarily external to people and why the mere removal of constraint is only 
one part of a proper and adequate account of what it is to be free. 
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In fairness to Berlin he is at least aware of many of the dangers implicit in the idea 
of negative freedom. He is swift to point out that advocacy of non-interference such 
as Social-Darwinism was, and indeed still is, used to support policies which benefit 
the strong at the expense of the weak, and he is quite aware of the evils of a totally 
unmanaged economy. 	 And yet he insists that 'the case for social legislation or 
planning, for the welfare state and socialism, can be constructed with as much 
validity from consideration of the claims of negative liberty as those from its positive 
brother'' without saying how this is possible. It is unclear how the case for social 
legislation can be constructed by reference to negative freedom alone without allowing 
the distinction between it and positive freedom to collapse. The whole point of 
nineteenth and twentieth century legislation restricting laissez-faire capitalism was to 
provide people with greater opportunities whereby they could enjoy more freedom 
than before. 
Before turning to Berlin's treatment of positive freedom I wish to take issue with his 
claim that freedom is compatible with autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of 
self-government.' That Berlin should believe this is quite extraordinary in view of 
his clear recognition of the importance of the existence of alternative (and not merely 
any old alternative) courses of action available to free agents. 	 After all, a 
democratic form of institutional arrangements provides for ways and means of 
changing public policy lacking in any other system of decision-making procedure. 
When people are denied the means of voicing their objections and the means of 
translating this into a concerted policy for change it is not only democracy that is 
being denied to them; they are also rendered less free than they might otherwise be. 
Needless to say there are numerous theories of democracy a full discussion of which 
is unnecessary. The form of democracy which I see as being particularly associated 
with freedom is not the Schumpeterian notion of a competitive struggle for the 
people's vote, the aim of which being the mere selection of an alternative 
leadership.' This form of democracy minimises the importance of participation for 
ordinary people at every level and in every organisation which affects their lives. 
Indeed it could be argued that a purely representative form of democracy actually 
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requires a degree of political apathy in so far as it requires long periods of relative 
quiescence on the part of the electorate in between elections. 	 Participatory 
democracy on the other hand is a richer, more vibrant form of democracy which 
provides opportunities for minority views to be heard and, importantly, considered 
before policy decisions are reached. It allows for the airing of all kinds of views and 
opinions and thereby empowers people who might otherwise go unnoticed and 
unheard. 
Of course, this is not to say that it is a requirement of participatory democracy that 
each and every view is legislated for. That would be absurd because it would be 
impossible to implement. In any case, as individuals we are members of a society 
and in significant respects achieve our identity through membership of groups of 
various kinds within it e.g. family, church and such like. Failure to recognise this 
results in a peculiarly individualistic and atomistic view of freedom and, as we shall 
see, is something which negative libertarians in particular have either ignored or 
misunderstood. Freedom is not something that can be either achieved or guaranteed 
outside institutional frameworks and it is idle to pretend otherwise. This is not to 
say that one is or should be bound by one's group membership which for some may 
well appear coercive and oppressive. Whatever institutions one is either born into 
or subsequently joins there must always remain appropriate mechanisms for allowing 
people to leave or opt out. Only when the social nature of persons is properly 
understood is it possible to appreciate that individual freedom is not necessarily 
threatened by a government's decision to legislate in opposition to what you or I 
might demand as long as certain conditions are embodied and respected within 
legislative procedures. If freedom within a state is to be upheld the authority of the 
state must, according to George Brenkert, fulfil three important conditions. They 
are: 
(i) 	 the decisions and actions of the state must protect the 
self-determination of individuals compatible with a like 
self-determination of others ... 
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(ii) that the state ensures that its citizens may pursue 
reasonable and important human interests (such as 
politics, art, theology and such like as opposed to more 
trivial or less significant goals such as gymnastics) ... 
(iii) a politically free state cannot be one which attempts by 
itself to decide which interests are important and which 
ones are to be supported. Political freedom requires 
that the state not determine simply by itself how society 
operates or individuals live ... qua free these 
determinations must flow from the participation of its 
citizens to the maximum extent feasible.' 
If these conditions are met, the freedom of individuals and legitimate authority of 
democratic government are more compatible than might otherwise be supposed. 
Those subject to despotism are ex-hypothesi limited in their range of options by a will 
which they are powerless to moderate or modify. Liberty and democracy simply 
cannot be construed as having no bearing on one another such that answers to the 
questions 'What am I free to do or be?' and 'By whom am I ruled?' are logically 
distinct and presuppose different concepts of freedom. In fact Berlin believes that 
the desire for freedom and the desire for self-government are desires for different 
things. So different moreover 'as to have led in the end to the great clash of 
ideologies that dominates our world. For it is this - the "positive" conception of 
liberty: not freedom from, but freedom to - to lead one prescribed form of life -
which the adherents of the "negative" notion represent as being, at times, no better 
than specious disguise for brutal tyranny.' 
In the decade between the Inaugural Lecture and the publication of Four Essays on 
Liberty Berlin's hostility towards positive freedom went unmodified. What he means 
by positive freedom is clearly expressed in the following passage: 
`The positive sense of the word "liberty" derives from the wish on the 
part of the individual to be his own master .... 	 I wish to be the 
instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be 
a subject, not an object, to be moved by reasons not by causes which 
affect me, as it were from the outside. I wish to be ... self-directed 
and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a 
thing, or an animal, that is of conceiving goals and policies of my own 
and realising them.... I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as 
a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices 
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and being able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and 
purposes.'' 
He condemns those who take freedom to have anything to do with self-mastery, for 
two reasons. Firstly there is, he believes, implicit in this notion a bifurcation of the 
self which he sees as a metaphysical extravagance. Secondly, such a view has the 
unfortunate consequence of conceiving of the real self as something wider than the 
individual - something as wide as the tribe, race, church or state, which, by imposing 
its collective organic will upon its recalcitrant members, achieves its own and 
therefore their own 'higher' freedom. 	 What begins with a harmless enough 
metaphor of self-mastery ends up as something more properly described as coercion 
or tyranny. Before we know where we are we find ourselves being told what a short 
step it is from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility to an authoritarian state 
obedient to the directions of an elite of Platonic (or Stalinist) guardians. 	 The 
laudable concept of self-mastery is denigrated as tantamount to despotism. And yet 
it is not clear from what he says that he believes the progression from the desire for 
self-mastery to the authoritarian excesses he so graphically describes is one of logical 
necessity or mere probability. 
In fact there is no reason to suppose that it is either. Indeed without some reference 
to self-mastery we would be left with a merely negative conception in which there is 
no room for what Charles Taylor calls 'qualitative discrimination as to motive' 
without which talk of a person exercising his freedom would be empty. Taylor 
concludes: 'Even where we think of freedom as the absence of external obstacles, 
it is not the absence of obstacles simpliciter, for we make discriminations between 
obstacles in representing more or less serious infringements of freedom. And we do 
this because we deploy the concept against a background understanding that certain 
goals and actions are more significant than others.'' This is enough to show that 
degrees of freedom are to be determined not by reference to the quantity of 
restrictions removed; some reference to the qualitative significance attached to 
various options is unavoidable. 
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It is disingenuous of Berlin to assume that those of us wishing to emphasise the 
importance of being able to determine one's ends for oneself by reference to 
judgements relating to the relative significance of such ends should assume that we 
are committed to the outrageous premise that the ends of all rational beings must fit 
into a single universal harmonious pattern. No account of what it is to be fully 
human or truly free can dispense with the idea of rational self-direction, for a person 
who was incapable of so directing himself would, to all intents and purposes, be a 
victim of circumstance. 	 Lacking the critical faculties essential to making the 
appropriate qualitative distinctions between his various desires he would be open to 
manipulation and control. 	 To deny the requirement of self-determination in an 
account of freedom is to misunderstand what is involved in interfering with someone's 
freedom. For anyone interfering with actions which are not in part self-determined 
would not, strictly speaking, be interfering with a person's freedom at all. A full 
discussion of what is involved in self-determination must be deferred until Section 6. 
Meanwhile we must terminate this all too brief account of the two concepts view 
because it is becoming all too evident that a satisfactory account of freedom has to 
face up to the question of what it is that the agent, freed from the relevant constraint, 
is free to do. There is sufficient reason to cast doubt on the validity of the claim that 
there is a conceptual distinction between two fundamentally opposed kinds of 
freedom. Furthermore the attempt to drive a wedge between two distinct concepts 
does nothing more than obscure the proper nature of the dispute about freedom. 
Rather than try and specify what freedom is, it is more profitable and more important 
to concentrate attention on the range and limits of what free people are free from and 
what they are free to do or become. 
In a well-known paper Gerald MacCallum makes the following claim: 
`Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is 
freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or 
barrier to doing, not doing, becoming or not becoming something. 
Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents) from 
something to do, not do, become or not become something; it is a 
triadic relation. Taking the format "X is (is not) free from y to do 
(not do, become, not become) z". X ranges over agents, y ranges 
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over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, 
interferences and barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of 
character or circumstance.' 
And he adds: 
`When reference to one of these terms is missing in such a discussion 
of freedom, it should be only because the reference is thought to be 
understood from the context of the discussion.'3°  
A very similar formulation is provided by Joel Feinberg as follows: 
`--- is free from --- to do (or omit, or be, or have) 
The respective blanks being filled in by naming the subject, specifying the constraint 
or compulsion as well as the action, omission or state of being actually or 
hypothetically desired. 
Such a scheme at least provides us with a fruitful way in which to proceed. Section 
2 will concentrate on the second of the term variables. Its limits will be made 
explicit and the range of what may legitimately count as a constraint will be extended 
beyond the narrow boundaries imposed upon it by some negative libertarians. 
Although it is probably a more straightforward variable than the final one in the 
triadic schema in that in many ways it is easier to specify the sorts of things from 
which people are free than their more positive requirements, it is far from a 
straightforwardly descriptive exercise. In fact it was largely because of the belief 
that a non-evaluative account of freedom could be provided by concentrating for the 
most part on external constraints that negative libertarians have been attracted by the 
prospect of providing an account of freedom in negative terms. Because all 
statements to the effect that 'X is free' are supposed to be understood without 
reference to disputable political theories, disagreements over whether 'X is free' or 
not are thought to be entirely factual in nature. The assumption is that a purely 
objective and neutral account of coercion can be provided without reference to what 
people care about or value, or the sorts of thing in which people have a genuine stake 
or interest. Freedom is seen as no more than the absence of coercion and is thus 
essentially negative in the sense (Hayek tells us) that peace, security, quiet or the 
absence of any impediment is negative. Freedom, on this view 'does not assure us 
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of any particular opportunities, but leaves us to decide what we shall make of the 
opportunities in which we find ourselves.' While according to Steiner threats may 
well alter a person's desires with regard to the performance of certain actions 'but 
neither the making of threats nor that of offers constitute a diminution of personal 
liberty.' Before exposing the shortcomings of negative libertarianism vis a vis the 
nature of constraints we need to evaluate some of the numerous attempts that have 
been made to restrict freedom to something purely negative. 
1.2 What is Wrong with Negative Freedom? 
Attempts to characterise freedom in terms of the mere absence of physical obstacles 
to action extend back to at least the time of Hobbes who claimed that: 
`Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not 
contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. As for 
example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to 
descend by the channel of a river, because there is no impediment that 
way, but not across because the banks are impediments. And though 
the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to 
ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the 
nature of the water and intrinsical.' 
The problem with this of course is that people, unlike flowing water, are purposeful 
beings acting in accordance with belief-systems and values and freedom has to do 
with actions rather than mere movement with clear implications for the first variable 
in the triadic schema. The presumption here is that X is a creature capable of acting 
(as opposed to simply moving). Even if there are reasons for supposing that other 
creatures than human beings are capable of agency the present discussion is 
specifically concerned with human freedom and side-steps issues relating to both the 
nature of action and the sufficient conditions of personhood. While disputes over the 
nature of freedom centre around all three variables, the second (y) and third (z) 
variables generate questions of such special significance and interest that this essay 
takes it for granted that the X variable refers to persons and that this is less 
problematic a notion than in reality it is. The 'cause' of human action lies in part 
in the circumstances in which it takes place as well as its being seen or understood 
in a certain light. As Benn says: although 'we can give a causal account of trying 
and deciding, we can grasp the thrust of those concepts only by taking account of the 
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causal effectiveness upon action of a belief system, which supplies a kind of 
independence - a cause "intrinsical" - that neither waterfalls nor motors possess.' 
It is precisely because we discriminate between one obstacle and another by reference 
to our evaluation of a situation that freedom cannot be equated with the mere absence 
of obstacles. 
The prima facie attractiveness of the Hobbesian view of freedom as the absence of 
external obstacles is its obvious simplicity. But the price of simplicity is an account 
of freedom which not only fails to recognise manifest instances of unfreedom as such 
but is willing to include amongst instances of unfreedom those constraints on actions 
which no sane person would wish to perform. I might be denied the opportunity to 
kill myself by being tied to a locomotive engine wheel but what would that have to 
do with loss of freedom? As Berm reminds us: 'It is just because the concept of 
freedom is most at home in formulating complaints and grievances in claiming rights 
and demanding consideration of one's interests, that the functional range of the notion 
of freedom of action is bounded, practically if not logically, by notions of what there 
can be a reason to form an intention to do.' And it is an inadequate account in 
that it fails (because of its inability) to distinguish between one obstacle and another 
in terms of their contribution to lack of freedom. To borrow a familiar example of 
Charles Taylor's comparing life in Hoxa's Tirana with that of contemporary 
Londoners: 
`We recognise that religion has been abolished in Albania, whereas it 
hasn't been in Britain. But on the other hand there are probably far 
fewer traffic lights per head in Tirana than London .... Suppose an 
apologist for Albanian socialism was nevertheless to claim that this 
country was freer than Britain, because the number of acts restricted 
was far smaller. After all, only a minority of Londoners practise 
some religion in public places, but all have to negotiate their way 
through traffic. Those who do practise a religion generally do so on 
one day of the week, while they are held up at traffic lights every day. 
In sheer quantitative terms, the number of acts restricted by traffic 
lights must be greater than that restricted by a ban on public religious 
practice. 	 So if Britain is considered a free society, why not 
Albania?'" 
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The moral of this story is that even a negative conception of freedom cannot dispense 
with some sort of qualitative distinction between options which casts serious doubts 
on any attempt to portray freedom in entirely value-neutral terms. In an important 
footnote to Four Essays on Liberty Berlin recognised as much when he admitted that 
the extent of one's freedom depends inter alia on the value one ascribes to 
`possibilities of action' .38 As we shall see, this is an important concession and a 
radical departure from what one might call 'descriptive negative libertarianism' in that 
it recognises that there is more to the evaluative nature of judgements relating to 
freedom than mere subjective preference. Moreover, (something which I hope to 
demonstrate in due course) the extent of my freedom is partly dependent on the value 
of the alternatives available irrespective of my valuing them as such. 
It is unfortunate that Berlin provides no hint of possible criteria by reference to which 
we are to make the necessary qualitative distinctions. 'Meaningful choice' cannot 
be accounted for in purely quantitative terms as if the extent of my freedom were 
solely a function of the number of options at my disposal, for the very idea of a 
`range' of possible choices is itself dependent on evaluative judgements of various 
kinds and it becomes increasingly difficult to identify something as a genuine 
alternative without reference to a wide-ranging package of normative considerations 
relating to human nature, real interests, rationality, well-being and the like, the result 
of which is a profound scepticism for the whole enterprise of trying to disassociate 
the nature of freedom from its value or from reasons why anyone should be 
concerned with its promotion. In short, it is doubtful that freedom and the value of 
freedom are anything other than conceptually related. 	 Recalling Berm and 
Weinstein's claim that 'it is appropriate to discuss whether (one) is free to do 
(something) only if it is a possible object of reasonable choice'," Connolly continues 
in the same vein by suggesting that 'Without the normative point of view from which 
the concept is formed we would have no basis for deciding what "descriptive terms" 
to include or exclude in the definition' .' It is, after all, perfectly legitimate to 
question the value of being free from external constraints. 
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We need look no further than Mill's On Liberty to find two possible explanations of 
why we value liberty so highly. 	 The first, and broadly utilitarian account of 
freedom's value is that it is instrumental in exposing falsehood and enabling us to 
discover truths which would be denied to us if we were otherwise constrained. It 
would be mistaken to deny the unquestionable instrumental value of freedom in this 
respect. If the spirit of enquiry is not to die out completely we must be allowed to 
ask questions and be allowed the requisite means for answering them. But Mill's 
justification goes further than a strictly utilitarian value structure would warrant. 
Mill recognised that there was an intrinsic value in being free because of its 
connection with individuality or what we would refer to as personal autonomy. 
Without freedom and the opportunities upon which its meaningful exercise depends 
our autonomy, and all that this entails as far as our dignity and self-respect are 
concerned, will inevitably be circumscribed. 	 For the most part we object to 
constraints on our chosen course of action because it is an interference with the 
exercise of autonomy the importance of which for personal well-being cannot be 
overstated. It is frequently suggested that freedom's worth is bound up with the 
importance we attach to attempts to satisfy our desires. Clearly freedom has 
something to do with this but the connection is not as self-evident as some negative 
libertarians would have us believe, and some of the difficulties associated with this 
view of freedom are outlined in subsequent sections. 
If normative considerations are conceptually tied to any plausible characterisation of 
freedom in the way being suggested, then there are serious difficulties facing negative 
libertarians who dispute the conceptual connection between freedom and its exercise. 
We have seen how Parent tried to force a distinction between freedom and 
opportunity and how Berlin was not entirely consistent in what he had to say on this. 
What we are in need of is clarification of the extent to which freedom could be 
construed as an opportunity concept and if so in which sense. 
We may interpret the idea of 'having an opportunity' in purely negative terms such 
that anyone not subject to constraints of a relevant kind may be said to possess an 
opportunity. Opportunities on this view are no more than lack of obvious obstacles. 
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But if we are to go along with the view that our reason for valuing freedom so highly 
is largely concerned with our exercising some control over our lives, then it is an 
unnecessarily restrictive use of the term. An opportunity could just as easily and 
much more plausibly be construed as having something to do with possessing the 
relevant capacities, abilities and powers. Freedom is indeed valuable but for reasons 
related to its exercise; options available to me must be those of which I am able to 
take advantage. It is to mock the poor, the dispossessed and those who are ignorant 
of alternative possibilities to insist that opportunities are simply there for the taking. 
Because of his strong attachment to freedom as a descriptive concept, Oppenheim 
may be accused of exactly that. For he says that: `Y makes X unfree to do x if Y 
prevents X from doing x, but not if Y merely fails to make it possible for X to do x.'41  
In other words if it were government policy to do nothing to alleviate poverty in spite 
of the available means, it would be improper to include those in the poverty trap 
along with others whom we might wish to describe as unfree. 
As we shall see in the next section there are good reasons for doubting the plausibility 
of restricting what are to count as constraints on freedom to intentional as opposed 
to unintended and impersonal social factors preventing people from opting for 
particular courses of action. The distinction between constraint and failure to enable 
is not as sharp as Oppenheim would have us believe, and providing that we have 
criteria for identifying those who may legitimately be held responsible for failure to 
enable, we are not reduced to including almost everybody as constraining agents in 
the way that Oppenheim suggests.' 	 People may not only be deprived of 
opportunities in the sense that they are denied the requisite facilities - money, 
education or whatever - they may also find that constraints are such that they are 
denied the opportunity of even conceiving of alternatives from which to choose. The 
greater the opportunity for acquiring an understanding of those factors which 
contributed to one's seeing the world in one way rather than another, the better one 
is placed to do something about it and, accordingly, enjoy greater freedom. As 
Brenkert remarks, opportunities do not exist independently of a person (and his or her 
abilities and powers) for whom the opportunity is said to exist." While 
acknowledging the obvious difference between opportunity and ability in that one may 
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have the latter without the former, Brenkert reminds us that all too often 'bare' 
opportunities are the object of focus as in say job opportunities. But to the extent 
that we are concerned with real or genuine opportunities we are equally concerned 
with the abilities, means and ipso facto the motivation of individual people.' And 
this is why there is more to the provision of opportunities for freedom than the mere 
removal of constraints. 
Negative libertarians from Hobbes onwards have been at pains to force a distinction 
between freedom and power and the associated means whereby people possess the 
appropriate abilities to exercise their freedom. Hayek is particularly clear on why 
the distinction should be upheld. 
`The confusion of liberty as power with liberty in its original meaning 
inevitably leads to the identification of liberty with wealth; and this 
makes it possible to exploit all the appeal which the word liberty 
carries in support for a demand for the redistribution of wealth. Yet 
though freedom and wealth are both good things which most of us 
desire and though we often need both to obtain what we wish, they 
still remain different. Whether or not I am my own master and can 
follow my own choice and whether the possibilities from which I must 
choose are many or few are two entirely different questions.' 
While Partridge appeals to what he calls 'ordinary language'. 
`If I ask "Am I free to walk into the Pentagon?" the question will be 
clearly understood; but if I ask, "Am I free to walk across the 
Atlantic Ocean?" the appropriate answer will be "You are free to, if 
you can." This suggests the main argument: the linking of "being 
free to" with "having the capacity or power" deprives the word "free" 
of its essential and unequivocal function, which is to refer to a 
situation or state of affairs in which a man's choice of how he acts is 
not deliberately forced or restrained by another man. '46 
While the relationship between physical (in)ability and freedom is explored more 
thoroughly in the next section we can readily accept Partridge's claim that 'freedom' 
and 'power' are not synonymous but appeals to ordinary language have limited utility 
in this context. While they may not mean the same it may well be the case that any 
freedom worth having presupposes effective power. 
	 My freedom to run for 
President is effectively non-existent if I lack the necessary means, financial and 
otherwise, to campaign. The fact that I have no desire to become President has no 
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bearing at all on the value of that particular freedom. The distinction is particularly 
difficult to sustain where power and abilities are the very conditions of free action -
something Benn refers to as 'objective choice conditions' - or states of the world 
independent of the agent's beliefs - and not merely conditions which render freedom 
valuable in the way suggested by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. 
`The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a 
result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is 
sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall 
not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as 
affecting the worth of liberty ...'47 
In fact possessing an ability or power has both an objective and subjective dimension 
in that it is partly a function of external circumstances and partly a function of 
personal characteristics. 	 However before considering the relationship between 
freedom and power it is perhaps appropriate to take stock. So far we have found the 
distinction between two radically opposed conceptions of freedom to be found wanting 
and have seen how any expression of the form 'X is free' is incomplete without some 
reference to what it is that he is free to do or be. We have had reason to doubt the 
appropriateness of restricting the nature of the middle term variable (constraints) to 
factors intentionally imposed and external to the agent in question in spite of the 
obvious appeal of simplicity. Since qualitative distinctions between available options 
are unavoidable, freedom cannot be understood in purely descriptive terms. For this 
reason the simplistic view of equating freedom with absence of constraints to doing 
what one wants is equally unacceptable. And yet this view in one form or another 
continues to find a measure of support. Both freedom and well-being have been 
interpreted in terms of desire-satisfaction in one or more of its formulations and as 
the essay proceeds it is hoped that the attraction of such a view will be progressively 
undermined. Having seen that a positive dimension to freedom is indispensable we 
need to find the means whereby the third term variable in the triadic schema can be 
rendered intelligible and alternatives identified by reference to something other than 
merely being desired. As Berlin quite properly insists, freedom is concerned with 
`the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities.'" 
	 Any account of 
freedom which ignores the importance of alternatives is hopelessly attenuated. It is 
therefore incumbent upon us to provide an account of the nature and importance of 
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alternatives and in so doing be better placed to appreciate the conceptual connection 
between freedom and power. Such an account will take us some way towards a richer 
and altogether more positive account of freedom than that associated with liberal 
individualism. 
Unfortunately it is far from easy to decide how to set about individuating alternatives 
in a given choice situation. An example, not altogether fanciful in this day and age, 
should enable us to pin-point the difficulties involved. Liam lives in Londonderry 
and has just left school with three GCSEs. On visiting the Job Centre he is told that 
he is one of several hundred men and women in pursuit of a handful of jobs most of 
which are out of the question in view of his meagre qualifications. In this sense they 
are not real or genuine alternatives at all. The picture is not all black however for 
there are a couple of possibilities which Liam might like to consider. 	 A local 
greengrocer is looking for an assistant and a new American-based company requires 
casual labour for night work. Liam is willing to try anything in view of the job 
situation and has to rapidly make up his mind between the relatively pleasant shop 
work and the boring yet better paid night work in the factory. There is little doubt 
that those of us with stimulating and well paid jobs would accept either with 
equanimity, but what about Liam's freedom? Given the limited information we 
possess about his background we do not know if his poor exam results are due to lack 
of application on his part or to poor teaching, or, if the former, whether this was due 
to laziness or to the problems associated with parental neglect. But in this particular 
example I wish to consider not the constraint factor in Liam's overall freedom nor the 
extent to which he is autonomous and capable of taking into consideration all of the 
relevant factors involved in the choice of job (or for that matter to reject both and 
either return to full-time education or take up residence with his sister and look for 
work in England). Instead I want to try and show how meaningful choice between 
alternatives is not only a function of their number but is dependent on much else 
besides. Liam has at least got a choice and thus is free to some extent. On the 
other hand if he had a degree, together with all that went with it in terms of 
references, confidence and so on, he would have a much wider range of alternatives 
from which to choose. As such we would be justified in suggesting that he would be 
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freer to a much greater extent. It remains to be seen why this is so. I referred 
earlier to an important footnote of Berlin's in which he says: 
`The extent of my freedom seems to depend on (a) how many 
possibilities are open to me (although the method of counting these can 
never be more than impressionistic. Possibilities of action are not 
discreet entities like apples, which can be exhaustively enumerated); 
(b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualise; (c) 
how important in my plan of life, given my character and 
circumstances, these possibilities are when compared with each other; 
(d) how far they are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; (e) 
what value not merely to the agent, but the general sentiment of the 
society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities. All these 
magnitudes must be "integrated", and a conclusion, necessarily never 
precise, or indisputable, drawn from this process.' 
There is much in this passage with which we can agree. Certainly choice without 
alternatives from which to choose is empty. And yet the notion of 'alternative 
choice' is very much underdescribed as well as being more problematic than the 
above quotation would suggest. However, with certain qualifications, Berlin is right 
to suggest that the extent of my freedom is related to the number of alternatives open 
to me. And yet it is notoriously difficult to individuate one from another. I am 
free to write this paragraph in a number of different ways but the question 'How 
many ways?' is impossible to answer. If on the other hand I am prevented from 
publishing my thoughts on the grounds that they are critical of the government, my 
freedom is diminished considerably. Censorship and its associated sanctions combine 
to constrain me in important respects. If my thoughts remain unpublished owing to 
technical difficulties to do with supply of materials or industrial action it is 
problematic as to whether or not my freedom is affected. And does performing an 
action with my left hand as opposed to my right, or doing it before or after lunch 
count as having more than one alternative? The decision is, perhaps, arbitrary and 
for the most part of no significance. It becomes important when we are deprived of 
something to which we may legitimately attach value and significance. Berlin is thus 
quite right to suggest that my overall freedom is affected by factors relating to value 
and importance as well as the difficulty and probability of actualising the alternative 
in question - to which might be added various subjective choice conditions such as the 
ability to conceive of it and to appreciate its value as well as the strength of will to 
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pursue it or whatever. But before considering these it is necessary to draw attention 
to some of the problems associated with identifying alternatives for what they are. 
One thing which cannot be invoked in the individuation of options is the willingness 
with which someone chooses it. I may willingly choose to do that which failure so 
to do would result in such severe punishment that the possibility of doing otherwise 
with impunity is not a genuine alternative. If A is compulsory and failure to comply 
results in severe sanctions such that no reasonably prudent person would dream of not 
complying, one is not free with respect to A. Refusal to comply and to take the 
punishment instead is hardly an alternative if the sanction is severe. That prudence 
and rationality are indispensable to the very individuation of options is obvious where 
the sanctions imposed for refusal to comply result in being tortured. Indeed if the 
person who was about to inflict the torture was himself likely to be tortured if he 
refused to carry out his grisly orders it would be equally inappropriate to retort with 
confidence 'But you are still free to disobey.' The reason why his freedom to refuse 
is circumscribed is because of the import of the notion of a reasonably prudent 
person. So called alternatives which are inexorably associated with truly appalling 
sanctions are no longer alternatives. To be regarded as such they must be seen 
under the heading of 'possible objects of rational choice'. To those who would 
question the view that at least a minimum degree of rationality is necessary to 
freedom on the grounds that irrational choices however imprudent or harmful are 
choices nonetheless, the reply would be that while it is quite true that there is nothing 
incompatible with being a chooser and choosing that which is detrimental to one's 
long-term interests including one's capacity for future choice, we are here concerned 
with what is involved in the living of a free life. The extent to which a choice has 
a bearing on such a life depends on the extent to which it is based on self-knowledge 
and understanding as well as the nature of the objects of choice and probable 
consequences of so choosing. Ignorance or lack of concern in this regard may well 
render a choice irrational and where it is reasonable to suppose that such ignorance 
is the direct responsibility of a third party, may be said to render X as chooser unfree 
in crucial respects. 
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Rationality is thus an indispensable notion in characterising the third variable in the 
triadic schema. To dispense with it - to argue that X is free from constraint y to 
choose to z in spite of such threats - would be to side with those who refuse to 
acknowledge that threats or sanctions are constraints. Benn and Weinstein take this 
to be wilfully perverse. 	 After all is it not the case that the incompatibility of 
freedom and coercion is what classical liberalism is all about? And they rightly 
conclude that 'the point of denying that a threatened penalty is sufficient to determine 
the agent's action is to challenge the usual prudential defence. The agent's counter-
plea that in his circumstances only a saint or a fanatic would have disobeyed is a 
claim that the wrong standards are being applied to him, i.e. he could not be expected 
to disregard normal prudence.'' To dispense with the idea of rational choice is to 
give up a great deal. Witness the incomprehension involved in being told of two 
prisoners who are so tightly bound together that the slightest movement causes 
extreme pain, that they are still free to move their limbs. The most that could be 
said of the two captives is that they are still able to move their limbs and, one might 
add in view of their predicament, if they so wish. 
To return to the question of significance in the enumeration of alternatives. If the 
alternatives open to one are all much of a muchness it is true to say that one is not 
as free as one would be if the range and variety were greater. I may have the choice 
of attending church or staying at home on Sundays, but if I were permitted to attend 
only Protestant churches I would be less free than someone who was allowed to 
attend Catholic Churches, Orthodox churches or Hari Krishna Temples. Pupils in 
the later stages of schooling are often presented with options from which to choose. 
But a pupil who may choose between social studies, classical studies and politics has 
less of a range of choice than one who has amongst a list of options subjects as 
different from one another as drama, design technology and psychology. As often as 
not what makes one alternative a different kind of thing to something else is 
subjective and impressionistic, but it is important not to accept an individual's 
assessment as always being the relevant and determining factor. After all, if a pupil 
had nothing with which to compare his range of options he might well believe that 
the options on offer were indeed wide-ranging. Having never heard of psychology 
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his judgement would be affected accordingly. This is why schools have a duty to 
introduce pupils to as wide a range of disciplines and ways of life as is compatible 
with the aim of producing educated people with some insight into human flourishing. 
A school which simply introduced its pupils to a wide variety of things just for the 
sake of it would be utterly counterproductive in terms of contributing to its pupils' 
overall freedom. It would take very little imagination to fill up a timetable with 
nothing more than one game or activity after another (such as tiddly-winks, billiards, 
badminton, ballroom dancing, clay-pigeon shooting, rounders and so on). Education 
is not just a matter of increasing the number and variety of alternatives but of 
equipping pupils with whatever is necessary to take advantage of alternatives, the 
significance and value of which are recognised and appreciated. The very least that 
is involved here is equipping them to become rational choosers. 
If an increase in the number and variety of alternatives contributes to the overall 
freedom of someone, can we say with equal certainty that the absence of alternatives 
is always and necessarily a restriction on his freedom? The answer depends on the 
extent to which anyone can be held responsible for such a lack of choice. Lawrence 
Crocker believes that he is now free to eat breakfast in Paris and supper in Seattle on 
the same day, while nobody was free to do this a century ago: the reason being, of 
course, the availability of the jet aeroplane.' Crocker is indeed free to do this since 
(a) the physical means are available and (b) nobody can be held responsible if 
Crocker fails to avail himself of such an opportunity. Even so, he is wrong to 
suppose that his great-great grandfather was unfree so to do. Crocker senior simply 
lacked the available means of travelling at such high speeds and there is no reason to 
believe that anyone was responsible for this which is to say that he was neither free 
nor unfree to do this but merely unable. The unavailability of an alternative is 
therefore insufficient to justify an individual complaining of lack of freedom. 
What is it then about certain options which makes them significant while others 
remain utterly inconsequential as far as freedom is concerned? 
	 Consider the 
difference between preventing people from playing hopscotch and forbidding the 
formation of political parties or forcibly sterilising large numbers of people in the 
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interests of reducing the rate of population increase. If hopscotch were banned then 
the sum total of individual freedom would indeed be reduced, albeit only very slightly 
and not significantly. If games in general were no longer permitted people would 
have a legitimate reason to complain of a gross infringement of their liberty. Games 
are, after all, a very important aspect of many people's lives. However the banning 
of political parties is of infinitely greater significance than the banning of a particular 
game such as hopscotch. Politics matters in a way that hopscotch does not. My 
political views stem, in large part, from my moral views and my moral views are 
dependent on those fundamental evaluations which help define me as the person I am. 
What of the law leading to my compulsory sterilisation? Suppose that instead of 
becoming a father I have decided to join a monastic community because I attach 
greater personal importance to a celibate life devoted to prayer than that of husband 
and father. Whatever the attractions of life as a monk I doubt whether any monk 
would deny the value of the role of fatherhood; valuable, moreover, in a sense much 
more profound than that of a life filled with numerous games of hopscotch. When 
all is said and done games have no ultimate significance. It does not really matter 
who wins or loses and one can satisfy one's need to play or to exercise in a variety 
of ways. On the other hand to be forcibly sterilised in advance of having fathered 
any children is a gross violation of a fundamental human right irrespective of whether 
or not I choose to exercise that right. The fact that I have chosen a plan of life 
which is incompatible with fatherhood is irrelevant. Criteria of significance are not 
reducible to what a person happens to want. To suggest as much is, as Taylor so 
clearly demonstrates, either vacuous or false.' It would be trivially true if we 
simply defined significance in terms of the strongly desired and false on the grounds 
that we simply do not always have a greater desire for that which we know to be of 
significance to our life-plan'; not only do we experience certain desires as 
intrinsically more significant than others, but we are all too painfully aware of the 
fact that many of our most strongly felt desires are incompatible with what we really 
want in the sense that the object of desire is the object of one's will.' Fatherhood 
is a significant alternative not because many men happen to want it very much but 
because parenthood is something to which most people attach ultimate significance 
39 
and find deeply fulfilling. As such it is seen under a very different aspect from that 
of winning a game. 
The charge of authoritarianism is frequently levelled against those of us who would 
wish to retain a conceptual link between freedom and opting for alternatives of 
genuine value and significance. If all that was being maintained was the suggestion 
that were someone to pursue certain goals on the basis of their having been deemed 
as in his best interests by so called 'experts', then the charge might well have some 
punch. But nothing of the sort is being claimed. The very least that is involved in 
rational choice is that the reasons for doing something should be the agent's reasons. 
Unless one acknowledged or endorsed the rationality or desirability of a particular 
goal one would not be making a rational choice at all; one would simply be acting 
in accordance with some other-determined life-plan. (Even survival itself would 
cease to have any genuine value for me if I were totally indifferent towards living or, 
more plausibly, forced to live a life of endless pain, despair or hopelessness.) It is 
also important to recognise that we frequently attach significance to different aspects 
of our personalities and characters, not to mention the plethora of possibilities 
confronting us in varying degrees as we grow older and assume additional 
responsibilities or change our occupations and life-styles. 	 What seemed to be 
relatively unimportant at one stage in our lives may take on a tremendous value at 
another. The fact that certain alternatives are available - alternatives which are not 
at least irrational or harmful - does therefore contribute to the degree of freedom one 
may be said to enjoy. The point is that they must be alternatives which are at least 
in accordance with rational agency. And there are many things which may well be 
in my interests and be of immense value to me in my life as a whole which, at any 
one time, may be either unwanted or unheard of. Young children may be totally 
unaware of the nature and value of personal autonomy, for example, and yet we have 
good reason to suppose that autonomy is something for which they have a need and 
right in that without it their chances of flourishing in a western industrialised society 
are seriously hampered. The free person must pursue goals which are in accordance 
with his real interests (or at least not incompatible with them) with a certain positive 
attitude. Indifference is incompatible with both rationality and self-determination 
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both of which are prerequisites of free agency. In so far as he could properly be 
said to be choosing anything with indifference he would, in all probability, be 
choosing in accordance with convention or the will of another. 
There might also be thought to be an apparent authoritarianism associated with the 
idea of 'objectively valuable'. Who is to say what is valuable and what right does 
he have to insist that a valued alternative is of little or no value to someone else? 
This question is addressed in 5.4 but without embarking on a lengthy essay in moral 
theory I suggest that it is simply perverse to deny that what is of value to someone 
amounts to nothing more than his valuing it. There is at least no contradiction in the 
idea of my strongest desire being the desire to act in accordance with my real-
interests but when we come to examine more closely what is involved in having a 
real-interest in something we shall see that they all too frequently fail to coincide. 
Certainly unless one were to find room for many of one's strongly felt desires and 
natural proclivities one would, in all probability, find oneself living a frustrating 
existence with its associated tensions and nervous disorders. But the fact remains 
that some kind of regulation of one's desires is essential if one is to stand any chance 
of living one's life in accordance with one's judgements about the most suitable kind 
of life to live. 
Our judgements on these matters are something for which we may be held largely 
responsible. But responsibility for such evaluations presupposes the existence of 
appropriate opportunities such as having access to alternative points of view which 
in turn requires contact with free agents who, by their own evaluations and re-
evaluations, frequently provide us with the incentive to look at things afresh. If the 
only people we ever came across were themselves uncritical and passively obedient 
it would be infinitely more difficult to develop the capacity for critical evaluative 
judgements which are so essential to free agency. It is the challenge and criticism 
provided by other (autonomous) people that help us distinguish error from truth and 
self-delusion from enlightenment. This is why it is irrational to deny others the 
freedom and opportunities which we demand for ourselves. We must be forever 
alert to the fact that we may not have judged correctly where our real-interests lie and 
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the direction in which self-fulfilment and personal well-being is to be found. And 
this is the reason why a shared life with public norms and shared evaluative concepts 
in a common language is all-important. It provides the background against which 
not only the very idea of doing something for a reason gains purchase but which is 
presupposed in choosing or deciding anything at all. Berlin's reference to the value 
placed on alternatives by 'the general sentiment of the society in which one lives' 
underlines the fact we formulate our values in society; they do not arise afresh, ex 
nihilo, in each generation. What is in our interests as individuals is bound up with 
the sentiment of the society of which we are a part. Recognition of the importance 
of society in helping us formulate life-plans does not commit us to crude 
majoritarianism. Important as societal values are, they are not mere generalisations 
about what most people happen to want; instead they refer to the shared evaluative 
concepts in our language and it is by reference to these that we may begin to 
understand what it is for something to count as a 'reason for action'. 
Berlin's claim that freedom depends on the ease or difficulty with which alternatives 
may be actualised is a salutary reminder that we have yet to address the connection 
between freedom and power. The availability of an alternative is largely theoretical 
if I am either denied the requisite means or have to make superhuman efforts to take 
advantage of them. Brenkert is persuasive in linking freedom with what he calls 
`effective self-determination' - something which presupposes having the abilities and 
powers whereby (one) may take advantage of certain opportunities, or real 
alternatives. 	 He is at one with Richard Norman in his conviction that real 
alternatives presuppose being in possession of the means by reference to which 
alternatives become genuine or real. The means identified as crucial in this respect 
and the possession of which enhances one's power and thereby one's freedom are 
both material (Brenkert and Norman) and cognitive (Brenkert) or cultural (Norman). 
Material means include things like health care, adequate housing and resources for 
participating in the political process, all of which require wealth of various kinds 
including money. Poverty is not a natural phenomenon - indeed there is a case for 
saying that poverty in Britain exists because we as a society find it acceptable. It is 
because we do not protest more vehemently against it that we share the collective 
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responsibility for its existence and continuation. 	 For this reason I believe that 
Brenkert is quite correct in alerting us to the ideological function of negative 
freedom's emphasis on the mere absence of physical coercion. If this was all there 
was to being free, those suffering from poverty would themselves be free and 
whatever else they may complain about they could not justifiably complain of lack of 
freedom. 
Information and knowledge as well as the ability to understand it are indispensable 
in being able to recognise a choice as a choice - and this is especially true if the 
choice has a significant bearing on one's identity and one's life-plan. Free access 
to information via media which are themselves free is vital. An equally essential 
prerequisite is the existence of a free and adequately resourced education system. 
It is pointless simply to fill up children's minds with a vast amount of propositional 
knowledge which in itself contributes little to the development of their capacity for 
self-determination. They must be given the opportunity to think and to reflect not 
only about the subject or topic about which they are learning but also about who they 
are, their values, their needs and interests as purposive beings with lives and projects 
of their own. They need to be able to appreciate the socialisation forces that have 
affected all this and to be able (and willing) to re-evaluate their fundamental 
evaluations. 	 Their education should attempt to equip them with the capacities 
required for self-determination and a life of active participation as citizens in a 
democracy. It should concentrate on such matters because without these capacities 
they are less likely to be able to withstand the force of so many external pressures 
and influences where so much of what motivates is vicarious. Education, and in 
particular a system of schooling, should address the question of what it can do to 
ensure a measure of resilience and courage in pupils in order that they might develop 
the wherewithal to resist the pull of inauthentic desires with which we are all too 
familiar. An education system is uniquely placed to help youngsters in this way and 
in the final section a form of compulsory schooling is advocated as being essential for 
the sake of both freedom and human flourishing. 
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Brenkert is perfectly in order in castigating Parent for refusing to concede that failure 
to provide educational opportunities for thinking and reflecting in the way suggested 
is a violation of society's freedom on the grounds that all that is being denied is the 
opportunity to receive an education. As he says, 'a government can reduce or 
undercut political freedom in more ways than one.... (Parent's) approach is 
representative of an erroneous reductionism that seeks to define all of political 
freedom in terms of coercion or constraint. This monomania interferes with our 
understanding of political freedom.' After all it may not be entirely implausible to 
suppose that right-wing ideologues who have dominated the education agenda in 
Britain for over a decade do not despair of the fact that so many people leave school 
with an enthusiasm for reading The Sun and appear to be indifferent to the fact that 
the mass media are, for the most part, organs for a powerful non-elected and 
unrepresentative section of society. Self-determination is more than being able to 
think for oneself; it requires effective means for its exercise. Once again a free 
society requires a democratisation of the media, a much wider and more imaginative 
access to education for people of all ages and stages and a teaching profession that 
is sufficiently astute to be aware of the social and political implications of what they 
are being asked to do by politicians more concerned with rhetoric and their public 
image than the well-being of a genuinely empowered citizenry. 
My concern in most of what follows is with the nature and value of living a free life 
to which there is a great deal more than can possibly be captured in the idea of a free 
action - something with which negative libertarians appear to be stubbornly obsessed. 
It is only when debates about freedom are located in a social context, as opposed to 
the individualist straightjacket into which negative libertarians seem to confine it, that 
we may comfortably part company with those who believe with Mill that all restraint 
qua restraint is an evil. It is precisely because we are more concerned with the life 
of a free person than that of free actions as such - intrinsic value having more to do 
with being the kind of creature that is capable of choosing than with choice as such -
that we are forced to accept that not all constraints are evil. As we shall see, our 
legitimate concern with making choices which are authentically ours necessitates 
interventions restricting our choices which are paternalistic in nature. 
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Paternalism will be seen to have a special legitimacy when dealing with children and 
forcing them to attend school whether they want to or not. We are indeed social 
beings (see Sections 4 and 6) and it is a consequence that our freedom is not 
something that can be secured outside society. Custom and tradition are not as easily 
dispensed with as people like Mill would have us believe. To appreciate the social 
nature of man is to appreciate the fact that other people are not an obvious threat to 
individual liberty. The laws by which we are restrained are the guarantees of our 
freedom in protecting us from molestation and attack from other people. Yet in spite 
of Berlin's claim that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what 
constitutes a self there is in the writings of negative libertarians little to indicate that 
they conceive of persons as anything other than unique and private centres of 
consciousness primarily concerned with satisfying subjective desires. 
45 
2. FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT 
2.1 	 Constraints and Inability 
Although I have chosen to sit down and write, there are many other things that I 
could be doing. 	 I could be washing up, weeding the garden, having a bath, 
campaigning for CND and much more besides. There are also many things I could 
not do - certainly not at the moment. I am unable to prevent my College authorities 
from taking what I consider to be a particularly foolish decision, and I am unable to 
jump out of the bedroom window without hurting myself. None of this, however, 
is particularly interesting or significant. What is interesting and important are the 
circumstances in which it is true to say that my inability is due to lack of freedom, 
i.e. to the fact that I am constrained from doing z as opposed to those circumstances 
where the preventing condition is one of mere inability. If freedom is not to lose all 
possible content the distinction is vital and, in so far as we are able to provide for it, 
we have gone a long way towards providing criteria for the second variable in the 
triadic schema referred to in the previous section. 
The present section is an attempt (a) to extend the range of obstacles to human 
endeavour which may properly be subsumed under the notion of constraint; (b) to 
question the relevance of the distinction between preventing A from 43-ing and failing 
to enable A to 43; (c) to question the plausibility of restricting the notion to either (i) 
that which renders action impossible, or (ii) that which is deliberately imposed, or 
(iii) that which renders action punishable. 
In Four Essays on Liberty Berlin quotes Helvetius with approval: 
`The free man is the man who is not in irons, nor imprisoned in a jail, 
nor terrorized like a slave by the fear of punishment ... it is not lack 
of freedom not to fly like an eagle or swim like a whale.' 
Unqualified approval, however is not the most appropriate response. The first part 
of the claim is questionable. While enslavement and imprisonment are paradigmatic 
cases of constraint, it will be argued that when such obvious preventing conditions 
are removed, it is not necessarily the case that questions of individual freedom no 
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longer arise. As far as the second part of Helvetius's assertion is concerned, it is 
no doubt true to suggest that talk of freedom is out of place in circumstances where 
the impossibility in question arises out of a persons physical make-up. This much 
would seem indisputable. What is interesting is the reason why we should discount 
such preventing conditions as instances of unfreedom. In so doing we are refusing 
to admit that 'X is constrained by y from doing z' and 'Because X finds z impossible 
he is unfree' are necessarily saying the same thing. Whether or not X is made 
unfree by the impossibility of doing z depends on the nature of the impossibility in 
question. Indeed, as we shall see, 'impossibility' turns out to have rather less 
importance to discussions of freedom than might at first appear. 
Before examining this suggestion more closely it is worth drawing attention to 
different kinds of impossibility which, in their different ways, prevent someone from 
doing something. Six different kinds of impossibility have been distinguished by 
White.' 	 They include: (i) logical impossibility (e.g. squaring the circle), (ii) 
impossibility due to 'normal human limitations' (e.g. flying like an eagle), (iii) 
impossibility due to 'more or less distinctive personal limitation' (e.g. listening to the 
radio when stone-deaf), (iv) impossibility due to a natural state of affairs (e.g. 
walking from England to Canada), (v) impossibility due to 'a natural occurrence' 
(e.g. fire or flood), (vi) impossibility due to 'human activity or intervention 
(including forebearances)' (e.g. imprisoned in jail or terrorized like a slave). 
Not all of these different kinds of impossibility are relevant to discussions of freedom; 
the first most obviously so. It would be absurd to invoke the idea of unfreedom to 
cases where the impossibility was due to the logic of the case. The second case is 
so different from the sixth that it serves to go some way towards answering the 
question posed earlier, i.e. why should we accept that impossibility of the sixth kind 
is a constraint on freedom whereas impossibility of the second be disallowed? The 
answer, surely, has something to do with the fact that we are prepared to attribute 
responsibility of some kind to someone for limiting the possible options available to 
somebody imprisoned whereas such responsibility is altogether absent where the 
impossibility is of the kind described by Helvetius. 	 In other words, such an 
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attribution is a demand for justification. Given the value and importance of freedom 
in human life the onus of justification is on those who would deprive us of our 
freedom to make their case. Of those who eliminate or in any way diminish our 
capacity or opportunity for choice, we are always entitled to an account of their 
reasons. This is not to say that every case of responsibility due to human activity 
or intervention is a case of unfreedom. As White himself suggests, X is not made 
unfree because he cannot park his car in a place which is already occupied. He may 
protest that he is as unfree to park his car as if he had been forcibly prevented from 
stopping there by a policeman. But it would be correct to insist that the issue of 
freedom does not arise here. In spite of the fact that someone is responsible for the 
parked car, the responsibility is not of the relevant kind. Unless someone is morally 
responsible for X's predicament it is pointless to complain of a diminution of freedom. 
In this particular situation nobody is responsible in any other than a causal sense. 
Whether or not Y is culpable depends on the circumstances. If X were disabled and 
Y had parked in a space reserved for disabled drivers, then we would want to say that 
X's freedom had been diminished and, if this were the only possible parking space, 
eliminated with respect to the action he had in mind. 	 The significance of the 
difference between both kinds of responsibility cannot be overemphasised. 	 To 
collapse the distinction would make each and every hindrance to human action for 
which someone was causally responsible a constraint upon freedom, and the result 
would be that we should be unfree for most of the time. In order to prevent the idea 
of constraints becoming all-inclusive there is obviously a need to hold onto the idea 
that moral responsibility has special significance. The reason being that freedom is 
at stake only when obstacles to action stand in need of justification. Berm and 
Weinstein express the idea succinctly. 	 'Since freedom is a principle, whatever 
interferes with it demands to be justified; consequently, only those determining 
conditions for which rational agents (God or Man) can be held responsible can qualify 
as interfering with it.' 
As far as cases (iii) - (v) are concerned, more needs to be said. White ignores 
`internal' constraints in his discussion of (iii) but how and why such constraints are 
relevant is a question which is taken up below. White's comments on this kind of 
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impossibility are deficient in that they fail to draw attention to the fact that personal 
limitations are not always the sort of thing which must be forever endured like 
growing old. It may well be the case that the limitation in question could be 
eliminated if more resources were devoted to dealing with it and this raises a host of 
complicated questions to do with the nature of the limitation, the significance to the 
individual and/or society in removing it, the cost and effort involved and so on. 
More needs to be said about obstacles to freedom in general before taking the point 
any further. White is broadly correct in what he has to say about impossibility due 
to natural states of affairs such as the Atlantic ocean, but what counts as natural states 
of affairs does change from time to time. It is now no longer impossible to travel to 
the moon and back though even now, for reasons to do with responsibility outlined 
above, I should want to deny that because I am unable to go there someone is 
necessarily constraining me. I am neither free nor unfree to go to the moon; I am 
merely unable to go at the moment. The question of natural occurrence, White's 
fifth kind of impossibility, is not quite so easy. 	 When the occurrence is purely 
accidental and there is no prospect of the disaster being averted it is reasonable to 
agree with White that those affected should not be deemed unfree. Where the disaster 
and resulting impossibility could have been prevented those affected may legitimately 
impute responsibility to others and to that extent acknowledged to be unfree. 
Impossibility resulting from flood or earthquake is a different kind from that arising 
from an accident due to negligence at a nuclear reactor. Whether or not we are 
entitled to impute responsibility is a matter for debate. The fact remains that it is 
moral responsibility which is the crucial factor.' 
2.2 	 Intentionality and Responsibility 
In view of the fact that some philosophers within the negative tradition have made the 
notion of intentionality play such an important role within their accounts of what it 
is about an obstacle that turns it into a constraint, it is right that we should try and 
assess its significance. Oppenheim, for example, would like to make the deliberate 
or intentional imposition of an obstacle a criterion of moral responsibility. 
According to him, `Y makes X unfree to do x if Y prevents X from doing x, but not 
if Y merely fails to make it possible for X to do x',5 and 'With regard to P, R is 
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unfree to do x if P prevents R from doing x or would punish him if he did .'6 At 
one point in Four Essays on Liberty Berlin says something very similar. 'Coercion 
implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I 
could otherwise act,' although his position is hardly a model of consistency. On the 
very next page he is more flexible. 'The criterion of oppression is the part that I 
believe to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the 
intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes:8 Oppenheim is at least consistent 
and unambiguous. The implications he is prepared to draw are also consistent with 
his initial proposition. 	 Considering the plight of the unemployed after 1929 he 
refuses to concede that they were unfree to find employment on the grounds that the 
Depression was not deliberately caused. 	 True, one could argue that the U.S. 
government before the New Deal might be accused of failing to enable workers to 
find work, but Oppenheim is insistent that 'by not enabling R to do x, P does not 
necessarily make R unable to do so. Only when P makes it impossible for R to do 
x is there ... unfreedom.'9 The acceptability of this position depends on (a) there 
being a clear and meaningful way of distinguishing between constraining and failing 
to enable, and (b) the truth of the assumption that social forces are best excluded from 
restraining conditions. The onus is with Oppenheim and those who agree with him 
to present a sufficiently convincing argument to the effect that there are no cases of 
failure to enable which are at the same time constraints upon someone's freedom. 
Failure to enable will render a person unfree if (i) someone is in a position to take 
precautionary or remedial action in order to eliminate or significantly diminish the 
impact of the obstacle in question but fails to do so, and (ii) the obstacle itself must 
be such that it is capable of being removed if sufficient resources are devoted to its 
removal. There are limits, however, to the means it is reasonable to devote to the 
removal of any obstacle.' What counts as 'reasonable cost' must of necessity vary 
from case to case, but it is governed to a very large extent by (iii) where those 
subject to the obstacle in question are prevented from doing what they could normally 
expect to perform were the obstacle removed. If there were a drug which could 
prolong normal human life expectancy to 120 years, yet the production costs were 
exceedingly high and scarce medical resources were being sacrificed to produce it, 
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it would be inappropriate to complain of lack of access to such a drug as a restriction 
of one's freedom. The reason of course is that living to 120 years of age is not 
something that one can normally expect. As Blackstone puts it, 'the scope of what 
we consider to be a constraint is delimited by what we consider to be a human being's 
normal capacities and by the alterability of capacities and dispositions and the 
circumstances in which he exists." Of course, what people can normally expect is 
something which also varies according to time and place which serves to reinforce our 
opposition to the view so favoured by those like Oppenheim who would try and 
account for freedom in accordance with a purely descriptive set of criteria. 
Circumstances change and, as in the case of economic freedom, there is room for 
extending the range of restricting conditions which may reasonably be tackled. 
Although there are difficulties associated with the attribution of moral responsibility 
for failing to enable, there are circumstances when it is reasonable to expect a person 
to foresee the likely consequences of failing to take the appropriate action. It is on 
occasions like this when accusations of failure in moral responsibility are perfectly 
in order. Accusations of this kind may be levelled against both specific individuals 
as well as groups of people. Thus, in the days when working class children were 
denied access to education, we may legitimately equate someone's failure to enable 
them to read and write with actual (deliberate or otherwise) prevention. 
Oppenheim's second assumption, that social forces are best excluded from restraining 
conditions, is once again something that should not be taken for granted. Its appeal 
very much depends on the validity of that view of constraint which sees it as 
something deliberately imposed. Once this has been shown to be suspect we have 
less reason to suppose that impersonal social forces which conspire to prevent 
someone from pursuing a chosen course of action are mere obstacles rather than 
constraints. 
All of this goes to show that the range of features attributable to the notion of 
constraint will vary in accordance with the range attached to the other two variables 
in the triadic schema. If the model of man presupposed is that of an autonomous 
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chooser, constraints will include anything for which others may be held responsible 
in frustrating his capacity in this respect. This is why we are entitled to include such 
things as ignorance as a constraint upon freedom and why education can and should 
be a liberating force. 	 Similarly, we are allowed to include such preventing 
conditions as poverty and oppression amongst a possible list of constraints. If I lack 
the opportunity to act in accordance with my chosen course of action I am to that 
extent unfree:2 Poverty and oppression are obvious examples of the kind of thing 
which may frustrate one's interests. The social conditions under which we operate 
are neither God-given nor are they necessarily something deliberately and consciously 
imposed by others. 	 They are alterable and if the cost of this removal is not 
unbearably high, together with the possibility of identifying a person or body of 
persons to whom responsibility for doing whatever needs to be done may be 
attributed, then we can say that such obstacles are of the kind to render people 
unfree. Thus, whenever a system of education stultifies or stunts a child's capacity 
for choice, or a society condemns its work force to a machine-like existence on 
dreary production lines or where little or nothing is done to eliminate poverty, we are 
justified in complaining of lack of opportunity to choose between competing 
alternatives and are constrained as much as if our choices had been deliberately 
restricted. Opportunities are to all intents and purposes non-existent for those whose 
capacities for critical reflection, understanding, decision-making and such like - all 
of which are necessary conditions for meaningful choice - are underdeveloped or 
stunted. There is thus no reason to suppose that intentionally imposed constraints 
have greater moral significance than negligence and acts of omission. 	 If the 
consequences of failure to provide the necessary resources to meet certain basic and 
fundamental human needs are foreseeable and where the 'costs' of such a failure are 
not prohibitive, it is as legitimate to complain of constraints on freedom as if the 
failure were intentional and deliberate. 
2.3 	 Internal and External Constraints 
Although we have had cause to criticise negative libertarians for restricting constraints 
to factors external to the individual, the idea of internal constraint is more 
problematic than might at first appear. 	 Joel Feinberg attempts a systematic 
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classification of constraints in accordance with the following four-fold distinctions: 
(i) external positive constraints such as barred windows, locked doors and pointed 
bayonets (the examples here and in the following three categories are all Feinberg's); 
(ii) external negative constraints such as lack of money, lack of transportation, lack 
of weapons; (iii) internal positive constraints such as headaches, obsessive thoughts, 
compulsive desires; (iv) internal negative constraints such as ignorance, weakness 
and deficiencies in talent or skill. Feinberg's comment to the effect that not every 
absent condition whose presence would constitute an opportunity or ability qualifies 
for the category of negative constraint is consistent with the argument so far. As he 
continues: 'Only those whose absence constitutes a striking deviation from a norm 
of expectancy or propriety, or whose absence is in some way an especially important 
consideration for some practical interest either of the subject or of some later 
commentators can qualify as constraints.' 
The advantages of this classification is that it at least acknowledges the fact that in 
restricting constraint to external factors we are prevented from saying all that we 
would want to say about important causes of unfreedom. Ignorance, for example, 
is an obvious constraint on one's freedom in that it prevents one from embarking on 
all sorts of projects one might otherwise choose. However, it is doubtful that such 
a neat and simple distinction between 'internal' and 'external' can be consistently 
upheld. As is so often the case, factors external to the individual are instrumental 
in affecting his internal abilities and capacities and these in turn will have a profound 
effect on the kind of society he finds himself living in. So once again we have 
reason to believe that social forces cannot be excluded from a possible list of 
restraining conditions but are themselves governed by so-called internal factors such 
as attitudes, beliefs, qualities of character and so on. Clearly some constraints are 
more external than others, but at the end of the day it would be wrong to minimise 
the complex way in which internal and external interrelate. How often do we find 
in cases of mental illness that the conditions in which the patient has been living are 
a contributory factor. There may well be limits to what schooling can do for people 
whose environment is one of multi-faceted deprivation. The extent to which any 
particular constraint, internal or external to the individual, needs emphasis will vary 
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from one circumstance to another, but there are many examples of constraint where 
the utility of such a distinction is less than obvious and where an element of 
arbitrariness is unavoidable. 
Advantageous as the distinction may be, there are a number of problems to which it 
gives arise. In particular the notion of internal constraint in general is problematic. 
After all, one is usually constrained by others, and if what has been said about the 
significance of moral responsibility is correct, it is not so easy to appreciate the 
relevance of this in the context of internal constraints. We must at least be selective 
about the sorts of thing we are entitled to subsume under the heading of internal 
constraint. 	 Obsessive thoughts and compulsive desires such as those felt by the 
kleptomaniac may well act as constraints upon freedom, but what about headaches? 
Perhaps much depends on the kind of headaches - whether or not it is caused by 
someone drilling the road or too much alcohol at lunchtime. Headaches associated 
with hangovers or backaches resulting from heavy gardening are brought about by 
lack of prudence. If the headache is due to some pathological disorder for which 
there is no known cure there is no reason for describing it as a constraint. Contrary 
to what Feinberg may say, a constraint is not anything that prevents one from doing 
something. As far as kleptomania is concerned, it is very hard to generalise in 
advance of a great deal of information relevant to particular cases. Where A may 
have been subject to various pressures at an impressionable age, receiving little or no 
parental support or guidance, B may have become hooked on shoplifting through the 
malevolent influence of a Fagin. 	 C may be lonely and depressed and steal for 
compensation or comfort while D may have been subject to none of these pressures; 
he is simply weak-willed or over impulsive - perhaps his parents and teachers have 
done their best but to no avail. D is simply spineless and the responsibility for his 
predicament is largely his own. Although he does not respect himself and finds his 
behaviour repugnant, his attempts to do something about it are fruitless. As far as 
A, B and C are concerned other people may well have the relevant degree of 
responsibility for what is a fairly clear-cut case of internal constraint. Much has 
been written about internal positive constraints in relation to the concept of mental 
health. But we do not have to be experts on mental illness in order to appreciate that 
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the psychotic or severely neurotic are, in important respects, lacking in freedom and 
to withhold treatment where the means are available is as much a constraint as if the 
complaint had been deliberately caused by someone else." 
When it comes to internal negative constraints Feinberg somewhat uncritically 
brackets together ignorance with weakness and deficiencies in talent and skill and I 
am not sure that this is justified. 	 Where physical weakness is due to vitamin 
deficiency or lack of food we might well be justified in invoking the concept of 
constraint. As far as deficiencies in talent and skill are concerned it depends on the 
extent to which the talent is a necessary prerequisite of choice in general such as 
being able to predict the likely consequences of actions and decisions. Those lacking 
this ability may well be entitled to help and assistance. Others, like myself, who 
have no knowledge of how to play the violin can hardly be said to lack the freedom 
to play. 
2.4 	 Threats and Constraints 
In an attempt to show why it is that threats are not the kind of thing which either 
eliminate or diminish liberty, Hillel Steiner begins an article with the following 
statement: 
`An individual is unfree if and only if his doing any action is rendered 
impossible by the act of another individual. 	 That is, the unfree 
individual is so because the particular action in question is prevented 
by another. '15 
A threat does not render an action or decision of mine impossible and my freedom 
is therefore unaffected. But this is counterintuitive. As we shall see, there is more 
to being free than simply being in a position to do that which is possible. 	 If 
someone forcibly prevents me from going on holiday or to a concert I am rendered 
unfree because these are the kinds of thing which are possible objects of rational 
choice. Although ability is a necessary condition of freedom, unless what is chosen 
possesses desirability characteristics of a fairly specific sort reference to freedom is 
out of place. To ascribe freedom to someone is to make an evaluative judgement and 
not something that can be reduced to mere description in the value-free terminology 
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so much favoured by people like Oppenheim.16 The point is clearly made by 
Connolly as follows: 
`In the ordinary language of political inquiry the normative dimensions 
in the idea of freedom are not attached to it as "connotations" that can 
be eliminated; without the normative point of view from which the 
concept is formed we would have no basis for deciding what 
"descriptive terms" to include or exclude in the definition. Debates 
about the criteria properly governing the concept of freedom are in 
part debates about the extent to which the proposed criteria fulfil the 
normative point of the concept and in part about exactly what that 
point is. 	 To refuse to bring these considerations into one's 
deliberations about "freedom" is either to deny oneself access to the 
very considerations that can inform judgement about the concept or to 
delude oneself by faintly invoking the very considerations formally 
eschewed... the positive normative import of "free" ... is not attached 
to it accidentally but flows from its identification of factors pertinent 
to human well-being in situations where something is absent. And that 
normative import in turn sets general limits to the sort of situation to 
which the idea of freedom can be applied.'" 
Steiner, however, would wish to repudiate most of this: 
... it is mistaken to imagine that our conception of freedom is 
bounded by our notions of what might be worthwhile doing .... 
Statements to the effect that "X is free to A" do not imply or 
presuppose statements ... about what X really wants or about what is 
in his real interests to do or have done to him.'" 
But when a threat is hanging over someone it is absurd to deny that he is forced to 
reconsider what actions are in accordance with his best interests. A threat may or 
may not affect my desire for something or other but it certainly does affect what 
Steiner calls 'the evaluative status assigned to ... doing certain activities.' The 
desirability of a course of action is profoundly affected by threats of various kinds but 
Steiner's reluctance to concede this point stems from his fear that once threats are 
allowed to count as constraints each and every intervention must be, and we should 
find ourselves in the absurd position of finding our freedom curtailed each time 
requests were made of us, advice tendered, or when we were persuaded to change our 
minds. But such fears are groundless. Requests, persuasions and such like may 
affect my desires but they do not necessarily affect the desirability of a particular 
action. And it is this feature of threats - the fact that they render actions less eligible 
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or desirable for the rational agent who, other things being equal, prefers not to suffer 
the unpleasant consequences usually associated with them - which entitles us to 
include them on a list of constraints upon freedom. 
Unlike Steiner, Day argues that threats do indeed qualify as constraints on freedom, 
although his discussion is designed to show how they fall under this category in virtue 
of their making something impossible.' It is instructive to follow Day's reasoning 
in order to see how he reaches this conclusion because in the course of his argument 
he has some illuminating things to say about the nature of threats which lend support 
to the view that they are a major constraint to freedom. Consider the following 
situation: A says to B 'Hand over your money or I will kill you.' Such a threat 
curtails B's freedom because he is prevented from doing what he would otherwise do, 
namely, go off to spend his own money. Steiner would argue, of course, that B is 
perfectly free to ignore the threat and carry on his way, even if it means getting 
killed. Steiner's failure to understand why and how threats curtail freedom, according 
to Day, is due to putting all the weight on B's simple action, i.e. keeping his money 
rather than the complex (or conjunctive) action, i.e. keeping his money and walking 
safely away with it. As Day says, threats deprive by making one unable to do that 
which he can unconditionally now do; whereas offers do not do this and this explains 
why offers, unlike threats, do not diminish liberty.' 
It would appear then that being subject to threats affects one's liberty in important 
respects. As to whether they render certain (conjunctive) actions impossible or not 
is a different matter. Strictly speaking, they do not. It is the threat which is actually 
carried out that makes conjunctive actions impossible; a threat by itself leaves open 
the possibility of either complying with it or calling its bluff. So we can go along 
with Miller at least to the extent of admitting that we are unable to say all that we 
want to say about freedom entirely in terms of impossibility.' Threats curtail 
liberty, not because they make certain actions impossible but because they are 
instrumental in reducing the number of, and value associated with, possible 
alternatives. In other words the presence of threat T to alternative A affects the 
desirability of doing A and, given the importance of A in my overall scheme of 
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things, together with its being the kind of thing a rational being might choose, so 
reduces my freedom of choice. In this respect threats are similar to penal sanctions; 
they make certain actions ineligible to a rational chooser. 
2.5 	 Punishability and Constraints 
Punishability is something Oppenheim wishes to include amongst a list of preventing 
conditions (`With regard to P, R is unfree to do x not only to the extent that P makes 
it impossible for R to do x, but also to the extent that P would carry out an explicit 
or implied threat of punishment if he found R guilty of having done x.'23) Where a 
legal sanction is associated with a particular action I might otherwise perform, that 
action has not been rendered impossible but it is less eligible than it otherwise would 
be. To deny this is, as Benn and Weinstein say, nothing short of wilful perversity.' 
Yet people do (willingly and knowingly) break the law. Is it entirely absurd to 
suggest that in so doing they are unfree? An example (Oppenheim's own) will 
perhaps serve to show that this is not as unreasonable as it sounds. Consider a 
motorist who, in spite of the speed limit and in spite of his awareness of the likely 
punishment awaiting him if caught, nevertheless ignores all this and refuses to slow 
down. Was he free or unfree to speed at the time he ignored the warning sign to 
reduce speed? The answer is that it depends on the circumstances. If he had very 
good reason to believe that there was little chance of being caught (perhaps he had 
inside information to the effect that only 2 in every 10 motorists apprehended are 
actually prosecuted) we might well be prepared to acknowledge that he is indeed free 
to a certain degree; the degree of freedom being a factor of the probability of being 
caught and punished, although I am not sure how one could begin to quantify the 
degree of freedom any particular individual may be said to enjoy in view of the vast 
array of assumptions about individual attitudes to risk-taking. 
Even when one tries to quantify the degree of probability of doing something and 
getting away with it, there is still an element of uncertainty as to whether or not we 
would be entitled to call someone free or unfree in any particular situation. Where 
the probability is extremely high (approaching 1.0) we would have little hesitation in 
saying that we are free to do it; where it is approaching zero we would deny this. 
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When setting out to break the law a person makes certain calculations relating to the 
probability of being reprimanded and these calculations affect the extent to which he 
feels free. Nevertheless, while his assessment of his chances affects the extent to 
which he feels free, this is something that may turn out to be very far removed from 
the actual degree of probability of being caught. In any case if, for want of a better 
term, 'subjective probability assessment' was the crucial factor in determining an 
agent's overall freedom, we should find ourselves having to accept that where A 
estimates the probability of his being caught at 0.2 and B estimates his at 0.9, A is 
freer than B and this is a very uncomfortable conclusion to arrive at. How an 
individual rates the desirability of doing something is governed by this probability 
assessment, but the degree to which he is actually free is surely a factor of the 
objective probability assessment (assuming there to be such a thing). Objective 
probability assessments are too objective for our purposes in that an individual's 
assessment is of fundamental importance in determining the extent of his freedom. 
In the speeding example, it may just happen to be the day of a nationwide police 
strike of which A is ignorant. He believes he may be reprimanded and so sticks to 
the speed limit. His belief is thus a vital factor in computing the degree to which he 
is free or unfree to speed. As Crocker puts it: 
... one is never made freer by virtue of mistakenly thinking that the 
probabilities of one's actions are higher than they would be on a more 
objective standard, (and), one may be made less free by virtue of 
thinking that the probabilities of one's actions are lower than they 
would be on a more objective standard, insofar as so thinking tends to 
affect one's decisions negatively. '25  
Punishability is only one factor in quantifying individual freedom; others include the 
severity of the sanction as well as the number and variety of the alternatives ruled out 
by its imposition. If I am a millionaire and the standard fine permitted by law is 
£100, I am much freer with respect to this particular law than a school teacher. 
Having to pay £100 is much less of a blow to me than it is to him. Severity of 
punishment is a relevant factor in assessing the degree to which a person is free to 
disobey a particular law. Oppenheim, for some reason, in Political Concepts is 
anxious to force a distinction (which in Dimensions of Freedom he refused to accept) 
between the degree of unfreedom and its disvalue to the individual. (`The degree to 
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which an actor is unfree to act in a certain way is a function of the extent of 
punishment, but depends neither on the positive utility to him of acting that way nor 
on the negative utility to him of being punished:26) This is to ignore the vital role 
which prudence performs in considerations of eligibility. Where the negative utility 
of being punished is very small or insignificant, the individual is no less eligible to 
perform an action than if there was no punishment at all attached to his doing so. 
Conversely, where this is very high the action is ineligible to the prudent (i.e. 
rational) man. In other words, eligibility is a function of the values and desires a 
person happens to have. Where the consequences of a course of action include 
others imposing sanctions which any reasonable person would rather do without, the 
agent's freedom is in this respect diminished and perhaps, depending on the 
unpleasantness of the sanctions, altogether eliminated. 
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	3. 	 FREEDOM AND DESIRE-SATISFACTION 
	
3.1 	 Simple and Refined Versions 
My aim in this section is to discredit a view of freedom which surprisingly, if the 
objections raised here are valid, continues to be widely held and enjoys much support 
in liberal political thought. There is a simple (or crude) version which can be stated 
thus: 'A person is free to the extent that he is able to do what he wants to do,' A 
more refined version would go something like this: 'A person is free to the extent 
that he is able to do what he really wants to do - where 'really' is understood as 
referring to what he desires 'on balance' or 'all things considered' or 'having 
reflected carefully on the merits of the proposed course of action and decided that this 
is what he wants most.' The simple version was held by Mill, Russell, and at one 
time, Berlin, while the more refined version has more recently been defended by 
Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor. 
According to Hobbes, freedom `consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what 
he has the will, desire or inclination to do. '2 Mill, in discussing the permissibility 
of forcibly preventing someone from crossing an unsafe bridge, maintained that 
`liberty consists in doing what one desires, and (the man) does not desire to fall into 
the river.' Bertrand Russell continuing in this vein suggests that 'freedom in general 
may be defined as the absence of obstacles to the realisation of desires.' At the time 
of the Inaugural Lecture, Berlin was of the opinion that 'If I am prevented by other 
persons from doing what I want, I am to that degree unfree... '5. 
Frankfurt's thesis depends on a distinction between what he calls 'first order desires' 
and 'second order desires'. The former are desires to do or not to do one thing or 
another while the latter are desires that the agent wants to motivate him in what he 
actually does. 'Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants 
simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will.' It 
is in this sense that the agent can be said to really desire something or other as 
opposed to simply or unreflectingly desire it. 
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Taylor's position is sophisticated and, like Frankfurt's, will be the subject of careful 
consideration in due course. Taylor makes a number of illuminating and valuable 
distinctions between different kinds of desire which are relevant to the enhancement 
or diminution of freedom and there is much in his notion of 'strong evaluation' 
which I find appealing and useful. What is unacceptable without modification are 
statements to the effect that `(Freedom is) ... being able to act on one's important 
purposes.'' or 'If the conflict is between two desires with which I have no trouble 
identifying, there can be no talk of lesser freedom no matter how painful or fateful.' 
Freedom may well be 'at stake when we find ourselves carried away by a less 
significant goal to override a highly significant one' but the point I wish to dispute 
is that there is no more to being free than simply identifying significant goals. 
To account for freedom in terms of desire-satisfaction one would have to meet such 
a welter of objections that it is scarcely credible that so many people continue to 
subscribe to such an account. Its only attraction as far as I can see is that it 
dispenses with the difficulty of dealing with the totalitarian implications that some 
would wish to suggest necessarily followed from its denial. But this problem pales 
in comparison with the difficulties involved in making the account remotely 
plausible, the most obvious of which centre around the notion of 'desire' itself. 
Consider first of all the not infrequent difficulty we have in identifying many of our 
desires. Hampshire expresses it thus: 
`We may on occasion painfully discover and identify desires to act in 
a specific way on a specific occasion that we had previously excluded, 
as we now recognise, from our consciousness; and we may even 
discover that the desires which we had professed, were the exact 
opposite of the desires, which, after painful investigation, we now say 
we actually had ....We discover that our desires are often confused, 
and that it is often difficult to find the truth when we make statements 
about what we want to do, and lastly, we discover that the truth about 
the objects of desire is often complex, and that we have motives for 
concealing this complexity from ourselves and from others.'m 
In itself that is, of course, no objection to the idea of freedom as desire-satisfaction, 
but it does serve to indicate that on its own terms the theory does presuppose that we 
62 
are readily able to determine exactly what it is that we claim to desire. As will 
become apparent, were we to settle this question to our own satisfaction we would 
still have to be able to give reasons why we wanted that particular desire or set of 
desires satisfied; we would view the state of affairs in question which led us to desire 
it in the first place in a certain light. This in turn raises complex and significant 
questions to do with the desirability of the 'object' of the desire and whether or not 
the desire arose out of some kind of conditioning or socialisation. Are we simply 
habituated to satisfying it? Is it because of the pleasure to be obtained? Have we 
come to desire something because on reflection we are convinced of its desirability? 
And so on. I shall return to such questions presently. Meanwhile, the above 
quotation from Hampshire reminds us of the difficulties associated with coming to 
know what it is that I really do want, especially when my desires are in conflict. 
The predicament of having to reconcile conflicting desires is all too familiar. The 
only rational solution open to someone in such circumstances is one which does not 
merely permit the satisfaction of the most strongly felt desire, but one where the 
agent acts in such a way that his real-interests are not frustrated. This is, of course, 
a highly problematic notion and is addressed at length in 6.2. When I find it 
impossibly difficult to reconcile my conflicting desires and end up merely postponing 
making a decision or even surrendering to the desire which happens to have the 
strongest pull, I am less free than I might be. It is a characteristic feature of 
childhood that, having little or no life-plan', children are less given to speculating 
on the desirability of conflicting desires in terms of their propensity to contribute to 
the realisation of such a plan. 
I intend to return to the problem of conflicting desires in a discussion of how we go 
about deciding what it is that we really want. This question arises not only in 
situations of desire conflict but is one with which we are all too frequently faced. 
Before saying more about it however, I wish to raise a number of objections to the 
idea of reducing freedom to desire-satisfaction. Because my main concern is with the 
relationship between desire-satisfaction and freedom I shall ignore much of what 
could be said about the concept of desire as such - its relationship to feeling, whether 
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or not it is dependent on belief and if so what this might imply for desires which 
animals might be said to experience and so on. And I shall not attempt to classify 
desires systematically; it is far from clear what such a classification would amount 
to. What is crucial are questions relating to the authenticity of a desire. Is it truly 
yours or is it something you just happen to have due to a variety of causal 
circumstances of which you may or may not to be aware? Do you identify with the 
desire in that you are content in being motivated by it? Do you regret having it either 
because you regard it as unworthy or because you believe it to be foreign to the kind 
of person you take yourself to be? Is the desire irrational in that it occurs in spite of 
the fact that the consequences of satisfying it are either unknown or harmful? Is it 
transitory and fleeting or is it more deeply held and altogether more essential to your 
whole conception of yourself? Have you given due consideration to the consequences 
of satisfying the desire, and so on? All these questions have an important bearing on 
a person's freedom and, as we shall see, a satisfactory construal of the third variable 
in our triadic schema requires a different conceptual framework to that of 
desire-satisfaction. 
3.2 	 Authentic Desires and External Desires 
It is essential at the outset to realise just how often we are passive with respect to 
what we claim to want. 	 The most obvious case, even if it is an infrequent 
occurrence, is that of someone who 'wants' to do something (drink vinegar, slash his 
wrists or something equally bizarre) because he has been told that this is what he 
wants while under hypnosis. We confidently say of such a person that he does not 
really want any such thing. Now although our confidence is easily justified in the 
case of post-hypnotic suggestion, there are many more everyday examples of wants 
which are inauthentic yet still not demonstrably so - at least not without considerable 
difficulty . Consider the case of Angela, an adolescent girl who wants more than 
anything else to become a housewife and mother. For as long as she can remember 
this is all she has ever really wanted. There was a time when she vaguely entertained 
the idea of becoming a nurse, and, although she would not confess it, had a secret 
desire to become a fashion model. If nursing was no more than a childish fantasy, 
modelling is a non-starter given her present shape. All in all, she reflects, she would 
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be much happier at home looking after children and the creature comforts of her 
husband. Notice that she has at least considered alternatives however vaguely and 
briefly. Interestingly enough the alternatives in question were both few in number 
and the kinds of thing which, traditionally, have been women's work. There was 
certainly no vocational education at school and her parents never encouraged her to 
do anything other than a little typing between leaving school and getting married. 
She has also reflected upon the pleasures that housewifery has to offer and concluded 
that they really would bring contentment. At least in this respect Angela is different 
from so many other girls in her school who simply drifted into that kind of life or 
were pressurised into it. What then are we to make of these desires of hers and how 
do they relate to her freedom? 
The first thing which requires emphasis is the fact that desires or wants do not arise 
ex nihilo. Our socialisation plays a major part in the formation of so many of our 
desires, and factors associated with it are not infrequently responsible for our failure 
to form and articulate wants, ambitions and life-plans of various kinds. Angela's 
whole background was a constraint on the formation of possible desires. There was 
just no question, in that the opportunity was altogether absent, of her coming to want 
to be a firefighter, an engineer or a Member of Parliament. Moreover, this is not 
solely due to her school and home circumstances, limiting as they were, but to the 
general prejudice against women occupying these particular roles. In spite of recent 
legislation to do with equal opportunities, women whose abiding passion it is to do 
these jobs are frequently discriminated against. We can say that Angela and countless 
others like her lack a sufficient measure of critical reflectiveness in relation to such 
desires and that they are largely heteronomous as far as their 'life-plans' are 
concerned because the desires which they take to be significant are lacking the 
requisite degree of authenticity. 
Girls are not the only ones who are denied the opportunity of real and meaningful 
choice between a variety of alternatives. Tens of thousands of children of both sexes 
are expected to perform badly at school in this country and to be fit for nothing more 
than a life of drudgery in dead-end jobs with little or no job-satisfaction. The 
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self-fulfilling prophecy continues to deprive countless numbers of a life anything 
approaching personal fulfilment. It is important therefore, in considering the extent 
to which people are free, to take cognizance of the source of their desires. It is not 
clear from what has been said so far that Angela's desires have been foistered on her 
but her situation does illustrate the fact that we need to be satisfied that when 
someone has a desire for something it is in fact his desire and not one with respect 
to which he is, if not entirely passive, sufficiently inactive to prevent us from 
describing his desire as his and his entirely. Even if freedom were to be understood 
in terms of desire-satisfaction there has to be assurance that the source of the desire 
is in fact the agent himself. As far as his desires are concerned he must not simply 
be responding to a causal sequence such that if c1 ...cn then he desires to 4> ; this is 
the very least that is required for the attribution of (free) agency. 
Many of our desires, like those of the children just mentioned, are not the kind of 
thing which we adopt after due and careful consideration concerning their intrinsic 
value or the consequences involved in satisfying them. As often as not we are unsure 
of how we came to have them or why we continue with them. Indeed, they have 
probably been part of us for such a long time that they have become inseparable from 
what we (and others) take ourselves to be. We may welcome them, even embrace 
them and totally identify with them. Approval of a desire may well be thought to be 
sufficient for it to be considered authentic but this would be to acknowledge that the 
attitude one adopts towards a particular desire is the mark of its authenticity. A 
readiness to identify with a desire, or at least to feel no actual disapproval of it, is no 
doubt a necessary condition of its authenticity but it is certainly not sufficient. Unless 
we can be sure that the desire in question is not the mere product of our socialisation 
we have reason to deny its authentic status. 
There may well be a whole host of factors preventing a person from realizing that his 
desires are not truly his - he may be suffering from self-deception, inability or 
unwillingness to reflect on the extent to which it is consistent with his other desires, 
he might fail to take due cognizance of its priority over other desires he might have 
within his particular life-plan, or he might lack any such plan, merely drifting from 
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day to day. Children in particular are likely to be subject to inauthentic desires and 
for this reason it will not do to suggest that a child is free in so far as he is doing as 
he pleases. The same goes for the adult who identifies with certain desires. A 
woman who identifies with her position as a servile and obedient wife or the semi-
imprisoned state of a full-time carer to a demanding and selfish aged parent is, in 
important respects, unfree and if she insists that such roles are in accordance with her 
real-interests she is in all probability suffering from self-deception. 
Many liberals will find this conclusion quite unpalatable. If freedom is not a matter 
of doing what one wants and one is not even the final authority on that, are not the 
floodgates open to all manner of totalitarian forces? Surely the alternative is a very 
odd kind of freedom indeed. Such an objection does not have the force it might at 
this stage appear to possess. If freedom must indeed include some reference to the 
idea of a person's 'real-interest' this in turn is something that could not begin to 
make sense without reference to a first-person perspective. For it is part of my 
real-interest that I acknowledge the value of those decisions and choices which are in 
my interests. To deny this most certainly is authoritarian but one is not committed 
to anything so preposterous as a result of refusing to accept an account of freedom 
in terms of desire-satisfaction. 
In denying that some of my desires are truly mine I might be thought guilty of 
self-contradiction. If a desire is experienced by me then surely it is mine however 
inauthentic it might be. After all, it is not part of the mental life of someone else. 
As it stands, this is of course quite true. However, I do believe that the claim can 
be seriously upheld without appeal to a metaphysical account of selves within selves. 
The line between an authentic and an inauthentic desire may be impossibly difficult 
to draw with precision. When exactly does a desire which is artificially induced 
become so much part of me that my personal identity would be in jeopardy if I were 
forced to repudiate it? The question is probably unanswerable. And yet the fact 
remains that there is a line to be drawn. 
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Frankfurt attempts to express the distinction in terms of an analogy with certain kinds 
of behaviour." He suggests that when mindlessly drumming one's fingers on the 
table, although the movements are those of someone in particular - someone's fingers 
are actually doing the drumming - it is nevertheless perfectly legitimate to deny that 
drumming one's fingers is what one is actually doing. The drumming is more 
properly accounted for in terms of an event occurring in one's body. The movements 
in question are, strictly speaking, attributable only to one's body. Similarly, 
according to Frankfurt, a person may be passive with respect to certain events within 
his mind. The kind of thing he has in mind are obsessional thoughts and thoughts 
that run through our head willy-nilly. Such thoughts are not the result of our own 
actual doing. Despite the paradoxical nature of the claim it seems to be perfectly 
coherent to say of such thoughts that they are not the thoughts that I think, just as 
certain bodily movements of mine are not necessarily actions that I perform. As 
Frankfurt says: 
`To insist unequivocally that every passion must be attributable to 
someone is ... as gratuitous as it would be to insist that a spasmodic 
movement of a person's body must be a movement that person makes 
... There is in fact a legitimate and interesting sense in which a person 
may experience a passion that is external to him and that is strictly 
attributable neither to him not to anyone else.'12  
He then proceeds to consider which of the passions in a person's history are external 
and to examine the conditions of externality. 
Frankfurt's first and obvious example of a desire which is external is one which is 
artificially induced by such means as hypnosis or the result of drug-taking. The fact 
that desires are caused by something (physically) external to the agent does not in 
itself provide the defining characteristic of external desires. Rather, it is the fact that 
`they present themselves in a manner 'discontinuous' with one's understanding of 
one's situation and with one's conception of oneself ... (although) the person often 
appears by a kind of instinct to circumvent these discontinuities with rationalization: 
he instantaneously provides the passion with meaning, or somehow construes it as 
having a natural place in his experience. Then, despite its origin, the passion 
becomes attached to a moving principle within the person; and the person is thus no 
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more a passive bystander with respect to it than if it had arisen in a more integral 
response to his perceptions.'" Frankfurt goes on to consider the view that the 
criterion of externality is the desire to be rid of them or to prefer not to be moved 
by them. In other words it takes the crucial factor to be the attitude adopted towards 
the desires in question. 
If we find the desire acceptable, at least to the extent that it is not incompatible with 
our preferred conception of ourselves, then the desire is internal.' But as Frankfurt 
observes, this is to equate the real with the ideal and one can become resigned to the 
fact that a desire is attributable to oneself as well as to being someone of whom one 
does not entirely approve. If disapproval is not a sufficient condition of externality 
what of the suggestion that it is at least a necessary condition? It is difficult to think 
of a convincing example in which a person to whom a passion is external nonetheless 
approves of its occurrence. And the difficulty in finding an example of this kind also 
tends to support the conjecture that a person's approval of a passion that occurs in his 
history is a sufficient condition of the passion's being internal to him.' But even if 
this is correct, and we shall have reason to dispute it presently, Frankfurt has not yet 
presented us with a criterion of externality and he turns to this in the last section of 
his paper in the context of a discussion of incompatible desires - his example is that 
of someone who wishes to compliment an acquaintance on some recent success but 
finds that his jealousy and the associated desire to injure the man is an obstacle to his 
giving expression to his friendly gesture. The conflict here stands in need of 
resolution but it is not a matter of simply deciding as one might between going to the 
cinema or the concert hall. In the latter case the resolution is possible in terms of 
degree of preference; one simply decides what it is that one would rather do. The 
jealous man on the other hand can only resolve his conflict by rejecting one of the 
desires altogether and in so doing withdraws himself from it. 'He places the rejected 
desire outside the scope of his preferences, so that it is not a candidate for satisfaction 
at all.' This is not to say that the rejected desire (say the desire to be spiteful) is 
eliminated; the man might well continue to experience the rejected desire. Unlike the 
choice between the concert and the cinema the difference between the two desires 
here is that the difference is not one of mere strength. Whenever the man continues 
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to experience the rejected desire to be spiteful he has, Frankfurt believes, shown 
himself to be 'stronger than the desire to injure him that he finds within himself.' 
In rejecting the less worthy desire he is 'identifying' himself with the desire to be 
kind. In short, it is in making decisions of this sort that the relation of the person to 
his desires is established. 
Ingenious as this account might be, there are a number of things which do not ring 
true. Firstly, it is all too readily assumed that approval and disapproval are neatly 
associated with internality and externality. I see no reason why a desire cannot be 
such an integral part of me that I would be an entirely different personality without 
it and yet remain something of which I disapproved. Is it not often the case that we 
recognize our unpleasant character traits either as a result of introspection or, often 
more disconcertingly, when someone points out to us that we have a disposition to 
say and do things which annoy or hurt others. It may be something as trivial as 
sulking or something more serious like persistent sarcasm or a tendency to 
over-organize one's family. One may admit to the fact that one has a desire to 
behave thus and yet thoroughly disapprove of this aspect of one's personality. 
Similarly, I might admit that certain characteristics such as the desire to be generous-
spirited are admirable. I might want very much to compliment my acquaintance but 
acknowledge that it is out of character to do that kind of thing. Approval of such a 
desire and recognition that it is foreign to who I am are not incompatible. I 
experience the desire to hurt someone in such a way that I judge it to be 
reprehensible; the desire presents itself to consciousness as unworthy or shameful. 
And yet I know it to be a desire that is genuinely part of me; I am a spiteful person 
and any amount of disapproval and repudiation does not render such desires external. 
I might be more or less reconciled to this fact about myself. 
Moreover, Frankfurt puts far more weight on the idea of 'identification' than I 
believe it can carry. For one thing, it means that internality or externality of a 
particular desire is going to rest entirely on one's relationship to that desire. In other 
words it discounts the possibility of more objective criteria. It is entirely feasible to 
suppose that a person can identify with a particular desire - say the desire to be 
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public-spirited or charitable - and for others to know that this is just not him. A 
person may well identify with the desire for security and peace of mind to be found 
in a monastic community while just not possessing what it takes to live that kind of 
life. In spite of countless protestations and actions to the contrary which leave no one 
in doubt that he has every intention of joining the order, it is still possible to maintain 
that such desires are alien and external in so far as they run contrary to his entire 
personality. To borrow an example of Terence Penelhum's, a man might follow a 
career with the intention of becoming wealthy or powerful or because of the prestige 
associated with it or because it has traditionally been the career adopted by members 
of his family in spite of the fact that he has neither the drive nor the flair required. 
He shows no obvious distress and admits to identifying with the job and yet it is still 
possible for others legitimately to maintain that he has mistakenly identified with 
something external to himself. In adopting such a career he may well have given 
careful consideration to various alternatives and rejected them accordingly. In this 
respect his choice of career is authentic while at the same time the desire to pursue 
it is external in virtue of being incompatible with his personality:8 In this respect he 
differs from Angela whose adopted life-style was something into which she simply 
drifted. She is the product of her circumstances and we are able to say of her desire 
for marriage and motherhood that they are internal and inauthentic. 
To return to our truncated discussion of passivity with respect to desires. We can 
think of much more serious cases than those already mentioned; so serious in fact 
that one can be said to be a victim of a desire. Some desires are so powerful that no 
matter how hard one tries one is unable to resist their pull. I have in mind the 
difficulty experienced by the heroin addict who complains that he cannot resist it. 
There is a world of difference between this and the utterance of a Martin Luther to 
the effect that he Tann nicht anders'. We have no reason to believe that Luther's 
commitment to his deeply held beliefs was irresistible in the sense that I am trying 
to pinpoint. His beliefs did not possess him in the way that a heroin addict is left 
utterly incapable of resisting the pull of his desire for the drug. We can follow Neely 
in adopting as a criterion of resistibility, the following: 'a desire is irresistible if and 
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only if it is the case that if the agent had been presented with what he took to be 
good and sufficient reasons for not acting upon it, he would still have acted on it.'19 
A heroin addict who develops the strength of will required to overcome his addiction 
raises a number of interesting questions for the theory of freedom under discussion. 
In the first place, the considerable effort involved in fighting such an addiction 
indicates that the addict is far from content with his undiminished desire for the stuff. 
He sees it as something alien and an intrusion into the kind of life he would prefer 
to live and the kind of person he would like to be. Realizing that the drug is an 
interference and a constraint on his long-term interests he is anxious to rid himself 
of the desire which has hitherto been irresistible. Anyone who experiences his desire 
for something as an encumbrance experiences the desire in question on different 
levels. On one level he has a desire for something which he knows from experience 
will bring relief and perhaps pleasure. On another level he realizes that the 
satisfaction of the desire is no longer what will satisfy him. It is the distinction 
between satisfaction of desire and satisfaction of self that justifies talk of 'lower' and 
`higher' levels of desire. In so far as one is concerned with self-satisfaction one is 
also concerned with achieving a measure of self-control whereby one's desires no 
longer dominate or overpower one. The desire may be as strong as ever but one is 
oneself in a position of strength with respect to it. 
The adoption of a specific attitude towards one's desires is a characteristic feature of 
persons. Only self-conscious beings are capable of reflecting on the relationship 
between their desires on the one hand and their needs and real-interests on the other. 
Following David Gauthier we may distinguish between 'impelling wants' and 
`reflective wants',' a distinction which is sometimes expressed in terms of desires 
of the moment on the one hand and what one 'really wants' on the other. The drug 
addict who realizes what he is doing to himself even while experiencing the all too 
real pull of the desire for the drug does not really want it any longer. What he 
`really wants' is something altogether different. 
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3.3 	 Real Desires and Orders of Desire 
It remains to be seen whether or not a person who acts in accordance with what he 
really wants is any more free, in any meaningful sense of that term, than one who 
does what he wants simpliciter. Before pursuing this further it is worth considering 
what is supposed to be involved in the idea of doing what one 'really wants'. 
Frankfurt prefers the expression 'second order desire' to that of 'real wane' and 
regards the capacity to form such desires to be a peculiarly human characteristic. 
Many animals have the capacity for what Frankfurt calls 'first-order desires' - desires 
to do such and such - but only human beings want to have (or not to have) certain 
desires and motives. A person is said to have a second-order desire either (a) when 
he wants simply to have a certain desire or (b) when he wants a certain desire to be 
his will. In order to see what is meant by the former, Frankfurt invites us to consider 
the case of a psychotherapist who feels that he would be of greater benefit to his 
patients if he too knew what it was really like to be addicted to heroin and 
accordingly develops a desire for the drug. It is nevertheless perfectly acceptable to 
acknowledge that the therapist has a desire to desire heroin whilst at the same time 
not desiring his desire for the drug to be effective. In other words, he does not want 
the desire to move him all the way to action. 'His second-order desire to be moved 
to take the drug does not entail that he has a first-order desire to take it' .22 A person 
who wants a desire to be his will has what Frankfurt calls a 'second-order volition' 
- something which he sees as an essential characteristic of personhood. An agent who 
cared nothing about that which moves him to action is referred to by Frankfurt as a 
`wanton'. A heroin addict who was indifferent to the fact that his desire for the drug 
moves him to action - indifferent in that he simply does not consider whether the 
desires that move him to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to act - is 
a wanton addict in virtue of his wanton lack of concern one way or the other. 
Frankfurt's reason for introducing the idea of orders of desire is to provide some 
means of distinguishing desires that are truly my own from those which are not. The 
unwilling addict 'identifies himself ... through the formation of a second-order 
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volition, with one rather than with the other of his conflicting first-order desires. He 
makes one of them more truly his own and in so doing he withdraws himself from 
the other.' And it is in virtue of his identification and withdrawal, accomplished 
through the formation of a second-order volition that the unwilling addict can be 
subject to a force other than his own the result of which is his taking the drug against 
his will. 'It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volition ... 
that a person exercises freedom of the will.' It is impossible to do justice to 
Frankfurt's subtle and complex argument but the whole thesis is fraught with 
difficulties. 
Firstly there are problems relating to what is involved in identifying with a particular 
desire. Is it no more than mere recognition or acknowledgement, or is it necessarily 
accompanied by an evaluation of some kind? Secondly, and more importantly, 
someone may well identify with first-order desires, in the sense that it is 
acknowledged and approved of and yet, as in the case of Angela, remain in important 
respects non-autonomous with respect to the formation of the desires in question. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of why someone confronted with the task of resolving 
two conflicting second-order desires should care about which one wins out in the end 
-second-order volitions are, after all, merely desires : Frankfurt seems to admit as 
much in a footnote, ... a person may be capricious and irresponsible in forming his 
second-order volitions and give no serious consideration to what is at stake. Second-
order volitions express essential restrictions on the kind of basis, if any, upon which 
they are formed.'' If this is true we can ask why one cannot be a wanton with 
respect to one's second-order volitions. But even if a plausible story could be told 
whereby it could be firmly established that higher (and possibly higher still) orders 
of desire were not the result of wanton indifference, not to mention the problem of 
ensuring that one's identification with higher orders of desire is not itself a result of 
socialisation or other manipulative forces of which one is unaware, problems relating 
to identification still remain. 
Seemingly aware of the difficulties Frankfurt says that it is possible to terminate a 
series of desires of higher and higher orders without cutting it off arbitrarily. The 
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possibility rests on a person identifying himself decisively with one of his first-order 
desires. 
	 'When a person identifies ... decisively with a first-order desire this 
commitment "responds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders.'' 
We are asked to consider a person who, without reservation or conflict, wants to be 
motivated by the desire to concentrate on his work. According to Frankfurt the fact 
that his second-order volition to be moved by this desire is a decisive one means 
that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires or volitions 
of higher orders. Frankfurt also tries to dispense with the necessity for higher levels 
of endorsement of the initial act of identification or with lower-orders of desire as 
long as the initial endorsement has been made decisively. 'An (endorsement) is 
decisive if and only if it is made without reservation .... (that is, it is made) in the 
belief that no further accurate inquiry would require (the person) to change his 
mind.'27 
And yet the problem remains: how are we to ensure the autonomy of acts of 
identification? One attempted solution has been provided by Gerald Dworkin. For 
an act of identification to merit the status of 'autonomous' it must, according to 
Dworkin, be 'procedurally independent' in that it must not have been influenced 'in 
ways that make the process of identification in some ways alien to the individual.' 
I confess to having some sympathy with this way of dealing with a seemingly 
intractable problem even if it does account for appropriate acts of identification in 
negative terms. The fact remains that external influences of the kind which are likely 
to frustrate, inhibit or corrupt the normal process of thinking and reflection essential 
to autonomy are absent. In this way we might avoid the problem of infinite regress 
or the arbitrariness that might well be associated with commitments of this kind 
however decisively arrived at. Where one's commitments are unduly influenced by 
others, Dworkin describes such cases as failures of procedural independence. 
Whatever the correct position on this may be it seems to me that Frankfurt's account 
of identifying with and committing oneself to one's desire (of whatever order) is a 
misrepresentation of what actually happens in a case of conflict between one course 
of action and another. When confronted with a decision between alternatives we do 
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not ask ourselves (i) what do I desire? (ii) what desire do I wish to be effective or 
what desire do I wish to be my will? A course of action does not (at least not 
usually) present itself to consciousness in a neutral or value-free way; in so far as 
we identify it as a course of action (among many) we attach some value or other to 
it as a possible means of satisfying oneself. Seeing things as worth having or doing, 
as beneficial, agreeable or novel as opposed to worthless, injurious or base and so on 
- constitutes what Bond calls a 'system of valuation' and accounts for many of our 
second-order desires. In practical judgement I assess the merits of courses of action 
which in turn gives rise to desires of various kinds. As Watson puts it: 'In general, 
evaluations are prior and of the first-order. The first-order desires that result from 
practical judgements generate second-order volitions because they have this specific 
status; they do not have the special status that Frankfurt wants them to have because 
there is a higher-order desire concerning them.' 
It would seem then, that the idea of something's being 'really wanted' must draw on 
the language of value as opposed to higher levels of desire, but we are still far from 
getting a purchase on what is involved in the idea of really wanting something let 
alone being in a position of arriving at any significant conclusions concerning the 
relationship between freedom and doing what one really wants to do. It may help if 
we take up a point mentioned more than once already in this discussion, and that is 
the distinction between satisfaction of desire and satisfaction of self. As we have 
seen, it is possible to satisfy a particular desire such as spending money on luxuries 
of various kinds, only to find that something more is required if I am to feel satisfied. 
I may want to be elected to a particular office, succeed in getting elected and find that 
the reality of the position has more drawbacks than I envisaged resulting in the desire 
to be rid of it as soon as possible. Again, it is quite conceivable that I should desire 
something knowing full well that the object of my desire has distinct negative value 
and that I shall be profoundly unhappy if I satisfy it. Daniel, in Sartre's Les 
Chemins de la Liberte experienced his desire for homosexual relationships as 
repugnant and disgusting yet his desire for such liaisons was in no way diminished. 
Furthermore, this is not something confined to those desires which reduce us to the 
status of passive and unwilling victims; a reluctant homosexual may well be able to 
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control his desire. Talk of self-satisfaction however, presupposes a being with 
capacities and characteristics altogether absent in the animal kingdom and in very 
young children; I refer to the capacity for self-consciousness. A self-conscious being 
is necessarily aware of itself as having an identity over time; it is aware of itself as 
having a past and a future and there is more to his personal identity than that of 
which he is presently conscious.' Where there is a sense of personal continuity there 
exists the possibility of reflective desires the satisfaction of which contributes to 
self-satisfaction and self-fulfilment. And yet it is right to insist that it is not in virtue 
of the existence of such desires that we can be said to have a reason for doing one 
thing rather than another but the fact that we assign a value to the desired act in 
question. 32 
Self-conscious beings capable of formulating intentions with the idea of satisfying 
themselves do not flit, as it were, from one conscious experience to another with 
nothing more to aim at than desire-satisfaction. Instead, they choose between the 
demands of competing desires, satisfying some at the expense of others in the light 
of some life-plan' of their own. It would be a mistake to read too much into this; 
after all it is not meant to suggest a plan in the sense of a blueprint with a high 
degree of specificity. Some kind of 'plan' or 'project', however hazy and 
inarticulate, is pursued by all self-conscious beings. To be aware of oneself as a 
temporally extended agent is to be in the not always comfortable position of having 
to choose and decide between courses of action on the basis of some kind of 
evaluation of their merits and with reference to the kind of person I take myself to 
be or aspire to become. My freedom is diminished to the extent that my capacity for 
such choice is frustrated. 
3.4 	 Desires and Evaluations 
A choice of life-plan is very different from choosing between marmalade and honey 
or between a trip to Bognor or Brighton. The difference is well illustrated by Taylor 
in terms of what he calls 'weak' and 'strong evaluation'. To return to a previous 
example, that of refraining from spitefully hurting someone in spite of a strong desire 
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to the contrary. My reason for refraining has to do with my belief that such 
behaviour is unbecoming or mean. 
`In this kind of case our desires are classified in such categories as 
higher and lower, virtuous or vicious, more and less fulfilling, more 
and less refined, profound and superficial, noble and base. They are 
judged as belonging to qualitatively different modes of life: fragmented 
or integrated, alienated or free, saintly or merely human, courageous 
or pusillanimous and so on .... Intuitively, the difference might be put 
in this way. In the first case, let us call it weak evaluation, we are 
concerned with outcomes, in the second, strong evaluation, with the 
quality of our motivation ... what is important is that strong evaluation 
is concerned with the qualitative worth of different desires.'" 
A desire for marmalade is one of mere preference where the question of value does 
not arise. 
For something to be judged good in weak evaluation it is sufficient that it be desired; 
this is not so with strong evaluation. We have reasons for repudiating certain desires 
not on the basis of mere incompatibility with other more strongly felt desires, but on 
the grounds of their being judged undesirable in so far as they are recognized as being 
unworthy or incompatible with a fulfilling and satisfying life. Taylor's point in 
distinguishing between strong and weak evaluation is to contrast the different kinds 
of self that each involves. Unlike the strong evaluator who makes use of a language 
of evaluative contrasts, the weak evaluator is no more than a simple weigher or 
calculator, his calculations being largely hedonistic in kind. It is important to 
emphasize that strength of desire is irrelevant as a mark of what one most values. 
One can desire something so much that one is determined to get it in spite of one's 
evaluative judgement that it is the very last thing one should be doing. In other 
words, one's strongest desire may well be for something one least values. Anyone 
so motivated is considerably less free than one whose motivational and valuational 
system are in accord. It is in reflecting about our desires in terms of the kind of 
being we are that the idea of 'true self' begins to get a purchase. 
In making a strong evaluation we are reflective about the kind of life we wish to live 
and the kind of person we take ourselves to be and would like to become. At this 
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level of evaluation we are made aware of the sheer plethora of possibilities facing us 
as human beings. It is not so much what the individual desires but what he might 
come to desire should circumstances change that is important. There is no guarantee 
that what I now identify as that which is really wanted will be viewed in the same 
light in five years or even five days time. It is important then that one should do 
one's best to minimize frustration as a result of acting in accordance with false beliefs 
or on the basis of inadequate information. There is no implication in any of this that 
identification with any particular course of action is vital to the account of freedom 
being developed; what is necessary for that account is that the individual be in a 
position of being able to take a different stance with respect to the object of 
identification in accordance with the developing self. Hence the importance of 
strong evaluation. There will be many occasions in the course of self-development 
when I need to suppress or radically alter the kind of thing with which I readily 
identify - not only for my own self-interest but in the interests of the community of 
which I am a part and in which the opportunities and possibilities for 
self-development arise. 
What I take myself to be - my self-conception - is not something I suddenly discover, 
something that is there all along waiting to be identified. On the contrary, it is 
something with a permanently elusive quality. It is something about which I can have 
a more or less clear idea depending on the extent to which I am in a position to take 
advantage of the opportunities which present themselves from day to day. The self 
crystallizes as it were in accordance with one's commitments, convictions and values. 
Animals and infants are deficient in this respect. They are also indifferent to the 
quality of their motivations and their desires are to be distinguished, if at all, in virtue 
of their strength or intensity only. The same goes for obstacles; we identify an 
obstacle for what it is as a result of being able to make certain qualitative distinctions 
between our many and varied goals and it is because we are rational beings 
possessing criteria of significance with respect to goals and purposes that we value 
freedom so highly. All of this seems to reinforce the importance of strong 
evaluation. 
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In so far as we do have the capacity for strong evaluation we are not doomed to live 
the extraordinarily impoverished existence of the weak evaluator. We have other 
bases for choice than that of 'most pleasurable'. And yet if we really are concerned 
about leading fulfilled and satisfying lives the notion of doing what we really want 
is both insufficient and misleading. Self-satisfaction is something very different from 
desire-satisfaction in that it presupposes a criterion for so ordering our desires and 
preferences that is not itself reducible to desires and preferences.' Freedom cannot 
be reduced to doing what one wants. The expression 'what I really want' quite 
properly suggests that the individual has reflected on the pros and cons of various 
alternatives and if freedom means anything at all it is very much a matter of being 
in a position to do just this and to act in accordance with one's evaluation. But 
reducing freedom to action in accordance with what one really wants begs an 
important question, namely the extent to which wanting something is reason enough 
for action. In subsequent sections I hope to show that there is more to rational action 
than mere pursuit of desire-satisfaction and the free person is one who is in a position 
to act in accordance with something other than that which he most wants. 
In typical cases of constraint we feel frustrated when forcibly prevented from giving 
free rein to our desires or wants. This goes some way towards explaining why 
freedom is so highly valued; we feel frustrated when we are prevented from acting 
in accordance with our choices. Not all instances of unfreedom result in frustration 
of this kind. When forced to do something by another which I would have done 
anyway, I am not frustrated. Nevertheless, I am unfree in a most important respect. 
Although I am not prevented from obtaining whatever it is that I want, my capacity 
for choice is altogether circumscribed; had I chosen an alternative course of action 
I would have been prevented from carrying it out. To those who would take issue 
with our refusal to allow those actions one is forced to perform (when the action in 
question is what one would have done in any case) as being compatible with free 
agency, there is a simple reply. In such cases the choice between possible actions is 
non-existent; lack of frustration has nothing to do with it. It is conceivable that I 
might change my mind and choose something quite different from the course of action 
permitted. Unless there is the possibility of choice between alternatives it is 
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unreasonable to suppose that the conditions of freedom obtain. One is free only if 
one has the opportunity to do more than whatever it is one actually does at a 
particular time. Consider the case of someone who is so conditioned that he accepts 
with equanimity the servile conditions under which he is forced to live; he is not in 
the least frustrated and his desires and opportunities coincide perfectly. Whatever 
else we are permitted to conclude, we are not justified in calling him free. Again, 
he might well desire those things which are incompatible with the life of a free person 
such as being in a state of permanent inebriation or addiction. To refuse to concede 
that freedom is something other than desire-satisfaction is to remain blind to an 
important distinction which as well as reducing freedom to a purely mentalistic 
concept has, if ignored, paradoxical and dangerous consequences. I refer, of course, 
to the difference between being free and feeling free. If freedom were to collapse into 
a mere subjective feeling we would be forced to concede that the inhabitants of Brave 
New World, whose desires are manipulated to coincide with whatever is required of 
them, are as free as anyone else. Berlin recognised this when he wrote: 'If degrees 
of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I could increase my freedom 
as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them. '35 If, on the other hand, 
one's freedom is a function of the degree to which one's actions are in accordance 
with one's self-conception by reference to which one's significant purposes gain 
application, it behoves us to provide a convincing argument to show what is wrong 
with criteria of significance resting on no more than subjective preference. This is 
not a straightforward task but is something which is dealt with at length in the second 
part of this essay. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
It is not only within certain theories of freedom that the satisfaction of desire is 
considered to be important, it is a prominent feature in most recent accounts of well-
being and human flourishing. Although it appears in different guises, sometimes as 
`post-reflective-desire-satisfaction' (as in John White's The Aims Of Education 
Restated) or the satisfaction of 'informed-desires' (as in his Education and the Good 
Life: Beyond the National Curriculum and James Griffin's Well Being: Its Meaning, 
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Measurement and Moral Importance) it is because writers such as these are sceptical 
of the possibility of providing objective criteria by reference to which people may be 
said to flourish that they fall back on desire-satisfaction and accordingly rest content 
with accounts of well-being which are ultimately subjective. 
So far we have had reason to doubt that the measure of freedom people may be said 
to enjoy rests entirely on evaluations that are entirely subjective. No amount of 
satisfaction with a particular set of circumstances will suffice, for unless people have 
access to a variety of significant alternatives other than those which they happen to 
want they are certainly not free. And we have seen that criteria of significance do 
not themselves rest on subjective preferences. The charge of authoritarianism is 
easily levelled against those who would adopt a more objectivist stance with respect 
to rational choice than that associated with desire-satisfaction, and the charge is 
clearly in need of rebuttal. The next three sections of this essay attempt to defend 
objectivism against such criticisms. 
Section 4 is largely an attempt to cast doubt on the assumption that desire-satisfaction 
and self-satisfaction are as closely associated as subjectivists would have us believe, 
and to suggest that although the opportunity for choice between alternatives is crucial 
to both freedom and well-being, the basis upon which choices are made is only 
partially explicable by reference to our wants. Choices are no less governed by our 
knowledge and understanding of both ourselves and what is judged to be of value and 
significant in human life on the one hand and with what is thought to be appropriate 
and in accordance with our real-interests on the other. Rational choice cannot rest 
entirely on desire-satisfaction however well-informed and in Section 5 I not only 
refute the claim that desires are sufficient reasons for action but dispute that Humean 
theory of motivation (to the effect that desires are the key to rendering motivation 
coherent) upon which so many subjectivists rely. If our scepticism concerning what 
is little more than dogma in philosophical psychology is justified and that coherence 
attaches to some form of moral realism, we shall be strengthened in our conviction, 
to be sustained in Section 6, that we do indeed possess interests which are genuine 
and whose failure to meet would result in our being seriously harmed. What these 
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amount to, as well as how actions based on their due recognition are more rational 
than those attempting to satisfy desires, is there made explicit. It will be argued that 
criteria for rational choice may satisfy both the demands of objectivity as well as the 
non-violation of a person's individuality. The fact that there is no single summum 
bonum does nothing to diminish the conviction that whether we flourish or not 
depends largely on the extent to which our interests are met. While these vary to 
some extent from one person to another there are limits beyond which the rational 
person cannot go and such limits are capable of objective determination. 
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4. DESIRE SATISFACTION AND WELL-BEING 
4.1 	 Post-Reflective-Desire-Satisfaction and Well-Being 
Until the publication of The Aims of Education Restated philosophers of education 
seem to have been reluctant to face up to the question posed by John White in the 
third chapter of that book namely, 'What is the "well-being" of the pupil?". In spite 
of the fact that the nature of human flourishing has exercised the imagination of 
philosophers since Socrates it refuses to lend itself to a schematic account. Like so 
much else in philosophy we are better able to understand it as a result of critically 
evaluating the attempts of others to flesh it out. 
In spite of more recent thoughts on the matter presented in his Education and The 
Good Life: Beyond the National Curriculum I remain unconvinced by White's 
continued insistence on accounting for personal well-being in terms of desire-
satisfaction. In the earlier book he explains well-being in terms of what he calls 
`post-reflective-desire-satisfaction' (PRDS) whereas his latest account is in terms of 
`informed-desires'(ID). Rather than present summaries of either the third chapter 
of the earlier book (`The Good of the Pupil') or the second chapter of the later book 
(Personal Well-Being') I prefer to draw attention to those features of his argument 
to which I am fundamentally opposed and in so doing construct an alternative and less 
subjective account of well-being. The problems with which I should like to take 
issue to begin with include: (i) his conception of rationality and his neutrality with 
respect to possible ends of rational choice; (ii) his failure to distinguish between 
satisfaction of desire and satisfaction of self; (iii) his account of reflection in PRDS; 
(iv) his emphasis on choice as opposed to discovery of values; (v) his scepticism 
concerning the possibility of objective values and his reliance on the polarisation of 
`ethical experts' on the one hand and individual choice on the other; (vi) his 
individualistic account of human nature and his less than adequate account of the 
`social nature of man' which, in The Aims of Education Restated leads him to 
characterise individual well-being as something over and above the well-being of the 
society of which one is a part. 
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One of the most troublesome aspects of White's account of well-being is the concept 
of rationality employed. In actual fact it is a combination of a theory of rationality 
and a theory of what is good for individuals. Briefly stated it is that if upon 
reflection a person prefers the satisfaction of desire d to the satisfaction of other 
desires, he is rational to the extent that he sets about satisfying that desire. 
`Educationally', according to White, 'this generates the aim of equipping the pupil 
to work out what he most prefers to do e.g. by providing him with an understanding 
of different ends-in-themselves and seeing that he develops the disposition to make 
reflective and, therefore, autonomous choices.' And he believes that an attractive 
feature of this view 'is that it seems to make the individual himself the final arbiter 
of his own good, not a blind follower of the authority of others, whether God or men. 
It underpins an education which avoids the imposition of value judgements on the 
pupil: he is not to be indoctrinated with others' pictures of the good, but freely 
chooses his own.' Almost all the reservations mentioned in (i) - (vi) above arise out 
of this small section of White's book. 	 However, it is with his conception of 
rationality that I am concerned at the moment, a conception which, apart from relying 
on desire satisfaction to provide the grounds for choice, is neutral as far as choice of 
ends is concerned. Moreover this conception of rational choice makes it difficult to 
know how one might bring a 'coherent ordering' to the alternatives open to one. 
It would seem that for both White and Rawls only the choice of means is open to 
criticism; choice of ends (assuming there to be no fear of harming others) being a 
matter of individual choice, it being an impertinence for one person to call the 
reflective choices of another irrational. But suppose someone were to decide that he 
wanted to spend his time doing something quite ridiculous such as counting blades of 
grass in a field. (The example is that of Rawls and is taken up by White as a 
possible criticism of the PRDS theory of well-being.) Both take it as absurd that 
anyone should choose to waste his time in anything so devoid of interest or purpose 
yet they differ in the reasons they provide for the absurdity of such an activity. 
Rawls is anxious to demonstrate the truth of what he takes to be a 'basic principle of 
motivation' which he refers to as the 'Aristotelian Principle' according to which 
`other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities 
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... (they) take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at 
it, and of two activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling for a larger 
repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations.'5 This is why, according to 
Rawls, those of us who can play both draughts and chess generally prefer the latter.' 
Unfortunately this so called principle is open to a number of objections, the most 
obvious of which are referred to by Brian Barry.' Either Rawls's principle is meant 
to be taken as an empirical generalisation, in which case it would seem to lack all 
foundation, or it is meant to serve as something constitutive of rationality as such, the 
price of which being the neutral account of rationality which Rawls is at pains to 
defend. In the end Rawls has no choice but to defend the principle as an empirical 
generalisation about people, as his grass-counting example would indicate. At least 
in so doing he is not open to the double-edged charge of inconsistency and 
perfectionism. Rawls tries to persuade us that anyone with a disposition towards 
counting blades of grass all day would, in all probability, be suffering from some 
kind of neurosis. The fact remains, however, that a person who chose such a bizarre 
pastime may or may not be neurotic; he may have considered the pros and cons of 
spending his time in this way and be able to tell a very convincing tale as to why it 
merits his attention. Admittedly for such an example to be remotely convincing it 
would be a very strange tale indeed. Where someone opted for draughts at the 
expense of cultivating his talent for chess, we would surely not dismiss him as 
neurotic. For this reason it will not do to invoke the Aristotelian Principle in order 
to demonstrate the abnormality of such behaviour; to do so would involve one in the 
circular argument of presupposing its truth in order to defend it against counter 
examples.' But Rawls cannot be accused of circular reasoning. In the end he is 
forced to admit that if we allow that a person's nature is to enjoy grass-counting - or 
for that matter anything else equally futile - 'then surely a rational plan for him will 
centre around this activity. It will be the end that regulates the schedule of his 
actions, and this establishes that is good for him.'9 In other words, not even for 
Rawls does the rationality of a chosen end depend upon the truth of the Aristotelian 
Principle; the point of assuming it to be true is that it is supposed to account for 
those things recognised as good for human beings as they are.' 
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White also invokes a theory of 'what we implicitly know men are naturally like' ." 
Human beings are such that they seek to satisfy a huge variety of desires and for this 
reason a man who chose to count grass and nothing else would indeed be absurd in 
maintaining that his well-being lay in this direction and in this direction alone. But 
White provides us with a totally unsatisfactory account of why such a theory is 
absurd. As long as the grass-counter has other desires (the desire for friendship, art, 
relaxation and curiosity, to name but a few which are appropriate to man as part of 
his nature) it is obvious that his well-being cannot 'consist in the satisfaction of what 
he most desires on reflection.' As long as 'what he most desires' is understood as 
a 'graded pattern of different desires' as opposed to one dominant desire, White is 
committed to exactly the same subjective account of rational choice in order to avoid 
the 'danger of embracing a perfectionist view that accords higher status to some ends 
than to others (and, educationally, leads us back into the familiar problem of 
imposition and indoctrination)'." No matter how stultifying, trivial or pointless 
something might be, as long as I am convinced that it is worthwhile and rewarding, 
as long as I find it agreeable and satisfying, as long as I remain of the opinion that 
it is the very essence of personal fulfilment, there is nothing anyone can say which 
is reason enough to demonstrate that I am mistaken. 
Can we really rest content with a view of human well-being which is restricted to the 
mere satisfaction of desires chosen on reflection? And is there no more to rationality 
than the maximisation of such satisfaction? Surely any account of well-being and the 
choice of ends which are essential to it must accommodate the fact that we are not 
mere bundles of desires confronted with the task of getting them into some sort of 
order of priority. Desires are not things that descend upon us from nowhere; they 
have a certain rationale. We come to desire x rather than y for reasons to do with 
the aspect under which we see them. 
	 We recognise x as possessing certain 
desirability-characteristics which are absent in y. 	 And it is in virtue of such 
characteristics that we come to acknowledge the worth or value of x because we 
believe that the pursuit of x will satisfy us. We do not choose x because we already 
have a desire for it; we choose it because we recognise it as possessing some 
inherent worth. Now White of course will have no truck with all of this. While 
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he is quite prepared to accept that reasons for choosing x are reasons in virtue of the 
benefit accruing, he (like Rawls) believes that there is no more to this than mere 
desire-satisfaction. It is part of my thesis that while the reasons offered for choosing 
x as opposed to y may be subjective in the sense that certain activities (reading poetry 
say) are not necessarily a feature of everyone's well-being, there are nonetheless very 
good reasons for wanting some things (such as friendship or a free press) which are 
objective in the sense that there are reasons why anyone should assign a positive value 
to such things. In other words whilst the notion of well-being is not a unitary concept 
in that there is only one such state which is common to us all - a life devoted to 
scholarship, community service, the theatre or whatever, may not meet with universal 
approval - there are limits to what it may coherently encompass and such limits are 
delineated by reference to something other than PRDS as we shall see when returning 
to this issue in Section 6. 	 To confine the reasons for action to mere desire- 
satisfaction is to assume that desire-satisfaction entails self-satisfaction. 
	 Yet it is 
quite conceivable that my satisfied desire for x may leave me thoroughly unsatisfied. 
I may end up feeling ashamed or guilty or simply indifferent; I may not actually 
mind, in retrospect, if my desire had been frustrated altogether. 
For the grass-counter, or anyone engaged in a similarly worthless exercise, to merit 
the status of someone in pursuit of a rational enterprise he would have to be able to 
explain what there was about the answer that was so important. If all he can say is 
that his desire to know the total number is overriding, or that he is not really 
interested in knowing the answer, it's the activity itself which is fun, I see no reason 
for concluding that his choice is in the least bit rational if it occupies him to the 
exclusion of so much else. The very least we should require of him would be that 
he could say something about the importance of having this particular desire satisfied; 
what is there in it for him? If desire-satisfaction is to be post-reflective there must 
have occurred some sort of judgement as to the relative merits of grass-counting. 
But this involves a conscious attempt to work out what reasons there are for wanting 
a particular desire satisfied. The rational person reflects upon the degree to which 
a satisfied desire is likely to satisfy him and does not stop short in the way suggested 
by White to the effect that 'reflectiveness 
	 subserves desire-satisfaction.' A 
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person may well achieve PRDS to the maximum degree and still lead a debilitating 
and stultifying existence which is both harmful to him and the society of which he is 
a member. Any account of rational choice which ignores the relationship between 
it and a person's good or real-interest, concentrating exclusively on his chosen goals, 
is radically misconceived. 
There is a good deal more to life-planning than doing the things we want most and 
those concerned with the education of the young must recognise that in broadening 
their pupils' horizons by introducing them to the possibilities inherent in various life-
styles they are starting them off on a voyage of discovery, not on a shopping spree. 
They are concerned with equipping children with the skills and capacities which are 
necessary in order to discover what is of lasting value and not simply with enabling 
them to satisfy present and future desires. Children need to be taught how to reflect 
and to be provided with the relevant criteria and it is White's failure to provide a 
satisfactory account of what is involved here that prompts much of the following 
discussion. 15 
The younger the child the more difficult is he likely to find the task of coherently 
ordering desires into some sort of hierarchy. If he is to leave school with anything 
resembling a life-plan' he needs to be able to evaluate his wants in some way or 
other. 	 As an adolescent he may want all kinds of things which are either 
incompatible or unrealistic. The older we get the more likely it is that a combination 
of circumstances and worldly wisdom enable us to recognise our own limitations and 
we are better placed to accept that some of the things we wanted, or still want, cannot 
be accommodated with many other things which we have chosen to do with our lives. 
It is no easy task to forge the bewildering variety of competing desires into some sort 
of order. Success in this is as much as anything a mark of our maturity. The fact 
remains however that working out a hierarchy of desires in accordance with the 
degree to which they are wanted is no more the mark of a rational agent than is 
rendering them consistent within such a hierarchy. If teachers are to be of assistance 
to youngsters engaged in the struggle towards such a maturity they need to provide 
a more reliable criterion than something as subjective as desire-satisfaction. 
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If it is true that deliberation is of ends as well as means then any ordering of desires 
must take place in the context of some understanding of the kind of life that is likely 
to result in personal well-being. Given the plethora of possibilities, the only way of 
determining which desires to satisfy is by reference to our convictions about the 
respective merits of particular life-plans. Children must therefore be brought to 
consider the desirability or otherwise of a whole range of activities and ways of life 
and teachers must not allow themselves to lose sight of the importance of this under 
the deluge of decisions required of them on a daily basis all of which should, ideally, 
subserve the objective of rational life-planning. They must guard against the danger 
of allowing means to become inflated into ends and, in particular, against falling into 
the trap of our contemporary malaise which is one of value-neutrality with regard to 
the kinds of life that are compatible with human well-being. 
Now it is undeniable that a normal (adult) human being is not indifferent to his fate. 
It is man's capacity for reason that not only distinguishes him from the animal 
kingdom but elevates him to the status of 'chooser'. Unlike animals, and for that 
matter the very young, a normal adult is not only capable of working out what it is 
that he really wants, he also has certain views as to their desirability. In so far as the 
animal or infant may be said to feel anything at all when they get what they want this 
state is little more than one of equilibrium between desire and its satisfaction (or non-
frustration). In no way can the satisfied desire be equated with self-satisfaction; for 
this to be possible an individual must adopt some stance or attitude towards the desire 
in question. He must see it as worthwhile or desirable and the satisfaction which is 
consequent upon achieving or obtaining that which one values is altogether different 
from mere contentment. All kinds of things can result in someone feeling contented; 
he may simply wake up content or find contentment in sitting in the sun. Although 
the feeling of satisfaction one enjoys as a result of obtaining or pursuing that which 
one believes to be worthwhile may be phenomenologically indistinct from mere 
contentment, only in the latter case is it appropriate to speak of someone being 
satisfied with something. One feels content because of something but one can feel 
satisfied with something only if the feeling is a result of some particular judgement 
that the thing in question conforms to one's ambitions, hopes or ideals. The theory 
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under discussion clearly provides no room for such a distinction. Well-being, on this 
view, is a species of contentedness.' The capacity to evaluate is therefore crucial 
in any coherent account of being satisfied with something and, accordingly, in any 
coherent account of well-being. 
The comparison with emotions and their 'objects' is obvious. Emotions do not 
descend on us out of the blue; they presuppose judgements and evaluations to the 
effect that something is shameful (in the case of remorse) or dangerous (in the case 
of fear) or whatever. In feeling satisfied with something one necessarily evaluates 
the object of one's satisfaction. 	 And just as it makes sense to question the 
appropriateness of one's emotion, talk of the justification of a particular evaluation 
in cases of what one finds satisfying is equally in order, which is to say that a person 
must be able to provide reasons why particular states of affairs are seen as desirable 
or otherwise. Once again this is a mark of maturity and young children are defective 
in this respect lacking, as they do, a strong sense of the future and the capacity to 
formulate life-plans of their own. 	 It may or may not make sense to attribute 
anything peculiar to man in terms of what Mill called a 'distinctive human 
endowment' or what Aristotle referred to as a 'characteristic ergon'19 but an adult 
human being who had no room for friendship, who was never bored but found 
everything of equal interest, who was indifferent to the aesthetic qualities of his 
environment, who had no ambition of any kind, who was unconcerned about the truth 
or otherwise of various propositions or was never moved by moral considerations 
would scarcely qualify as living the kind of life appropriate to persons. 
In what follows I propose to consider what is involved in reflecting upon one's well-
being and the nature of the good life, and in so doing hope to show not only the 
limitations of that view so readily adopted by White whereby values are simply 
chosen, but also to spell out an alternative model of how values and commitments are 
more properly understood as something to be discovered rather than chosen. Such 
an account, if correct, offers a significant pointer towards providing value judgements 
with a more objective status than can possibly be allowed on White's account. We 
shall then be in a position to appreciate the real value of autonomy and freedom as 
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essential ingredients in human well-being and as something possessing intrinsic value 
of a very special kind. In the process it is hoped that the nature of the third variable 
in our triadic schema will be brought into sharper focus, as indeed will the 
relationship between well-being and rational choice. 
The importance of reflection in determining the value of things has long been 
recognised by White. In his book, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, he argued 
that 'What is intrinsically valuable is identifiable with what a person would on 
reflection want for its own sake'2° and it is reflection which enables a person to 
determine which of all possible options he prefers and which is essential in the 
weighing of relative importance of various ways of life.' The problem, of course, 
is one of adjudicating between those considerations which are relevant to the 
formulation of priorities, and those which are hindrances to such decision making. 
White, however, is adamant: 'The individual himself must make the ultimate 
decisions,' but the basis on which decisions are made is the result of a very special 
kind of reflection. 	 'He has to dig beneath his surface inclinations, steel himself 
against unthinking acceptance of ideals of life which he has picked up from others, 
penetrate to more fundamental levels of his being, to his "deepest needs" .' 22 The 
italicised phrase fits uneasily with mere desire-satisfaction. After all, the satisfaction 
of desires and acting in accordance with my needs are frequently impossible to 
reconcile, and in what follows White seems altogether too vague about the nature of 
the reflection in question. 'Suppose,' he says, 'there is nothing at the bottom of the 
barrel. 	 Can we discover our deepest selves? Or is self-creation ... a more 
appropriate description? It is nonsense to say that we create ourselves ex nihilo 
But ours are still the ultimate choices ... . Ultimately, perhaps, we cannot adjudicate 
between man as self-creator and man as self-discoverer. We may do worse than to 
revert to the old notion of human life as a process of self-realisation, relying on the 
Janus-faced character of this concept, with its suggestions both of coming to know 
oneself and of working out a self-determined plan.'23  
As it stands, this is both confusing and misleading. The confusion arises from the 
juxtaposition of the language of desire-satisfaction with that of needs. Do I reflect 
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in order to find out what I want or what I need? To see how widely different these 
notions are, one has only to point to the fact that one can be mistaken about the latter 
in ways which do not make sense in cases of what is merely wanted. I may not 
always know what it is that I want, but when I do the question of error does not arise. 
White's insistence (which is at least consistent with his overall thesis) that 
`reflectiveness subserves desire-satisfaction' and that 'we should do the things we 
most want to: that is what life-planning is all about,' is simply unacceptable and, 
as the argument proceeds, we shall see how reference to interests are crucial in 
determining where one's well-being might lie. Until more has been said about what 
it is that one discovers through reflection it is difficult to indicate in what respects the 
statement misleads. In reflecting about what to do with my life I am trying to do 
something more than acquire self-knowledge, important as this undoubtedly is. I am 
also trying to arrive at certain conclusions about what is worthwhile. I am concerned 
with not merely believing that I am flourishing but with actual flourishing. White 
gives up too soon. His supposition that 'one cannot, finally, say what one's well 
being is as distinct from what one thinks it is'25 would, if it were true, mean that there 
would be no reason why I should care about being misled over the issues involved. 
What would it matter to me, as long as I had a worked out hierarchy of desires, all 
of which were integrated and consistent together with the possibility of seeing them 
satisfied if my chosen life is stultifying and worthless? On White's account the only 
room for mistaken evaluation is an evaluation that is unreflectively arrived at. Given 
the subjectivist premise with which he begins there is no distinction in reality. It is 
this premise which needs refuting if we are to provide for the possibility of genuine 
human flourishing. 
Not the least worrying aspect of subjectivism is the possibilities it affords for the 
manipulation of people and their beliefs. The subjectivist cannot even fall back on 
the value of autonomy. White tries, but his subjectivism prevents him. All he can 
really say in defence of autonomy in the Aims of Education Restated is that it is useful 
in helping one formulate a 'settled, integrated system of preferences,' thus avoiding 
a life of either permanent conflict or blind reliance on the authority of others. 
Autonomy is indeed a necessary ingredient of personal well-being but for different 
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reasons to those offered by White. As we shall see, it is valuable in itself in that 
human beings who are heteronomous lack the dignity associated with personhood. 
It has an intrinsic value in not being a mere means to something else.' 
If we were to ask White what he thought the point of all this reflection amounted to 
he would say that it is to enable pupils to make choices with respect to possible ways 
of life. And there is more to this than mere plumping. 'One chooses against a 
background of wants which one already has ... . Choosing is weighing relative 
importances.28 The importance of this in White's account cannot be overestimated. 
Having gone through a period of compulsory schooling the ideal pupil to emerge is 
the autonomous, reflective chooser and it is an ideal which, in my view, is in need 
of considerable modification before it is acceptable as an aim of education. 	 It 
assumes a model of man which is deficient in many respects; a model which fits 
uneasily with something White says immediately afterwards. In all this reflecting 
about the life I am to choose, 'I can only think this through in the full knowledge of 
what kind of creature I am ... '29 Now, either I am capable of choosing this or I am 
not. If I am, then 'what I am' is hardly a constraint upon my reflective choices; if 
I am not, there are limits to choice of which the free and autonomous person needs 
to be aware. 	 The picture that emerges from White's book is not of a person 
constrained in this way. Nature and human culture only assist in helping pupils to 
establish their priorities; in the end 'the individual must make the ultimate 
decisions.'" There is a tension here which is troublesome, the significance of which 
seems to go unrecognised by White, yet an exploration of this tension will prove not 
only illuminating as far as a proper understanding of the limits to individual choice 
is concerned but will also be helpful in providing a basis from which to construct an 
alternative picture of human well-being. 
Sometime during the middle of the twentieth century epistemology managed to escape 
from the individualistic bias which had been its stranglehold from Descartes to 
Russell. 
	 No doubt the solipsistic conclusions resulting from attempts to ground 
knowledge in sense-data and kindred concepts provided the necessary impetus. 
Unfortunately, progress in practical reasoning has been less obvious. Part of the 
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problem has been the insistence of those philosophers who have tried to provide some 
objective basis for moral reasoning to restrict the debate to the question of how moral 
judgements may be shown to have truth values, whereas the aim of practical 
reasoning is less concerned with arriving at the truth (less concerned with what to 
believe) than with the determination of right action (with the aim of knowing what to 
do or be). In so far as practical knowledge is possible it presupposes the possibility 
of being mistaken. Not the least difficulty with subjectivism is that standards of 
correct judgement in such matters originate within the individual. 
	 But as 
Wittgenstein succinctly observes, if 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right 
... that only means that here we can't talk about "right" .'31 Judgement, in other 
words, presupposes certain public (objective) standards of correctness which is why 
it won't do to reduce practical reasoning to a species of choice-making or 
commitment as we find in so much recent moral philosophy influenced in large part 
by people like Hare and resulting in statements to the effect that choices are made 
against a background of wants one already has,' and that 'we eventually reach a point 
(in rationally deciding between competing life-plans) ... where we just have to decide 
which plan we most prefer without further guidance from principle.' The view of 
freedom underpinning all this is one which relies on the self as a subject of an 
independent and 'self-determined' will, the tenability of which is open to question. 
The defects in Hare's account of moral reasoning, as well as the serious implications 
for moral education, have been ably demonstrated by Grenville Wall.' 
	 The 
antinomy or paradox in moral reasoning which Hare endeavours to solve in his 
Freedom and Reason arises, according to Wall, out of his conviction that (a) 'one of 
the most important constituents of our freedom, as moral agents, is the freedom to 
form our own opinions about moral questions', and (b) the answering of moral 
questions is, or ought to be, a rational activity . '35 It is the apparent contradiction 
between freedom and reason that gives rise to the paradox. And yet, Wall argues, 
such a paradox is incapable of resolution if its first term is taken to mean that the 
source of correct practical reasoning lies within the individual will. If this is indeed 
the case it would necessitate abandoning the second term of the paradox - at least if 
by 'rational activity' Hare means that public standards of correctness are applied to 
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moral reasoning. But it is clear that Hare means nothing of the sort because reason, 
for him, is subservient to the will in moral judgement.36 It is, therefore, what the 
individual himself desires that is important and which, in the end, provides the final 
authority for any particular moral judgement. The consequences for education of 
reducing moral judgement to no more than personal commitment or a function of 
individual inclination are wide-ranging and serious. It is hardly surprising that the 
ethic of individualism is such a pervasive feature of contemporary society when pupils 
leave school with values premised on something so subjective. 
Wall tries to show that Hare's ethical individualism must be incorrect for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, following Wittgenstein, he maintains that where there are no 
rules or public criteria of correctness in making judgements the notion ceases to have 
application.' Secondly, it presupposes a Humean scepticism with regard to the 
power of reason in human action. This dualism between reason and passion, Wall 
argues, implies that rational criticism of action is possible only when it can be shown 
that people have chosen means which are empirically appropriate to the achievement 
of the ends they have set for themselves, and, as we shall see in the next section, 
there is reason to believe that this is a very misleading and highly restrictive account 
of rationality. As Wall says, 'Wants are not, for the most part, "brute facts", for 
the very language in which they are described and made intelligible to us contain the 
seeds of the possibility of rational appraisal.' Which means that 'choosing is only 
possible in contexts where choices can be rationally evaluated.'38 And again, the 
principles which form the major premise in moral reasoning in Hare's theory, are not 
freely chosen in the way Hare would have us believe. They are, Wall properly 
reminds us, presupposed by the possibility of choice, for how else could we 
distinguish between choosing and mere organic or bodily movements towards 
something. In other words, X cannot be said to have chosen to 4> simply in virtue 
of his (13-ing. Likewise, there is more to subscribing to a principle or set of values 
than merely announcing the fact. This would amount to what Charles Taylor calls 
'radical choice' - or choice which is not grounded in reason. As he reminds us, the 
dilemma confronting the young man in L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, between 
staying with his mother and joining the Resistance, is indeed something we should 
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normally characterise as a dilemma. But what makes it such is that he faces two 
moral claims upon his allegiance, claims which are not themselves created by radical 
choice. If they were, all that would be required for the solution to moral dilemmas 
would be a simple declaration to the effect that one had decided to do one thing rather 
than another. But the resolution of moral dilemmas is much more complicated. At 
the very least it requires a capacity to employ an evaluative contrastive vocabulary 
by reference to which 'choice' becomes intelligible. If it is the case that we can 
make radical choices without regard to evaluation such a choice becomes, as Taylor 
says, a simple expression of preference (as opposed to a choice made by a strong 
evaluator).39 Indeed, it is possible to go further and say that it is by reference to our 
capacity for strong evaluation that our identity as persons is circumscribed. 
Deprived of this we would, in Taylor's words, 'cease to be ourselves, by which we 
do not mean trivially that we would be different in the sense of having some 
properties other than those we now have ... but that we would lose the very 
possibility of being an agent who evaluates; that our existence as persons, and hence 
our ability to adhere as persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside 
the horizon of these essential evaluations that we would break down as persons, be 
incapable of being persons in the full sense.'' 
Practical knowledge may well be possible but only where there is a measure of self-
knowledge whereby particular courses of action are imbued with significance within 
a particular scheme of things. The truth of this becomes apparent when we consider 
what it would be like to commit oneself to values on the basis of desire-satisfaction 
alone. Such a policy would leave one totally devoid of personal integrity. The 
satisfied desire is (trivially) my desire, but for that desire to be part of me in the 
sense that it is me that is satisfied and not merely the desire, a view of the self is 
required which is defined by reference to something other than that which is in 
endless pursuit of desire-satisfaction however reflectively arrived at. The idea is not 
easy to spell out, but I believe it receives careful and elegant articulation in a book 
by Michael Sandel. 
`In so far as I possess something, I am at once related to it and 
distanced from it. To say that I possess a certain trait or desire or 
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ambition, is to say that I am related to it in a certain way - it is mine 
rather than yours - and also that I am distanced from it in a certain 
way - it is mine rather than me. The latter point means that if I lose 
a thing I possess, I am still the same 'I' who had it; this is the sense, 
paradoxical at first, but unavoidable on reflection, in which the notion 
of possession is a distancing notion. 
	 This distancing aspect is 
essential to the continuity of the self. 
	 It preserves for the self a 
certain dignity and integrity by saving it from transformation in the 
face of the slightest contingency. Preserving this distance, and the 
integrity it implies, typically requires a certain kind of self-knowledge. 
To preserve the distinction between what is me and what is (merely) 
mine, I must know, or be able to sort out when the occasion demands, 
something about who I am.'" 
One is reminded of an essay by Iris Murdoch in which she is critical of reducing 
individuality to an abstract and lonely will.' Such an analysis, she believes, 'makes 
no sense of (a person) as continually active, as making progress, or of her inner acts 
as belonging to her or forming part of a continuous fabric of being'. And it is such 
metaphors as 'fabric of being' and 'vision' which are indispensable. What we desire 
is a function of what we can see, which means that we are not free to choose in the 
way that Hare and Sartre would have us believe, because what we see is not entirely 
within our control. 'Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational thinker and 
a personal will. He is a confined being who sees, and who desires in accordance 
with what he sees, and who has some slight control over the direction and focus of 
his vision.' 
Although White appears not to recognise the distinction between desire-satisfaction 
and self-satisfaction its force becomes apparent in his example of a pupil who is asked 
to reflect upon the merits or otherwise of a career in the civil service. White wants 
him to ask questions like 'Is the secure life of a civil servant found to prove satisfying 
to me in the long term?' and would caution him to think this through in the full 
knowledge of what he is.' But looked at within the context of well-being as PRDS, 
it is impossible to grant that there is any more to all this than making a choice of 
career in the light of those desires he would like satisfied, or, which is more or less 
the same thing, which desires left unsatisfied will cause him most frustration. But 
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in reflecting on the kind of person one is, one is engaged in an altogether different 
enterprise from reflecting on what it is one most desires together with the best means 
of realising it. As Sandel puts it: 
`Where the subject is regarded as prior to ends, self-knowledge is not 
a possibility .... The bounds of the self are fixed and within them all 
is transparent. The relevant moral question is not "Who am I?" (for 
the answer to this question is given in advance) but rather "What ends 
shall I choose?" and this is a question that is addressed to the will. 
For the self whose identity is constituted in the light of ends already 
before it, agency consists less in summoning the will than in seeking 
self-understanding. The relevant question is not what ends to choose, 
for my problem is precisely that the answer to this question is already 
given, but rather who I am, and how I am to discern in this cluster of 
possible ends what is me from what is mine. Here the bounds of the 
self are not fixtures but possibilities, their contours no longer self- 
evident but at least partly informed. 	 Rendering them clear and 
defining my identity are one and the same.'' 
It is all very well for White to invoke the metaphor of 'depth' and the necessity of 
penetrating to the 'fundamental layers of one's being' but in the context of his 
overall thesis it is not clear what this could possibly mean. 
Iris Murdoch believes that when proper attention is given to the moral context in 
which action is required, there is little or no scope for choice as such. If this is 
correct, the implications for a theory of freedom and for bringing up children to 
understand something of their own well-being are profound. This emphasis on one's 
status as a moral being is crucial if we are properly to understand what is involved 
in reflecting, not only about moral dilemmas, but upon the numerous possibilities 
open to one. Not only must children be brought up to have some understanding of 
who they are and what it is that really matters to them but, importantly, they must 
learn to appreciate the significance of the broader social context in which decisions 
are made and actions are performed. Decisions made in ignorance of this are not 
those of the free man but of one who is, to varying degrees, blinkered or constrained 
in his appreciation of the full significance of what he might be doing. For there to 
be any possibility of practical knowledge the scope for individual choice must of 
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necessity be restricted.' This claim, together with its implications for individual 
freedom and well-being, merits careful examination. 
From his earliest days, the child chooses within the context of a particular culture 
with a language, concepts and traditions of its own. These are inherited and are as 
much a part of his self-identity as any desires he might have or choices he might 
make. Indeed, it is impossible to see how he could come to want anything at all 
without reference to this shared and common framework. Not only does it determine 
his whole conception of himself, it provides him with the wherewithal for the 
adoption of those ideals in accordance with which he is able to conclude that it is 
better to do one thing rather than another. A child who was denied access to such 
a tradition, and all that it implies, would be denied the very possibility of choice and 
his actions would not be those of a free agent but of one imprisoned in a solipsistic 
world. Supposing reflection to be possible in such a world, it would amount to little 
more than something geared to the satisfaction of contingent desires; he would be 
unfree to deliberate upon the value of ends or upon the extent to which their pursuit 
might contribute to his self-fulfilment. To appreciate this is to begin to appreciate 
what is involved in the social nature of man. 
It seems that the significance of this has only recently been appreciated. In order to 
appreciate the shortcomings of individualism and subjectivism, both of which in some 
form or other seem to be presupposed by White, it is worth considering the 
arguments advanced by people like Alasdair Maclntyre in his After Virtue," and by 
John Kekes in an article entitled 'Moral Sensitivity' .49 As a result, I hope to be in 
a stronger position to be able to substantiate the claim that the language of 'discovery' 
is more appropriate in characterising the nature of the teacher's task in enabling 
pupils to appreciate the direction in which their well-being might lie, than is the 
language of 'choice' so favoured by White. 
It is a characteristic feature of modernity, Maclntyre believes, that conceptions of 
selfhood have become divorced not only from the roles which people adopt but also 
from what he calls a 'narrative' linking the various stages of human life. Just as it 
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is impossible to understand what someone is doing apart from a particular context or 
setting involving intentions, institutions and practices, such 'settings' have a narrative 
history of their own. 	 'We identify a particular action only by invoking, at least 
implicity, two kinds of context ... we place the agent's intentions ... in causal and 
temporal order with reference to their role in his history, and we also place them with 
reference to their roles in the history of the setting(s) to which they belong.'50 One 
notable characteristic of all lived narratives is their teleological nature. 'We live out 
our lives ... in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future ... There 
is no present which is not informed by some image of some future ... which always 
presents itself in the form of a telos - or a variety of ends or goals - towards which 
we are either moving or failing to move in the present.' The implications for 
selfhood are twofold: (i) my personal identity depends not merely on my own 
psychological states, as Locke amongst others would have it, but on what I am 
justifiably taken by others to be during my lifetime; (ii) I am essentially part of 
others' narratives just as they are of mine. To ignore the 'social' aspects of one's 
existence is to misrepresent what is involved in the notion of the unity of one's life, 
and without a proper understanding of what such a unity consists in, the answers to 
questions concerning one's well-being will inevitably be deficient. 	 The self of 
individualism is whatever it chooses to be, but it is a self with no moral identity at 
all. It is a self without a tradition (or at least one that may ignore such traditions at 
will). Such a self cannot really be characterised as being in search of his well-being - 
this being merely chosen; 	 the search for one's good 'is generally and 
characteristically constructed within a context defined by those traditions of which the 
individual's life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal to 
practices and of the goods of a single life.'52 	 As Maclntyre concludes, the 
presupposition of any objective conclusion about what is 'good for X' is a conception 
of the unity of X's life. 'What is better or worse for X depends upon the character 
of that intelligible narrative which provides X's life with unity. Unsurprisingly it is 
the lack of any such unifying conception of human life which underlies modern 
denials of the rational character of moral judgements ....53 'Right' and 'wrong' 
presuppose the possibility of being mistaken, yet, ex hypothesi, this is something for 
which, in the example from Sartre referred to earlier, there is no room. And yet the 
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young man was confronted with a moral dilemma and he knew it. But the reason 
why this is so is because he was sufficiently unclear about his ideals and priorities; 
he was unsure as to what really mattered at the time, seeing himself under the 
description of a son or a French citizen, or some combination of these. When one 
is forced to choose between descriptions of this kind one is better positioned to clarify 
who one really is. 	 Such clarification may, alternatively, be characterised as a 
process of discovery. One's ideals and identity are not created in such situations; 
it is more a case of discovering those things which are of ultimate significance in 
one's life. 
John Kekes also draws our attention to the fact that a setting or tradition is required 
in order to provide human actions with any intelligibility. Just as a composer is able 
to write down any note he decides, for these notes to add up to anything remotely 
meaningful he is restricted by the tradition of which he is but a small part, such as 
that involved in the creation of a string quartet. Intelligibility is not a function of his 
will but something that depends on a familiarity with the language of music. If he 
is fortunate there will be a certain inevitability in his notation. But it is not only 
within the confines of art that reference to choice is misleading. Within the bounds 
of logical and physical possibility I can do almost anything I choose, but the 
significance of what is done is outside my control, for this is something requiring a 
shared conceptual framework. 	 This is especially true, according to Kekes, in 
morality. 'Choosing an action is rarely, and only exceptionally, a conscious active 
process of deliberation. An agent acts as a matter of course given the past, his 
ideals, his perception of the situation, and the practical exigencies. 
	 This is why 
concentration on choice obscures the real texture of moral life. To appreciate that 
texture one must start with how a person sees the situation in which he is to act. 
Sensitive perception is the crux of the matter.' 
If we take friendship as an example we will, I think, appreciate the truth of this. If 
my friend is in difficulty and I am in a position to help, I do so; I do not first 
construct a practical syllogism and conclude that I ought to help - nor can the 
assistance be construed as something I choose to give - there may be occasions when 
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my loyalties to my family outweigh those due to my friend but it is these very 
loyalties which prevent me from giving her the help she requires; I don't choose not 
to help her, nor choose to put my family first. It is the circumstances which, given 
my perceptions and ideals, determine my actions; I perceive the situation in the way 
I do as a result of coming to acknowledge that certain things have a particular value 
and importance in my life. The values in accordance with which I decide what to 
do are instantiated in my particular circumstances and relationships. There is a sense 
in which I know what is called for or what is appropriate. But practical knowledge 
of this kind would be impossible if it were not for this shared public world of ways 
of seeing and coming to value relationships and activities of various kinds. The 
situation not only determines what one does, it is the spur to the appropriate feeling 
or emotion which occasions the appropriate action. Thus I can be said to know what 
to feel and be held accountable if I fail to act in accordance with the appropriate 
emotion. A moral education is necessarily incomplete if it fails to attempt to engage 
children's emotions. 	 A child should learn to feel remorse, grief or whatever, 
because the occasion demands it, and not because he is led to conclude as much by 
a process of deductive reasoning. 
According to Kekes, one's sensitivity to a moral situation depends on what he calls 
the 'moral idioms' available. These are provided by the language, tradition and 
culture and they include such descriptive appraisals as considerate, honest, 
courageous, conscientious, cruel, selfish, obsequious and arrogant. 	 Their 
significance is only partly culturally dependent; significance is also a function of the 
breadth and depth of understanding a moral agent brings with him to a situation.' 
Thus it is that Kekes believes that one's sensitivity to a moral situation is dependent 
on the significance one attaches to the moral idioms at one's disposal. Where one 
is able to employ moral idioms successfully in the characterisation of a situation, the 
requisite course of action is generally straightforward. This is why the choice of 
action is far less problematic than the selection of idioms and thus where reflection 
is particularly important. Its function is to give breadth and depth to the employment 
of moral idioms: 'to see both that our moral idioms are the conventional products of 
the social context we happen to live in, and that underlying the various conventions 
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there is an abiding concern with benefit and harm and with living a good life.' 
Reflection enables one to make important discoveries; it is necessary if we are to 
develop a greater moral sensitivity whereby we are able to recognise that what we had 
hitherto taken to be a correct understanding of a situation was superficial and 
incomplete. The deeper comprehension, which is the outcome of reflection, is not 
itself a matter for individual choice. Discoveries of this kind, Kekes maintains, are 
not like those of a tone-deaf man suddenly acquiring musical appreciation, it is more 
akin to a musical person coming to appreciate a particularly difficult work. 
Expressed in this way it may look as though one is advocating an account of the way 
in which values come to be assigned which is excessively deterministic. If one were 
entirely passive with respect to discoveries of this kind the characterisation of a 
situation in terms of one moral idiom rather than another would rest on a purely 
causal relation between the experiences to which one was subject and the language 
in which one's evaluations were formulated. The result would be an individual who 
was no more than a passive register of competing evaluative characterisations and, 
as such, totally bereft of that requisite degree of personal autonomy for any life-plan 
to count as authentically his own. He would be no more than what Martin Hollis 
refers to as 'Plastic Man' whose identity is socially created and whose behaviour is 
to be explained in terms of a programme he did not write.' Such a man will lack 
responsibility not only for the language in terms of which any moral judgement or 
decision on his part is rendered significant or intelligible, he will also bear no 
responsibility for his self-identity in that the answer to the question 'Who am I'?' is 
in no small part a function of the answers one gives to questions like 'What matters 
to me?', 'How should I characterise a particular state of affairs?', 'Why do I identify 
this particular state of affairs as one of moral conflict?' and so on. 
In reaction to such a passive conception it is all too easy to express the alternative in 
terms of individual choice. A system of values is not something which is simply 
adopted or chosen at will. In his article 'On Seeing Things Differently',58 Richard 
Norman ably demonstrates that although the figure in Leeper's Ambiguous Lady 
Illusion 'can be seen as a picture of a young woman or an old woman, the fact 
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remains that in spite of there being more than one way of seeing the figure it does not 
follow that this is entirely subjective; we cannot see the figure in any old way. 
What is there imposes limitations on what is seen. As Norman says: 
`The possibilities are made available by the concepts in our language; 
what is possible for us to see depends upon how it is possible for us 
to conceptualize our experience. (However we do see the figure) it 
cannot correctly be seen as a man.' 
And he draws a parallel between ways of seeing such pictures and Weltanschauungen. 
... the possible ways of seeing man's nature and his place in the 
universe are made available by the moral and intellectual traditions 
within one's culture. Thus there are limits to what can be said. And 
what is said can be more or less accurate. The available traditions do 
not confine us once and for all; new ways of seeing can be developed 
and extended - but not arbitrarily.' 59 
Just as I cannot choose to see the figure in one way rather than another (at least not 
initially), I can no more be said to choose a particular Weltanschauung. 	 The 
appropriate vocabulary, Norman argues, is akin to that of 'discovery' in that one's 
position vis-a-vis the underlying values which affect one's whole outlook towards 
social institutions are in some sense forced on one. How and why this is so is a 
complex matter and not easy to elucidate; so much depends on particular 
circumstances. Social interaction often leads to fresh insight concerning that which 
is of ultimate significance. One is frequently forced to take stock and reassess any 
such new insight resulting either from long and careful reflection or from sudden 
inspiration. There is a sense in which nothing has altered, yet one sees things in a 
different light. As far as the figure of the old/young woman is concerned, nothing 
in the sketch has changed but I may come to see it differently. Having seen it as an 
old woman and subsequently as a young woman I can no doubt choose to see it in one 
of two ways, but I am not at all sure that this is so easy when it comes to moral 
points of view. The language and conceptual vocabulary at one's disposal provide 
the limits in terms of which a moral standpoint is adopted or characterised. This is 
why I have italicised the last part of the quotation from Norman. Seeing things 
differently in morality is indeed possible - if it were not there would be no such thing 
as moral development - but what one sees is far from arbitrary. If one could choose 
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to see a situation in any old way the arbitrariness involved would deprive the notion 
of choice of any meaning whatsoever. If Sartre's student opted to stay with his aged 
mother without any reason whatever he could scarcely be said to have chosen 
anything at all, for choices presuppose reasons and moral dilemmas present 
themselves as such because of the ways in which alternative courses of action are 
recognised as legitimate claims on our allegiance. Without reasons the distinction 
between choosing to 4 and simply finding oneself 43-ing would collapse. 
While I am denying that one is simply forced to see a situation in a particular moral 
light, the sense in which one is free to adopt an alternative moral point of view needs 
to be made explicit. There are two equally valid ways of seeing the sketch under 
discussion but it begs some very important questions concerning objectivity in moral 
judgement to assume that each and every moral point of view is of equal validity or 
merit.60 The kind of choice involved in seeing a figure as either an old or young 
woman is very different from that in the formation of a world view. World views 
are formed on the basis of our evaluations which rest on our ability to articulate and 
characterise situations in terms of moral idioms. In characterising something as 
ignoble, base or unworthy, I am providing reasons why a course of action should be 
avoided. But in characterising a situation thus I am not merely choosing so to do, 
nor is my decision not to perform an unworthy action simply a matter of choice.' 
Moral idioms are selected not on the basis of a some Kantian-like lonely will but on 
the basis of deeper and more fundamental evaluations which are bound up with my 
entire self-identity. Who I am is intimately bound up with what I take to be of 
fundamental importance. 
	 I am not a mere product of my upbringing with a 
particular culture and language. 
	 Certainly I did not choose to grow within a 
particular cultural tradition, but having acquired a conceptual vocabulary with which 
to make sense of the world I am in a position to render articulate my most 
fundamental evaluations and in so doing take on some responsibility for my failure 
to re-evaluate my decision. In this way I am not a 'Plastic Man' to be explained as 
the end product of a complex causal chain. If this is so, we can begin to see how 
it is that we are not entirely passive with regard to what we acknowledge to be of 
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value or the desirable thing to do, be or become. But there is a difference between 
being responsible for a world view and simply choosing it. A world view is adopted 
because certain things matter in our lives; we are no more capable of repudiating 
them (by a simple act of will) than we are of becoming someone else. As Taylor 
agues, 
`Our (evaluations) are articulations of what is worthy, or higher, or 
more integrated, or more fulfilling, and so on. But as articulations 
they offer a purchase for the concept of responsibility. Much of our 
motivation - our decisions, aspirations, evaluations - is not simply 
given. 	 We give it formulation in words or images ... these 
articulations are not simply descriptions - (in the way that my 
characterisation of a table as brown is a simple description). On the 
contrary, articulations are attempts to formulate what is initially 
inchoate, or confused, or badly formulated (which) does not leave its 
object unchanged. To give a certain articulation is to shape our sense 
of what we desire or what we hold important in a certain way .... We 
can say therefore that our self-interpretations are partly constitutive of 
our experience. (In other words) certain modes of experience are not 
possible without certain self-descriptions .... That description and 
experience are bound together in this constitutive relation admits of 
causal influence in both directions: it can sometimes allow us to alter 
experience by coming to fresh insight; but more fundamentally it 
circumscribes insight through the deeply embedded shape of experience 
for us .... Our articulations, just because they partly shape their 
objects, engage our responsibility in a way that simple descriptions do 
not. This happens in two related ways which correspond to the two 
directions of causal influence mentioned above ... '62 
Taylor goes on to suggest that our insight into what we value depends upon, and to 
a large extent is limited by, the nature of our experience and yet we often pass 
judgement on a man's character for his limited insight due to insensitivity or 
fanaticism. 	 The other sense in which we hold people responsible for their 
evaluations is the way in which it is always open to us to re-evaluate. As I have 
suggested, at least this much is required if talk of moral development is to make 
sense. 
Re-evaluating one's most fundamental evaluations is a salutary and sometimes painful 
experience. It is at this level of attention to what is really important in one's life that 
one is most deeply engaged in self-definition. It must of necessity be a gradual 
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process for one cannot question all of one's values at once. It need not take place 
in the security of one's study; social intercourse and the decisions confronting one 
in daily life not only provide the stimulus but the context whereby one's use of moral 
idioms gains a particular significance. I respond as I do because I am, amongst 
other things, a father and a teacher. 	 Even though roles cannot determine my 
evaluations, those things to which I attach value and significance which go towards 
defining me as I am are discovered in activity. Actions, of course, are context-
dependent and much of what I do as a father and teacher is the result of standing in 
a particular relationship to my children and students. It is by relating to them and 
countless others as I do do that I come to be the person that I am. And yet I am 
more than the mere occupant of particular roles. If, in explaining my actions, I were 
to invoke nothing more than my role as such and such I would be evading my 
responsibility as a person and moral agent. As Cohen has argued, the citation of a 
role is never a sufficient reason for 4-ing.63 It is because I am more than just a 
father and a teacher that I can be held responsible for what I do and care about qua 
father and teacher. At the end of the day I am a man with particular convictions and 
my actions must be explained and assessed by reference to something more than the 
roles I occupy. What is quite compatible with the fact that I belong to a vast and 
complex network of relationships and roles is that I do not choose a particular world-
view and then set about acting in accordance with it. I come to endorse or repudiate 
world-views in activity. 	 It is activity which provides the basis for any self- 
knowledge I might have. In activity I make discoveries about myself; discoveries 
about past actions and the ways in which in future they must be characterised. 
Richard Norman reminds us of how well aware Tolstoy was of what is involved here. 
Before Austerlitz in War and Peace Prince Andrew Bolkonski makes such a 
discovery. Norman puts it thus: 
`The way in which experience ... serves to "confirm" a world-view is 
not a matter of matching a hypothesis against the corresponding 
observation(s). Rather, one finds that a certain perspective enables 
one to make sense of and to render intelligible the experience which 
one has lived through. 	 Thus Prince Andrew's vision of the sky 
enables him to look back at his previous experiences and see them for 
what they were - the empty gestures of military heroism, the feverish 
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and impassioned activity for the sake of trivial rewards, his own 
deliberate refusal to face certain aspects of his life.'' 
In this example the discovery is dramatic and sudden but further reflection may be 
said to confirm such 'flashes of insight' one way or the other. It is this, the more 
profound understanding that one has of a situation, that is not a matter of individual 
choice. It is a recognition and an acknowledgement that one has no choice in what 
one now takes to be of supreme importance, and when it is the result of careful 
reflection it is reflection on something worlds removed from that which will satisfy 
a coherently ordered set of desires. Any discussion of the relationship between 
`choice' and 'discovery' of values must guard against the temptation to become too 
schematic. There is an interplay between the two which is both subtle and complex. 
Nowhere is the complexity of the relationship between the notions of 'choice' and 
`discovery' more clearly demonstrated than in a stimulating paper by Alan 
Montefiore.' Choosing a set of values or embarking on a course of action is, 
according to Montefiore, irresponsible if not made on the basis of an understanding 
of context and circumstances. By circumstances he is referring to both external and 
internal factors in that both are part of one's fundamental nature. They are not to 
be thought of as fully and determinately 'given' in that one is powerless to do 
anything about them ... neither are they necessarily open to immediately evident 
recognition by simple introspection nor to modification in whatever direction one 
might consciously wish to impose on them.' He quotes Laurie Taylor who wrote 
in The Observer on 13th February 1977: 'When I think of all the time that I could 
have saved over the years by not wondering where my true self was or about the 
amount of progress I had made - if I had only realised that it was all a myth, then I 
think that I would have enjoyed myself a lot more' and points to the significant 
mixture of truth and confusion in all this. While it is true that: 
`myself, as I find it within myself at any given moment is formed in 
part out of my own past choices, had I chosen otherwise at such and 
such a turning in my road I should not be where and what I am today, 
but my past choices were once my present choices, just as the choices 
I face and have to make today will tomorrow belong to my past: my 
choices face me not as facts to be discovered but as decisions to be 
taken ... but this is not, very evidently, to say that the extent to which 
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my own nature lies within the power of my own self-determination is 
boundless. There are many things which I can neither do nor be, no 
matter how much I may try, or which I could only do or be at some 
morally unacceptable price; the concept of a morally unacceptable 
price is itself tied up with that of one's own self-reality or truth.' 
Montefiore is at pains to emphasise the fact that one's own reality, while depending 
in part on one's choices and present and future decisions, requires us 'to accept as our 
own at each particular moment of our lives a reality which for all that it may not be 
wholly determinate, is nevertheless at that moment given to us. '68 Invoking Charles 
Taylor's notion of strong evaluation he insists that 'our choices and evaluations 
remain, whether weakly or strongly, superficial if they are not rooted in the inner and 
outer reality out of which we are choosing. And this must include the recognition 
that there must always be more to these roots than whatever we may believe ourselves 
to have discovered so far.'' One's 'self-reality' then, is something to be discovered 
and recognised on the one hand and determined on the other. In his discussion of 
what is involved in strong evaluation, Montefiore makes what is a very profound 
point concerning the connection between the self's concern with itself as it were, and 
its concern with the community of which it is a part. He quotes from an unpublished 
paper by Thomas Wren to the effect that 'strong evaluation is not the auto-erotic 
activity of a purely inward-looking entelechy, but rather the reflecting phase or aspect 
of the self's commerce with the world.' As Montefiore says: 
`To decide what values to espouse is to determine not only some small 
part of the network of the world .... But to make such values my own 
is at once to make them part of myself, as I project myself towards the 
future, and to contribute to the constitution of that world of which they 
will become a part .... Strong evaluation conceived in this way 
involves a double movement, towards the disappearance of clear 
distinctions between concern with self and concern with others and 
towards loss of the distinction embodied in the language of different 
orders of desires. '71  
All this is profoundly relevant to the teacher's task. As we shall see, children learn 
how to want. As our understanding of and familiarity with moral idioms grows, our 
ability to characterise and accurately evaluate the plethora of possibilities before us 
is deepened. In the very young there will inevitably be an element of hit and miss 
in all of this. Learning how to use the appropriate moral idiom is a complex matter. 
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What is essential however is that a young child should be presented with fairly clear 
cut exemplars or ideals. As he grows older he will, in all probability, rely on such 
ideals on which to base his own beliefs and actions and these will necessarily have 
a measure of inauthenticity about them. It is a mark of maturity however that a 
person is able to dispense with models of this kind and to take on a greater measure 
of responsibility for what kind of person he shall be henceforward. But the reasons 
underpinning commitment to a set of values are not themselves self-chosen. They 
are in part due to choices made in the past by me as a member of a community where 
reasons are public and non-arbitrary.' In so doing their autonomy is strengthened 
and within the security of the classroom they are engaged in that all-important process 
of self-discovery and self-affirmation. Opportunities should be granted to children 
within certain prudential and moral boundaries to make their own decisions about 
what to do and what to believe, for it would be absurd to expect them to make 
important discoveries relating to their well-being without such opportunities, just as 
it would be equally absurd to expect them to recognise where their well-being might 
lie without reference to genuine and important discoveries relating to matters which 
are, for them, of ultimate significance and by reference to which their choices derive 
substance and meaning. 
If we consider the teacher's task and the responsibility he has for helping children, 
particularly adolescents, to re-evaluate their commitments and values, there is 
obviously much to be done throughout the curriculum but in particular in those 
sessions devoted specifically to personal and social education. If personal education 
is to amount to anything at all it must address itself to exactly this. Pupils must be 
provided with the opportunity to discuss their most deeply held convictions and 
expose them to critical assessment. They need this if they are to be helped in the 
difficult process of re-evaluating those things which really matter to them and which 
appear to provide point and purpose to their lives. It is absurd to expect very young 
children critically to evaluate the values in accordance with which they live. At this 
stage their values are being formed by parents, teachers and others. These values 
in turn affect desires and decisions. 	 Teachers have a particularly important 
responsibility to ensure that children are provided with every opportunity to subject 
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values to critical scrutiny. Unless such dispositions are formed early on in life a 
person is likely to become habituated to ways of thinking and behaving which are 
only in small part his own. 	 Quite simply teachers have to ask pupils a lot of 
awkward questions, many of which may well result in discomfort; the amount of 
discomfort experienced will in part depend on the rigidity with which such 
assumptions have been held and the degree to which parents and others have been 
effective in discouraging doubt. Where a child has had a particularly blinkered or 
bigoted upbringing teachers have to tread very carefully if their attempts to foster the 
child's capacity to think for himself are not to be rendered counterproductive. 
Teachers must also draw their pupils' attention to ways in which circumstances 
(external to themselves and not always under their control) affect and shape the values 
in terms of which the process of re-evaluation is to get a purchase. In re-evaluating 
his basic and most fundamental evaluations an adolescent needs to be made aware of 
the complex web of interrelationships between his own past choices as well as the 
decisions made on his behalf, all of which have contributed to making him the person 
he is. He ignores this at his peril; any decisions or commitments made without due 
reference to this are both futile and incoherent in that they are no longer the gestures 
of a being with a self-identity. 
It is my contention that both freedom and well-being have as much to do with the 
making of rational choices as being free from constraints, and I have insisted that 
desire-satisfaction is inadequate as a basis for rational choice. I have also maintained 
that rational choice presupposes some account of an individual's real-interests or well-
being and it will be my concern in Section 6 to articulate an account of what is at 
least necessary in all this. I hope to be able to demonstrate that being a chooser 
presupposes a measure of personal autonomy and that this is both an essential 
ingredient of well-being as well as providing the grounding, as it were, in terms of 
which freedom acquires its value. 
4.2 	 Informed-Desires and Well-Being 
In his most recent book, Education and The Good Life, White has moved from 
construing well-being as post-reflective-desire-satisfaction to well-being as the 
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satisfaction of informed-desires or those desires one would have were one in 
possession of information enabling one to appreciate the implications of satisfying a 
particular desire.' In so doing he acknowledges the fact that desires are not all on 
one level in that we may have desires to have nor not to have any particular desire. 
Recognising that desires have a hierarchical structure - which for Griffin provides the 
criterion for informed-desire (ID)74 - does not, White quite rightly maintains, imply 
a neat and tidy desire structure 'with one or two master desires at the top and 
everything else subordinate to them'. We are all too familiar with desires all of 
which we are intent upon satisfying but which, for a variety of reasons, largely to do 
with the brevity of life, we are unable to fulfil. Unfortunately White moves too 
speedily from his rejection of a PRDS account of well-being to what appears to him 
as the only alternative. Before examining what informed desires are supposed to be 
and why their satisfaction might be thought to be synonymous with personal well-
being it is worth reminding ourselves of what it is about the satisfaction of actual (as 
opposed to informed) desires which makes it so unsatisfactory as an account of well-
being. 
Firstly, and most obviously, many of our desires however authentic they may be are 
for things which are either harmful or trivial. The satisfaction obtained may be 
altogether incompatible with our well-being or have so little consequence as to 
contribute nothing whatsoever. Secondly, and of particular significance for teachers, 
people may well desire all kinds of things on the basis of inadequate or totally false 
information. 	 As they become more informed about the object of desire and, 
importantly, about themselves and the relationship between the two, they may well 
find that they no longer desire any such thing. Education has an indispensable role 
in helping children to formulate and reformulate their desires in accordance with 
increasing self-knowledge and understanding. As such it is instrumental in creating 
desires we never had and never would have in a state of ignorance. A person's 
desires (or lack of desires) may not only be due to lack of relevant information, they 
may be due to lack of appropriate concepts in terms of which desires are formulated. 
Without the appropriate conceptual apparatus one cannot even imagine that certain 
things are suitable 'objects' of desire. Again, teachers have a crucial part to play 
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here, not only to open children's eyes to the number and variety of desirable things 
and actions from which to choose but, as White himself insists, to help children 
organise their burgeoning desires by imposing some sort of hierarchical structure on 
them by reference to which conflict between them may be minimised. 
In contrast to an actual-desire account of well-being the prima facie attraction of the 
ID account is obvious. Assuming that one is aware of the implications of satisfying 
certain desires whereby one has a clear understanding of the objects of one's desire, 
one is less likely to be confronted with unresolved conflict and certainly less likely 
to fall victim to one's desires.' The ID account would also appear to accord very 
nicely with the view that there is no universally applicable summum bonum to which 
we should all aspire. People vary in their interests and enthusiasms, their characters 
and dispositions, tastes and convictions. Personal well-being varies accordingly. 
Recognition of individual differences would thus appear to sit quite comfortably with 
an account of well-being in terms of informed-desires and preferences. In reality, 
however, the whole idea of informed-desire is more problematic than people like 
White and Griffin would have us believe. 
First of all there is the problem of rendering the account of well-being in terms of ID 
intelligible. How, for example, are we supposed to decide between two incompatible 
courses of action which one would lead to most desire-satisfaction. Our desires are 
far from constant whether they be for careers, partners or specific pleasures. To the 
suggestion that it is desires at the time of satisfaction which count, Richard Brandt has 
doubts raised by the following example: 
`a convinced sceptic who has rebelled against a religious background 
wants, most of his life, no priest to be called when he is about to die. 
But he weakens on his deathbed, and asks for a priest. 
	 Do we 
maximise his welfare by summoning a priest? Some would say not, 
in view of his past desires. 	 The programme also ignores future 
regrets. '76 
Griffin is at least aware of the problem: 
... preferences change, and not always in a way that allows us totally 
to discount earlier ones. Suppose that for much of his life a person 
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wanted his friends to keep him from vegetating when he retired but, 
now that he has retired, wants to be left to vegetate. Is there any 
intelligible programme for weighing desires that change with time and 
hence for maximising fulfilment? If not we may be driven back to a 
happiness or mental state account.'" 
I admit to sharing Brandt's scepticism about the intelligibility of such a programme 
in spite of what Griffin has to say later in the book. 	 However the issues are 
complex in the extreme and I do not want to become bogged down with this problem 
when there are other problems for the ID account which are particularly difficult to 
overcome. 
There are numerous occasions when one's ID is for something that is manifestly 
incompatible with well-being. I may be fully informed about the harmful effects of 
smoking tobacco while continuing to smoke the stuff. Here my ID is to smoke 
tobacco in the full knowledge that my capacity to flourish is likely to be damaged 
thereby. In other words the informed-desires in accordance with which one acts are 
not coincidental with those actions which serve one's long-term interests and which 
are necessary for the avoidance of permanent disability and premature death. And 
the ID theorist cannot escape by pretending to restrict ID to only those desires a 
person would have were he properly to appreciate the information unless he can 
provide us with an account of what it is to 'appreciate' such information that is not 
circular. As Garrett Thomson puts it: 
`It is circular to define "appreciation" in terms of our informed 
preferences matching what is valuable, e.g. a person appreciates what 
he prefers if and only if he prefers Y to X only when Y is more 
valuable than X .... Without an independent grip on the ... notion of 
appreciation in the phrase "what a person would prefer if he 
appreciated what it is like to have what he prefers", it advances us no 
further to define prudential value in terms of this phrase.'' 
And again: 
`However much we juggle with the notion of an informed preference, 
it seems to be merely a general contingent truth subject to counter-
instances that people's informed desires are for the prudentially good. 
Because this is a contingent truth subject to exceptions, we cannot 
define the primary value relevant to harm in terms of informed desire: 
the latter cannot constitute the former.'79 
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Griffin himself more or less concedes as much in his appeal to our rough notion of 
well-being in deciding which informed-desires to exclude from (his) account of well-
being' but I confess to finding his account of how such circular reasoning might be 
avoided both unclear and unconvincing. If something is in accordance with my well-
being it is in virtue of something other than the fact that I have an informed 
preference for it. Even if it were the case that my desire to smoke tobacco ceased 
after witnessing a particularly vivid health education video on its harmful effects, the 
fact remains that the reason why quitting the habit is better for me is because of the 
advantages of not smoking and not because I have an informed desire to quit.' In 
other words the reason why the consumption of harmful substances and well-being 
are incompatible has to do with the harmful effects of the substance in question and 
not simply a function of my having an ID to abstain. Informed desires are the result 
of our coming to appreciate the nature or characteristics of that for which we have 
the desire. It is precisely because we see things in a certain light - as something 
worth obtaining or avoiding that we end up having some informed preferences rather 
than others. 
But this is to anticipate. It assumes that the correct relationship between something 
having value and its being desired is in the direction from value to desire; things are 
wanted because of the desirability-characteristics which may legitimately be attributed 
to them rather than being valued in virtue of a pre-existing desire. There is an 
abundance of literature in contemporary moral philosophy in support of both sides of 
the argument and the debate raises deeply complex issues concerning the existence 
of objective values. Although I cannot possibly do justice to the complexity of the 
question, it is my contention that the subjectivism implicit in all forms of desire-
satisfaction accounts of well-being (and freedom) is reason enough to lead us to 
search for a more objective alternative. 
White is sceptical of the success of any such enterprise. He asks: 'What kind of 
thing can a desire-independent value be? Where does it exist? How does one know 
that it exists? If X is said to be valuable for any individual, but someone does not 
desire X at all and would be deeply distressed if he had X, then how could it be 
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shown that X was really good for him or her? .... How could (acquaintance with a 
value move someone in its favour) unless she already had a desire of some sort which 
caused her to be moved in this way?'82 According to White, the claim that 
`perception of values' is sufficient to generate desires within us demands an account 
of both the metaphysical status of values and the causal mechanism whereby our 
perception of the former generates the latter within us. There are two quite separate 
issues here. One has to do with what a value might be (its ontological status), the 
other is concerned with its motivating force. If we are to establish the case for a 
more objective account of rational choice and well-being than any form of the desire-
satisfaction account permits, it is incumbent upon us to meet the sceptical challenge 
that sense be attached to the idea of objective value, the recognition of which being 
sufficient to explain and justify a moral stance without recourse to desire as an 
inescapable motivational feature. In order to refute the subjectivism associated with 
a desire-satisfaction account of well-being and the model of reasons for action on 
which it relies we have to demonstrate the plausibility of there being 'real' values 
existing, in some sense of that expression yet to be determined, 'in the world'. 
However I intend to defer this discussion until the second part of the next section 
where the relationship between value and desire will be explained more fully. 
Before then I wish to expose the shortcomings of that view of rational choice which 
is predicated on desires already held. 
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	5. 	 DESIRE-SATISFACTION, RATIONALITY AND VALUE 
	
5.1 
	 The means-end view of rationality' 
There is a familiar and widely held view concerning the rationality of actions which 
may be summarised as follows: an agent is rational if he adopts the requisite means 
towards optimally satisfying his desires overall. There are many variations and 
qualifications, the details of which need not detain us.' However, the account is 
nowhere more clearly presented than in Rawls's Theory of Justice ... the concept of 
rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in 
economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends.' I shall refer 
to this theory in what follows as the standard account. A rational person according 
to this 'is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between options open to him. 
He rates the options according to how well they further his purpose; he follows the 
plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater 
chance of being successfully executed.'4 
The features which serve to distinguish the standard account of rational action are 
thus (i) the adoption of the most efficacious means to the achievement of a given end; 
(ii) the pursuit of ends which are not inconsistent or mutually incompatible; and (iii) 
the maximisation of goal achievement. 
The standard account of rationality is open to a number of objections. First of all, 
the adoption of appropriate means to the attainment of a particular end is not 
altogether unambiguous.' Secondly, there are reasons for doubting that no more is 
required of a rational chooser than the adoption of the requisite means to a self-
chosen end. Even if defenders of the standard account were to maintain something 
to the effect that 4-ing is the necessary means to the achievement of some end (E) 
which the individual (X) desires, there remains the possibility that in actual fact E 
is not in X's real or long-term interests. If so we have a very good reason for 
denying the rationality of (13-ing. This is true whether or not X recognises the harm 
involved in 013-ing. If, in due course, he concedes that he was foolish in having 4-ed 
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he would be forced to acknowledge that his claim to the rationality of 4-ing is not 
necessarily incorrigible. 
While actions may certainly be explained by reference to the agent's reasons, such 
as the satisfaction of a particular desire, deliberation is as much concerned in 
answering the question 'What are the reasons for doing/avoiding such and such?' 
And this is another way of asking for good reasons for doing/avoiding something. 
An explanatory reason is thus very different from a justifying reason. To ask of X 
why it was that he 4-ed is not necessarily to ask whether or not it was rational for 
him to do so. It is to ask for an explanation and not (at least not necessarily) a 
justification. Those considerations which contribute towards a given action meriting 
the status of rational are not reducible to that subjective level which may be 
appropriate in explanatory reasons such as 'I wanted to V . 
Of course this is not to deny that the adoption of means to ends is a part of what is 
involved in rational agency; it just will not suffice as a description of the whole of 
what is involved in that it ignores the nature and value of the end in question.' 
Deliberation stops short of being entirely rational in so far as it is unconcerned with 
the extent to which preferences are capable of being accommodated within one's 
previously endorsed commitments and values. It is not that reflection necessarily 
results in self-satisfaction but the very least that is required is that it should try to 
ensure the avoidance of self-contempt or self-disapproval as a result of failure in 
coherence between one's chosen ends and one's whole view of oneself. It is a direct 
result of achieving a modicum of success as a strong-evaluator that one's subsequent 
desires are coloured, as it were, by the complex interplay between past choices and 
(assuming that ends themselves are not entirely self-chosen) discoveries, which means 
that the rationality of satisfying a particular desire cannot be determined without 
reference to this aspect of one's biography. In this and subsequent sections a view 
of rational choice begins to emerge which is ineluctably tied to the idea of what it is 
to be a person with a biography having genuine or real-interests amongst which is that 
of self-respect. Any account of rational choice which ignores this is therefore less 
than adequate. 	 I have already argued that well-being has got more to do with the 
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satisfaction of self than satisfaction of mere desires and in view of the fact that the 
self is something with a past and a future, no account of rational self-interest can 
ignore this. A necessary condition of rational choice must include reference to that 
plan of life which is (at least) not incompatible with our real-interests. 	 The 
assumption that this is no more than, or always coincides with, whatever it is that we 
desire, is bizarre as well as untrue. If it were true, man would indeed be born free 
and there would be no problem. The fact that it is untrue is sufficient reason for 
refusing to accept that account of rational action which ignores the value of the ends 
in question. 
Thirdly, the standard account provides no means of assessing the rationality of ends 
or desires other than that of mutual incompatibility or failure to maximise goal 
achievement. Even Rawls's grass-counter is rational if counting grass is for him a 
matter of utmost priority; there is certainly nothing essentially contradictory in this 
practice however odd it might seem. With respect to the value or worth of ends the 
standard account is neutral as well as taking no account of the source of desires —
something which was seen to be vital in determining the degree to which desires are 
properly attributable to the agent. According to Hare 'knowing that he will like it 
most and knowing that it is most in his interest to choose it, are the same piece of 
knowledge ...'7 But an account of rational choice which emphasises the importance 
of goal achievement at the expense of rational self-interest will not hold up. Where 
goal achievement leads to a fundamental warping or distortion of human nature (one 
need not invoke anything so dramatic as Brave New World, there being thousands of 
instances of people stunted and harmed in our own society - poverty, ignorance, 
exploitation, lack of meaningful choice, or social institutions which give rise to 
irresolvable conflicting interests, all of which are instrumental in distorting people's 
understanding of where their real-interests lie), it is incompatible with rational 
agency. 
The value-neutral account of rationality will not hold up because it is neutral with 
respect to real-interests. Rational choice is a normative notion in that its explication 
is impossible without reference to what is beneficial and harmful. 
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5.2 Wants as Reasons for Action 
The main difficulty with the standard account is the assumption upon which it rests, 
namely that desires or wants provide the basis for rational choice - rational in that 
they provide justificatory reasons for action. 	 Such a view has a long and 
distinguished ancestry. 	 We find it clearly stated in Hume's ethical writings and 
much twentieth century moral philosophy has witnessed its defence. One of the most 
notable and clearest defences is to be found in Nowell-Smith's Ethics: ' . . . it seems 
senseless to ask anyone why he is doing something when he has told you that he 
enjoys it, likes doing it, or wants to do it ... Pro-words ... all have this in common, 
that they provide logically impeccable reasons for deciding to do or not to do 
something. The "reason for doing" ... is expressed by such a phrase as "because I 
want ..." or "because I enjoy ..." ' .8 In a paper critical of such views, Michael 
Woods presents a more schematic account of this position. R is a reason for A's 
Xing if R specifies, or when fully expanded would specify, some desire which A has, 
which will be satisfied by A's Xing or whose satisfaction will be promoted by A's 
King.' While acknowledging that reasons must be capable of motivating, we shall 
find cause to question the assumption that all motivation has desire at its source.' 
While doubts concerning the view that desires provide reasons for action are not 
without foundation, we are a long way from demonstrating that desires are not 
reasons for action and have not yet begun to provide an alternative. The question 
of whether or not wants do provide reasons for action will be the principal concern 
of the remainder of this section while an alternative model will be sketched in Section 
6. 
The question 'Why are you doing that?' is ambiguous in that it is not immediately 
apparent what kind of answer would be deemed appropriate — appropriate, that is, 
in the sense of satisfying the questioner. Its ambiguity lies in the fact that it is not 
evident from the question whether an explanation or a justification is called for. 
Does the answer require an account of what it was that motivated me to do what I did 
— perhaps the action was so odd or out of character or place that my interlocutor is 
merely puzzled as to what it was that possessed me, or am I expected to provide 
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some sort of justification - perhaps the action was offensive, outrageous or immoral? 
No doubt the context as often as not provides some indication as to the sort of answer 
that is required and no problem arises concerning what I should say in response. But 
what concerns me is the status of one particular answer which I might provide. 
Suppose that in reply to the question 'Why did you do that?' I were to say 'Because 
I wanted to' — what are we to make of such a reply in terms of the distinction 
between explanation and justification? Does the fact that I want do to something 
explain my action or justify it? Can it fulfil the requirements of both equally well and 
does it rely on the context for being one or the other? Are wants ever reasons? 
According to Amelie Rorty the expression 'Because I want to' (BIWT) sometimes 
provides a justification, sometimes gives an explanation and sometimes is used to 
deny the right of the questioner to demand a justification; so much depends on the 
context and the beliefs and attitudes of the questioner and agent." Consider the 
following example: we are sitting having a conversation and suddenly I jump up and 
clap my hands together. Puzzled, you ask, 'Why did you do that?' If I retorted 
`Because I wanted to' it is unlikely that you will be satisfied. Indeed, it is highly 
likely that you will wonder whether or not I am cracking up and, if I repeat myself, 
might tactfully suggest that I see a doctor. If pressed and I continue to insist in all 
seriousness that I could not possibly tell you why I did such a thing, I simply had an 
overwhelming desire to clap my hands in this way, your suspicions would be 
vindicated. If, on the other hand, in answer to your question I reply that there was 
a mosquito which had been irritating me all evening and that at last I had managed 
to kill it, you would have an explanation of my behaviour as well as a justification. 
I had a reason for doing what I did which is perfectly intelligible. Again, take the 
case of throwing wine in somebody's face at supper; if asked to account for his 
behaviour the assailant were to reply `BIWT' we should not not only refuse to 
concede that this was a reason in the sense of justifying his action, we should, short 
of an immediate apology, conclude that he was not suffering from some nervous 
disorder but was gratuitously offensive. Moreover his rudeness is compounded by 
the answer `BIWT'. Reference to what he wanted or enjoyed doing does nothing 
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whatever to provide the necessary justification. `13IWT' could never be a reason for 
this kind of action. 
Context does therefore go some considerable way towards enabling us to classify the 
expression `13IWT' as one of explanation or justification. 	 And if in the two 
examples above `BIWT' had been prefaced with 'No reason ...' we should have to 
acknowledge that the expression `13IWT' was being used as a reason-terminator. The 
person uttering it intended it to be a question stopper in that he did not wish to 
provide any further explanation or justification for his behaviour. 	 Although the 
expression `13IWT' may well serve as an explanation or a reason terminator the case 
for it providing a justification or reason for action has yet to be made. As far as the 
killing of the mosquito is concerned it is not the fact that I want to kill it which 
provides me with a reason, but the fact that it has been getting on my nerves for some 
time and is now within easy reach and I have a good opportunity to swat it. Given 
these features of the situation I would have to have a reason for not swatting it. 
Circumstances might have been such that given my present heart condition, it would 
have been dangerous to exert myself in this way, in which case I should have had a 
very good reason for not trying to kill the mosquito and might well have asked you 
to do so instead.' 
Rorty suggests two justificatory uses of `13IWT' (i) when the questioner and the agent 
accept the same principles allocating priorities to relevant considerations, `BIWT' is 
used to place a factor already having an assigned priority rating into consideration in 
justifying a particular action. 	 Her example is that of a woman who selects a 
décolleté dress for a dinner party given by her husband's stuffy superior. Perhaps 
she wishes to sabotage his chances of promotion or dislikes the idea of having to eat 
there again. Her reply `13IWT' to his request for a reason for choosing such a 
daring outfit is, as far as she is concerned, Rorty says, a reason. As to whether it 
is a good one or not we cannot say, at least without taking sides in a matrimonial 
quarrel. (ii) 'When the questioner and the agent do not agree about the priority 
ratings of various considerations, "BIWT" is used by an agent to suggest that his 
wants be assigned a place on the scale of considerations.' In deliberately choosing 
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to dress in this way, knowing that her husband is likely to object on this occasion, she 
may not be defying a standard of priorities she usually accepts but may in fact be 
arguing for the priority of her wants over those of her husband's career. In this 
case, Rorty says, `13IWT' is used neither as an explanation nor as a straightforward 
justification within an accepted and shared system of priorities, but is used to suggest 
a revision in the scale of priorities. 'This is a justification on a different level from 
the one given by an agent who simply challenges a particular question.' To support 
this she gives an additional example of an old man with a heart disease whom doctors 
have assured that any exertion will result in death three hours later. Undeterred, the 
old man goes out to vote and returns home to die. Just before the end of the third 
hour he responds to his family's questions with the answer `BIWT'. Amongst the 
various functions served by this utterance Rorty includes that of justification.' 
In contrast to this, James Rachels has argued that something cannot be one's reasons 
for acting unless thought of it can make a difference to one's decision about what to 
do, and this is enough to show why wants do not qualify as reasons. 'I want to do 
A' is not a reason for me to do A since it is not a fact the thought of which sets one 
to doing it. It is not the thought of my wants that gets me going; it is the wants 
themselves. This is the important difference between doing something 'because I 
want to ... and doing it because Aunt Hilda's feelings will be hurt if I don't.' As 
Rachels says, thought need not intervene between the want and the act done because 
of it, in the way that thought must mediate the reason and the act done for it. 
Rachels goes on to conclude that `13IWT', far from providing a reason for 43-ing is 
as often as not an abbreviation for 'No reason, I just wanted to' - 'Why were you 
singing in the bath?' No reason, I just felt like it. '14 `13IWT' also serves to explain 
a person's behaviour: it indicates the kind of person he is, what his values are, what 
his likes and preferences are and so on, and it may indicate that his desires are out 
of control in that he just cannot help doing whatever he fancies. Once again it is the 
context which provides the clue as to what is meant by the somewhat unhelpful reply 
`BIWT' 
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We are not entitled to conclude however that every utterance of `BIWT' may be 
appropriately prefaced with the expression 'No reason ....' Very frequently people 
give the answer `BIWT' because they believe, however mistakenly, that wants and 
desires constitute reasons for action. We therefore need a more general argument 
to see why this belief is incorrect. Before dealing with this, let us deal with the 
much easier question of whether the fact that one wants something can ever justify 
one acting in a certain way. 
Returning to Rorty's example of the sick and aged voter, if his going out to vote in 
his condition is justifiable it is justified not in virtue of his desire to cast a vote but 
in virtue of the fact that he is at death's door and that he is entitled to one last defiant 
gesture as a free and rational agent.' It is also worth stating the obvious that we 
only take the question 'Why did you do that?' to be a demand for a justification when 
there are thought to be reasons for not doing it; it may or not explain what was done 
in the sense of providing some intelligible context, but in itself it says nothing with 
respect to justification. 
The case that rational choice has little if anything to do with the satisfaction of desire 
is only partially complete. The argument so far has done no more than show how 
desires or wants are not in themselves sufficient for rational action; it remains to be 
seen if they are in any way necessary requirements. In order to show that wants are 
not even necessary for a choice or action to be deemed rational it is incumbent upon 
us to provide instances of good reasons for doing one thing rather than another which 
are not dependent on the desires or wants of the agent. To show how this might be 
done we need look no further than prudential reasoning. 
Prudence presupposes a self having temporal extension. The prudent man does not 
merely consider how he is to satisfy his desires. A self-conscious being is aware of 
having a past, a present and a future and his interest in his own future is not 
something which rests on some antecedent desire.' 	 If this is true, prudential 
reasoning does not have to rely on desires of any kind we happen to feel at the 
present moment. I might want to do something at time t and given my future plans 
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have no reason whatsoever for doing it and, conversely, I might have very good 
reason to 43 at time t even though no desire so to do is present. On the other hand, 
it might be asked, what if I have every reason to believe that at time t1 I shall have 
a desire to 43, would not this provide a reason for ensuring that I take the necessary 
steps to ensure the possibility of CF-ing at that time? If desires are reasons for action 
and if at time t I have no desire to make the necessary arrangements so as to prevent 
my predicted future desires from being frustrated, I should find myself in the crazy 
position of having a reason for not doing that which is necessary to the performance 
of which I anticipate having good reason to do. Again, if it is in my interests to 43 
at t1 (where failure to 43 would be harmful or damaging) I now have a reason to 
ensure that the possibility of cF-ing is not frustrated (irrespective of what I desire at 
t). 	 What is in my interests and thereby what is rational for me to do is quite 
independent of what I desire to do at either time and what provides me with a reason 
for CF-ing is the fact that it is in my interests. A rational man cannot be indifferent 
to his future interests which means that what counts as a reason cannot rely on 
something as contingent as a desire. We have already seen how we can be the 
victim of our desires in a way which we cannot be with respect to choices or 
intentions. In deliberating between possible actions and deciding upon one particular 
outcome I am active rather than passive with respect to my desires. 
I wish to conclude this discussion by drawing attention to some important features of 
wanting which I believe provide reason enough for denying that the presence of a 
desire is a necessary feature of rational choice. According to Elizabeth Anscombe" 
whenever anyone says that he wants something the question 'Why'?' is always 
appropriate. If the answer is to be remotely intelligible he would have to say more 
about the object of his want other than 'I don't know, I just want it.' If this were 
all he could say we should, quite rightly, refuse to accept his claim as a genuine 
instance of wanting something. To want something is to be able to say something 
about it in terms of which it can be classified as the kind of thing that possesses what 
Anscombe calls 'desirability-characterizations'. The point being that there are limits 
to the kind of thing one can intelligibly be said to want. If someone were to erect 
a step-ladder in Trafalgar Square every Tuesday at noon, climb it and say 'Oh dear 
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me', descended, folded it and went back home, he would have to provide a more 
complex answer to the puzzled spectator whose request for an explanation met with 
a mere 'I just want to'. If in reply to further probing such as 'Do you feel that the 
exercise does you good?' , 'Is there something you are anxious to see which can't be 
seen from ground level'?' he were truthfully to answer 'No', and insisted that he just 
wanted to do this kind of thing we should be justifiably baffled. As Griffiths and 
Peters remind us, 'What counts as evidence for wanting something is more than the 
actual behaviour involved ... (it) depends on what we are prepared to count as a 
possible end without special explanation; and what we assign to this class of possible 
ends will depend on considerations which go beyond our observation of the individual 
concerned. It will depend in part on the way we think that human nature limits the 
things a man could reasonably be said to want.' 
The point they are making is the same as that defended by Richard Norman in his 
Reasons for Actions19 which is that the intelligibility of a want is determined by its 
relation to public standards and norms. Intelligibility or meaning is not, after all, 
a private affair but depends on certain public standards and norms which are 
themselves established by something more fundamental than choice or decision.' 
To want something is more than just being able to say 'I want to 43; it is to be able 
to see 4-ing in a certain light and it is to want to 4> because (13-ing is describable in 
a certain way. Norman puts it as follows: 'Not just any assertion of the form "I just 
want" can provide an ultimate reason for acting. If it does so, this will be because 
the description "X" characterises the thing in such a way that no further reason is 
necessary. And in that case it is the fact that the thing is describable as "X" not the 
fact that the thing is wanted that constitutes the reason for acting. The notion of 
"wanting" can be allowed to fall out altogether.'21 For a want to be intelligible 
others must be capable in principle of seeing what there is about the object or activity 
in question which anyone might have for wanting it. The important thing is that its 
intelligibility is in virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is; its being that kind 
of thing providing at least prima facie reasons for wanting it. 
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According to Norman an appeal to public norms and standards is not an appeal to 
generalizations about how people act or what people in our society want, but an 
appeal to the shared ethical and evaluative concepts in our common language. The 
fact that reasons refer to public norms does not entail that a person's reasons for (D-
ing are, at the end of the day, based upon what most people in his society happen to 
want. And he is surely correct to insist that public norms of rational action are prior 
to the notion of "wanting" .22 
5.3 	 Desire and Value 
Any opponent of value subjectivism is immediately confronted with the problem of 
presenting a coherent and convincing account of what might be involved in the idea 
of something possessing objective value. Moreover, an acceptable alternative to the 
subjectivism associated with desire-satisfaction theories of well-being and freedom has 
to meet the charge that it must, of necessity, be authoritarian. Rational discussion 
of whether or not values are subjective or objective are all too frequently plagued by 
the readiness of the disputants to assume that their opponents are advocating one of 
a number of possible theses about the nature of values and valuation. It is all too 
easy to assume, for example, that those who believe in the 'existence' of values are 
advocating the existence of peculiar items of furniture in the world which are, as it 
were, brutally there in the way that the primary qualities of things are said to exist 
and in a way that is quite independent of human sensibility. A defender of the 
`reality' of values is not necessarily operating with the restrictive model assumed by 
people like John Mackie which led him to protest that if values were to exist in the 
world they would be 'entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly 
different from anything else in the universe'.23  
For Mackie, only that which is 'in the world' as part of the very fabric of physical 
reality is objectively 'real'. But, this is a quite unnecessarily restrictive account of 
our moral phenomenology. There really is no reason to insist that for things, such 
as values, to be 'real' and not entirely dependent on subjective preferences, they must 
be in objects outside of the mind in exactly the same way that size and shape are. 
Physical objects are causally responsible for whatever perceptual experiences result 
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in our believing in their existence and our attribution of various qualities to them. 
But simply because values are not causally efficacious in the way that phenomenal 
qualities are, Mackie all too readily concludes that they are not genuinely real. 
Apart from the fact that the assumption that this sort of explanatory necessity is the 
appropriate test of the reality of values is question begging,' it presupposes that a 
perceptual model of values, whereby we develop a moral sensitivity to features of the 
world, is based on the model of awareness of primary qualities. 
Before we explore the limitations which such a model imposes, it is important to 
consider some of the problems associated with that view of objectivity to which 
Mackie subscribes, which confines the objectively real to those features of properties 
of the world which can be understood without any reference whatsoever to the effect 
they have on sentient beings such as ourselves. To the extent that something could 
only be conceived by reference to how in normal or appropriate circumstances it 
would affect a sentient being it would, according to Mackie, be a subjective property 
of something and not part of the fabric of the universe. Colours, on this account, 
are therefore subjective properties and not part of reality as such; they belong instead 
to the world of appearance. The immediate question is whether we are forced to 
equate that which is 'real' with what is objective in Mackie's sense of that term. 
Closely associated with this is the status of properties not conceivable independently 
of sentient responses to them. 
The way the world appears to sentient beings is in virtue of their occupying a specific 
(or parochial) point of view. Because beings such as ourselves with our peculiar 
organs of perception describe objects as coloured, it might be thought plausible to 
suggest that colour is not a feature of objects as they are, so to speak, 'in 
themselves'. But for this to be credible there must be some coherence in the idea of 
an absolute conception of reality which is characterisable independently of any 
particular point of view and by reference to which appearances in all their variety are 
explicable. There are several grounds for scepticism concerning any such notion the 
first of which relates to the difficulties involved in trying to render coherent the idea 
of an `Archimedean point of view' in terms of which the world could be described 
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as it is really supposed to be without reference to any particular representation of it. 
An Archimedean point of view would have to be described in exceedingly abstract 
terms and would, of necessity, exclude much of what we would wish to claim as 
objectively true, albeit from standpoints occupied by beings such as ourselves. 
There is also a mistaken assumption implicit in any such conception that an absolute 
conception of reality is somehow better and altogether more accurate as a description 
of the world than any less austere and inclusive a conception such as that provided 
by sensory perception. But as David McNaughton says: 'It is only from within 
some particular perspective that we can ask what is really there and the answer will 
be determined by the frame of reference which that particular perspective provides.' 
It is not as if we even require an Archimedean point of view in order to make sense 
of the idea of scientific progress or, for that matter, the scientifically objective. The 
fact that such objectivity presupposes a particular Weltanschauung does nothing to 
undermine its objectivity. Scientific theories are retained or dismissed by reference 
to, amongst other things, the extent to which the beliefs which they presuppose accord 
with other beliefs. Our conclusions relating to propositions relating to those features 
of the universe which provide knowledge of it are themselves part of a conceptual 
system and set of beliefs about the sort of place it is. 	 Any supposition that a 
scientific theory is superior to any other occurs within the context of beliefs which 
are no less parochial in virtue of being scientific beliefs. A measure of parochialism 
in the formation of whatever scientific theories to which we choose to subscribe is 
simply unavoidable. 
In the context of a discussion of behaviour Strawson contrasts two possible 
standpoints from which human behaviour may be viewed which he calls 'participant' 
(or 'involved') on the one hand and 'objective' (or 'detached') on the other. If we 
ask: 'Which is the correct standpoint?' or 'From which standpoint do we see things 
as they really are?' it is natural to suggest that the answer cannot be from both. 
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`Viewed from one standpoint, the standpoint that we naturally occupy 
as social beings, human behaviour appears as the proper object of all 
those personal and moral reactions, judgements and attitudes to which, 
as social beings, we are naturally prone; or, to put the same point 
differently, human actions and human agents appear as the bearers of 
objective moral properties. But if anyone consistently succeeded in 
viewing such behaviour in which I have called the "purely objective" 
... light, then to him such reactions, judgements, and attitudes would 
be alien; the notion of "proper objects" of such reactions and 
attitudes, the notion of "objective moral properties", would for him 
lack significance .... 
If it is the standpoint of participation and involvement to which we are 
so strongly committed by nature and society, which is correct, then 
some human actions really are morally blameworthy or praiseworthy, 
hateful or admirable, proper objects of gratitude or resentment; and 
those who have contended for the objectivity of morals are 
fundamentally in the right of it, even if the particular judgements we 
make in this area are even more liable to error or distortion than those 
we make in others; and to refuse to recognise this is deliberately to 
blind oneself to a whole dimension of reality. /26 
Once we dispense with the idea of a wholly unnecessary Archimedean point of view -
after all whatever such a conception could be it would be quite unintelligible for it 
expects us to form a conception of the world in concepts that are not our own - we 
can, says Strawson, 'recognise, in our conception of the real, a reasonable relativity 
to standpoints that we do know and can occupy. Relative to the standpoint which 
we normally occupy as social beings, prone to moral and personal reactive attitudes, 
human actions, or some of them, are morally toned and propertied in the diverse 
ways signified in our rich vocabulary of moral appraisal.' 
Questions relating to the intelligibility of an absolute conception of reality apart, there 
are serious doubts concerning whether or not reliance on such a conception could 
deliver the goods. Quite simply it would, on its own terms, have to explain and 
embrace rival conceptions. Competing conceptions would have to be shown to be 
defective in so far as they are misleading or parochial. The failure of the absolute 
conception of reality to demonstrate any such thing becomes apparent when trying to 
account for the way in which we experience things like colours and other states of 
consciousness. Clearly, within an absolute conception of reality there is no room for 
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the idea of something being really coloured; within such a conception secondary 
qualities such as colours being no more than mere 'appearances' and thus not part of 
`reality'. But for this to be acceptable the absolutist must provide an explanation of 
how it is that we see coloured objects in the way we do - why we see grass as green 
and not red or blue. An absolutist wishing to explain how grass appeared green to 
an observer would be faced with the unavoidable concession that it depended on a 
particular point of view while at the same time having to provide some means or 
other by which that point of view might be transcended. The problem is just how 
this could be done. If properties such as colours are in some sense 'projections' on 
to a description of the world' and not, as it were, part of the furniture of that world, 
the absolutist has a problem. As McDowell puts it: 
`To achieve the overarching objective account, one needs to transcend 
the point of view from which a given range of subjective concepts 
appears to be required in order to describe how things are, while 
nevertheless retaining as objectively factual the use of those concepts, 
or something close enough to them to serve as a basis for the supposed 
projection, in describing the context of the experience characteristic of 
that point of view. '29 
Bernard Williams admits to a degree of scepticism in this regard when it comes to 
colour, a scepticism which according to McDowell is not only justified but should not 
be restricted to colour. 	 The problem of accounting for colour is, as Williams 
admits, 'part of a larger question, how the partial views and local experiences are 
themselves to be related to the world as conceived in independence of them.'3° We 
have only to think of states of consciousness such as pains or other sensations to 
appreciate the difficulties encountered by the absolutist attempt to account for our 
subjective responses to such sensations. The difficulties are admirably illustrated by 
Williams in the following passage: 
`If I ... try to form a conception ... of just what is in the world when 
A is in pain, the temptation is to try to write into the world, in some 
hazy way, the appropriate context of A's experience ... the pain. But 
in taking the context of A's experience, and putting it into the world 
as a thing we can conceive of as there, we are in effect trying to 
abstract from how it is for A, the how it is and leave it as a fact on its 
own. (But) when it is so for A (e.g. it hurts for A), the only way of 
one's conceiving the appropriate it is so at all is that of adopting ... 
A's point of view and putting oneself imaginatively in a state which 
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one expresses (if it can be verbally expressed) by saying, as A, it is so 
(e.g. it hurts).' 31  
Our scepticism concerning the absolutist attempt to incorporate states of consciousness 
into an account of reality which is quite independent of any particular point of view 
would thus appear to be perfectly justified. There are, quite simply, limits to the 
extent to which we are able to ignore those features of the world whose very 
existence requires those specific modes of perception peculiar to ourselves. The 
problems associated with an absolute conception of reality are, then, manifold and if 
we are successfully to defend the idea of something possessing objective value we 
need an altogether less stringent account of reality. 
In a densely argued critique of Mackie's position McDowell asks why it is supposed 
that the model of reality he adopts excludes secondary qualities. 
`Secondary quality experience presents itself as perceptual awareness 
of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one. 
And there is no general obstacle to taking that appearance at face 
value. An object's being such and such as to look red is independent 
of its actually looking red to anyone on any particular occasion; so 
notwithstanding the conceptual connection between being red and being 
experienced as red, an experience of something as red can count as a 
case of being presented with a property that is there anyway - there 
independently of the experience itself.'' 
And he goes on to contrast different senses of 'subjectivity' according to which 
secondary qualities may be both subjective and objective. 
`Secondary qualities are qualities not adequately conceivable except in 
terms of certain subjective states, and thus subjective themselves in a 
sense that that characterization defines. 	 In the natural contrast, a 
primary quality would be objective in the sense that what it is for 
something to have it can be adequately understood otherwise than in 
terms of dispositions to give rise to subjective states. 	 Now this 
contrast between objective and subjective is not a contrast between 
veridical and illusory experience. 	 But it is easily confused with a 
different contrast, in which to call a putative object of awareness 
"objective" is to say that it is there to be experienced, as opposed to 
being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an 
experience of it .... What is acceptable ... is only that secondary 
qualities are subjective in the first sense, and it would be simply wrong 
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to suppose that this gives any support to the idea that they are 
subjective in the second.' 
If we grant that it is in virtue of our having a particular perceptual awareness which 
enables us to distinguish objects in respect of their colour we can, I believe, go along 
with McDowell in acknowledging some kind of analogy between colour perception 
on the one hand and our ability to discern moral properties on the other. The fact 
that an object looks red to beings like us does nothing to undermine our confidence 
that it is a red object. From our (anthropocentric) viewpoint certain things are red 
but it does not mean that their redness has been created by us. Similarly, we may 
go along with McDowell and admit that evaluative attitudes are analogous to the 
experience of colours in being unintelligible except as modifications of a sensitivity 
such as our own. If we did not possess a whole range of emotional responses which 
we share with our own kind, moral experience of any kind would be unintelligible. 
To the extent that we are able to admit to a sensitivity to a world containing red 
objects we are in the equally comfortable position of being able to concede that as we 
grow towards maturity we become increasingly sensitive to moral reality. Such a 
reality is no more created by the affective side of our natures any more than colours 
are subjective 'projections' onto a description of the world as it really is - the mere 
by-products of a mode of perception peculiar to beings like us. 
The analogy between colours and values is not perfect however as McDowell 
concedes - 'a virtue (say) is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the 
appropriate 'attitude' (as colour is merely such as to cause the appropriate 
experiences) but rather such as to merit it.' This reinforces doubts raised earlier 
concerning the relevance of causal explanations of value. But just as we can see 
something as red without inference from its underlying physical properties, so too 
may we directly observe a situation as cruel or courageous even if such recognition 
requires knowledge of other features of the situation which are themselves non-moral, 
such as the associated pain in the case of cruelty and the dangers or degree of risk 
involved in the case of courage. 	 But if there is a non-contingent relationship 
between the various non-moral facts (upon which moral properties may be said to be 
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a function) and moral facts or truths, the moral realist has to explain how the 
relationship is yet supposed to be one of non-entailment. 
The problem for the moral realist is to explain the connection between our knowing 
(or recognising) something to be intentionally cruel (and thus wrong) and knowing 
something of the natural features of cruelty in virtue of which it is seen as wrong if, 
as opponents such as Mackie would have it, the connection is not one of entailment. 
Mackie expresses it as follows: 
' .... it is not merely that the two features occur together. 	 The 
wrongness must somehow be "consequential" or "supervenient"; it is 
wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the 
world is signified by this "because"? And how do we know the 
relation that it signifies, if this is something more than such actions 
being socially condemned .... It is not even sufficient to postulate a 
faculty which "sees" the wrongness; something must be postulated 
which can see at once the natural features that constitute the cruelty, 
and the wrongness, and the mysterious consequential link between the 
two. '35 
If observation reveals only contingent connections, how are we to know that the 
gratuitous infliction of pain on someone else is wrong? It would seem that there is 
neither empirical basis nor logically necessary connection between the two. It is the 
supervenience of moral properties which leads Mackie to the conclusion that they are 
`queer' in being 'utterly different from anything else in the universe'. 
Attempted solutions to the problem of supervenience may be found in the work of 
John McDowell and Mark Platts. 	 In order to retain the autonomy of moral 
judgements (which is to say that they are neither inferences from non-moral 
judgements nor reducible to non-moral claims) Platts invites us to note a certain 
parallel between the arrangement of black dots on a white card which 'fix' a face 
there pictured to be seen. In seeing the face we do not attend to the dot arrangement 
and infer that there is a head to be seen; we observe the face directly Similarly, 
according to Platts, once all the non-moral facts about a situation are fixed, so are all 
the moral facts: 
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`We could know everything about those non-moral facts while being 
in utter ignorance of the moral facts. If we now go on to make moral 
judgements about the case we do not do so by attending to the non-
moral facts, the facts described in vocabulary free of moral import; 
we do not infer the moral facts from the non-moral facts.'' 
In observing someone behave courageously we do not firstly attend to his mental 
state, evaluate the probability of his overcoming the attendant dangers and on the 
basis of these and other non-moral factors subsequently infer that he is a courageous 
person. And yet the problem remains in accounting for the role of non-moral reasons 
in justifying differences in moral judgement, for this role would appear to be 
incompatible with the autonomy claimed for moral judgements or with the denial of 
the claim that moral judgements are inferences from factual claims. Platts attempts 
to overcome the problem in two ways. He first questions the assumption that the 
distinction between the moral and the non-moral is as clear as some would have it. 
When someone performs a courageous action how are we to characterise those 
features relating to his state of mind for example (which may be said to fix his 
courage) in morally neutral terms. Until we have a defensible means of explicating 
the contrast between moral and non-moral facts it is, Platts says, 'open to the realist 
to reply to the argument from moral reason in a simple way: if the giving of a 
reason intelligibly accounts for a difference in moral judgement, it is itself a moral 
reason.'' Such 'lower level, more concrete considerations' certainly do not entail 
that someone is courageous, rather they merit our attribution of courage. 
Platts's second way of addressing the issue is shared, amongst others, by McDowell 
and has, in my view, considerable persuasive force. Variously expressed as moral 
particularism or the uncodifiability of moral judgements, it is sceptical of the role of 
moral principles in moral reasoning. The very idea of a set of subvenient properties 
entailing the moral features of a situation presupposes the possibility of identifying 
the respects in which such a set are sufficiently similar to force some sort of logical 
connection between moral features and such similarities. When we attend to specific 
moral situations in all their complexities we are doing more than applying a principle 
whereby present moral judgements are in accordance with previous judgements. 'In 
ordering moral life, determining our moral judgements about a particular case by 
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means of some rules seizing upon non-moral aspects of that case will simply mean 
that we neglect the full complexity of that particular case.'38 Each case has unique 
and specific features careful and sensitive attention to which enables us to make a 
moral judgement which may well differ according to circumstances. 'In ordinary 
life, moral situations do not repeat themselves; only insensitivity can suggest that 
they do. '39 If true, it follows that one cannot know what is cruel or courageous in 
advance of a state of affairs which is situationally specific. As McDowell says, 
invoking Aristotle, 'the best generalisations about how one should behave hold only 
for the most part. 	 If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue 
requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up 
the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the 
rules would strike one as wrong. '40 
All of this raises immensely complex issues concerning the nature of moral reasoning 
which cannot be explored here but it does, I believe, serve to explain why the 
subvenient features of a situation do not entail moral judgements. It is precisely 
because moral judgements are situationally specific that the existence of the necessary 
universal propositions required if the connection between the non-moral and moral 
features of a particular set of circumstances is to be one of entailment, is ruled out. 
Moral realism can accept that the connection between non-moral and moral features 
of a situation while being one of non-entailment is equally non-contingent. 	 As 
Robert Arrington says, in a particular case, 'the moral quality is identical with the 
base characteristics - they are not two things only contingently related.'" Arrington 
reminds us of the complexity of moral perception: 
`A moral agent confronting a moral situation may perceive (a) various 
demands or values embodied in it; (b) the salient demand or value; 
and (c) the other dimensions as silenced by the salient one. 	 Her 
knowledge of all these things is particular and specific, incapable of 
being guided by or articulated in a general formula. She is able to see 
things and have this knowledge because ... she is the kind of person 
she is, because she has a certain conception of how to live.' 
And McDowell is surely correct in supposing that we identify moral features for what 
they are by a kind of perceptive capacity which he calls 'sensitivity' without 
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recourse to the questionable and specific faculty of moral intuition. One has only 
to remember those occasions in one's life when an initial encounter with a new work 
of art in an unfamiliar genre left one baffled and unmoved only to find, perhaps as 
a result of greater familiarity with it or after discussing it with people whose reactions 
and responses were quite different, that one comes to see it in an altogether new and 
much more meaningful light. 
One's moral responses are similarly subject to re-appraisal and re-evaluation, so much 
so that it is not inappropriate to talk of misperception or myopia where failure to see 
in the appropriate light is possibly due to one's appreciation being 'clouded, or 
unfocused, by the impact of a desire to do otherwise. '44 In coming to see a moral 
situation in a new light we may be said to discover something about a state of affairs 
(including ourselves) which results in the adoption of a new and altogether different 
evaluative stance. 	 Any such re-evaluation requires a measure of openness and 
sensitivity as well as a willingness to accept that prejudices of various kinds may well 
hinder our seeing things in the way that others do. Moral (and aesthetic) education 
must therefore equip children not only with the appropriate conceptual apparatus or 
vocabulary with which to articulate their perceptions but also instil a degree of 
humility and sensitivity whereby they become disposed to listen to the views of others 
and reassess their own position in the light of coming to see things afresh. It is 
worth reiterating once again that the re-evaluation and reflection involved is not solely 
about trying to find what it is that one really wants or cares about - although it is 
undeniably partly concerned with this. As it stands, such a model is incomplete in 
ignoring the importance of coming to see things as they really are by reference to 
which our emotional responses, amongst other things, may be deemed appropriate. 
There are obvious cases where reluctance to agree that certain actions are kind or 
courageous are either disingenuous or due to a kind of moral blindness analogous to 
the way in which some people are colour blind. (Psychopaths are fairly obvious 
candidates.) 
Given that moral judgements are said to provide at least prima facie reasons for 
action the question to which this inevitably gives rise is as follows: how, if reason 
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for action is supposed to be a reason for a specific person, can it possibly avoid 
reference to what that person actually desires? Reference to a moral agent's desires 
are, it is widely believed, unavoidable in any specification of a reason for action if 
it is to be complete in the sense of possessing motivational efficacy. 
Moral realism, while conceding that moral judgements do indeed provide reasons for 
action and that a reason for action must indeed have motivational efficacy, is not 
prepared to accept the Humean conclusion that reason is the slave of the passions. 
After all it is far from being obviously true. As Platts asks: 'Why should it not just 
be a brute fact about moral facts that, without any such further element entering, their 
clear perception does provide sufficient grounding for action?' And as Arrington 
reminds us, quite often in response to requests for reasons for action 'one often 
responds by stating independent, objective facts: Question - Why did you run out of 
the building? Answer - Because my room was on fire. Question - Why did you 
withdraw from the race? Answer - Because the polls showed I had no chance of 
winning . '46 In reply to the objection that this is misleading in that the desires to 
avoid being incinerated or humiliated are both obvious and universal, we may respond 
by asking why we should assume that such desires are prior causal conditions. Why 
not simply view them 'as identifying what the agent intentionally did, as opposed to 
conditions giving rise to what he did'?' Their obviousness is such that in leaving 
the building or conceding defeat the agent in question intentionally did what he did. 
Defenders of moral non-cognitivism are deeply wedded to the idea of there being at 
least two quite different mental states 	 These are (a) cognitive, in that they are 
concerned with what is believed and (b) appetitive, in being concerned with what is 
desired. 	 They are held to be jointly necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
intelligibility of any action we care to perform. Without appropriate beliefs and 
desires an agent is thought to have no reason to act. 	 On their own, beliefs are 
assumed to be motivationally inert while desire is the essential spur to motivation. 
As cognitive states, beliefs are no more than representations of what we accept as 
truths about the world. 	 According to non-cognitivists, desires are an entirely 
different kind of mental state. The contrast can be expressed as follows: if beliefs 
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are said to 'aim' at what is true, that is to say aim at being in accordance with how 
the world is, desires aim at changing the world. The contrast is in terms of the 
passivity of beliefs and the active state of mind associated with desires. 
Moral realism on the other hand finds much of this profoundly suspect. Realism 
questions the premise in terms of which non-cognitivism is led to the conclusion 
which is, after all, not entirely consistent with our moral phenomenology, to the 
effect that our awareness of certain (moral) facts provides insufficient reason for 
action. In other words why should we accept the necessity for two fundamentally 
different kinds of mental state in the first place? Is it so obviously the case that 
desires are devoid of beliefs and that beliefs are always morally neutral? Is the view 
of the mind as something containing states which are either wholly passive on the one 
hand or active (and motivating) on the other, acceptable? Again, while it is, of 
course, absurd to deny (contra Kant) that a virtuous action is the sort of thing that 
may well be the object of a person's desire, this is not to be committed to the view 
that our seeing an action in a favourable light, such that we may be said to have a 
reason for performing it, necessitates the inclusion of a desire in the motivating power 
of such reasons. Some beliefs are themselves motivational in the sense that their 
very existence commits one to action of some kind. Seeing a situation in a particular 
light (which is another way of saying that we believe certain things about it) may be 
sufficient to motivate, and beliefs of this kind are no less cognitive if they are in 
association with desires. As McDowell says: 
`Suppose ... that we explain a person's performance of a certain action 
by crediting him with awareness of some fact which makes it likely (in 
his view) that acting in that way will be conducive to his interest. 
Adverting to his view of the facts may suffice, on its own, to show us 
the favourable light in which his action appeared to him. No doubt we 
credit him with an appropriate desire, perhaps for his own future 
happiness. But the commitment to ascribe such a desire is simply 
consequential on our taking him to act as he does for the reason we 
cite; the desire does not function as an independent extra component 
in a full specification of his reason ...' 
And he quotes Nagel with approval. 
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`That I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that 
these considerations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act will 
promote my future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it 
is appropriate to ascribe to me a desire for my own future happiness. 
But nothing follows about the role of the desire as a condition 
contributing to the motivational efficacy of those considerations.' 
and asks: 
`Why should the reasons which move people to virtuous behaviour not 
be similar to the reasons which move them to prudent behaviour? To 
explain an action we regard as virtuous, we typically formulate a more 
or less complex characterisation of the action's circumstances as we 
take the agent to have conceived them. Why should it not be the 
case, here too, that the agent's conception of the situation, properly 
understood, suffices to show us the favourable light in which his action 
appeared to him?'" 
While I believe that McDowell's thesis has considerable persuasive force it is 
important to emphasise that the citation of a particular desirability-feature as a reason 
for doing or valuing something is not to suggest that a person would be irrational in 
failing to pursue whatever it was that possessed that particular feature - its beauty, or 
capacity to amuse, stimulate, or whatever. 	 Given the limitations on what it is 
plausible for a human being intelligibly to be said to want (such limits being a 
function of the light in which the object of desire is seen), the notion of desirability-
feature not only renders actions intelligible, it goes a very long way towards 
providing a rational basis for choice. The reason why desirability-features do not 
provide a complete justification for a course of action is that people and circumstances 
vary. What may be appropriate for me at a particular juncture may not be the best 
thing for someone else. 
Consider the case of Freud who, towards the end of his life, (according to Griffin) 
preferred to think clearly rather than take pain-relieving drugs. Explaining the state 
of thinking clearly as a desirability-feature, Griffin says, 'needs both perception and 
desire, without priority to either. To see this feature as desirable and to desire it on 
seeing it are the same. There is no plausible explanation of one in terms of the 
other.' If someone is confronted with alternative courses of action both of which 
are rational (such as reducing pain and continuing to work) although not necessarily 
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compatible, it is impossible to legislate for what other people should do. Freud's 
decision may well have differed from yours or mine but it was at least a decision 
based on the perceived value to him of work at the expense of suffering. 
Griffin is quite willing to concede that we sometimes discover values, as when we 
come to appreciate what is involved in a life of accomplishment. He is even willing 
to admit that when you see what accomplishment is you form a desire. There being 
no need for 'any pre-existent background desire (except those of vacuous generality) 
of which your new desire is merely another instance.' Indeed it might well seem 
as if all reference to desire is redundant given the universal value of not frittering 
one's life away. In what he has to say about the life of accomplishment Griffin is 
reminiscent of Kekes in suggesting that 'the language we use in reporting our 
perceptions already organises our experience and selects what we see as important; 
it is designed to show that we view certain things in a favourable light. Desire here 
does not blindly fix on an object; it is obviously pointed in certain directions by what 
we perceive favourably.' 	 What is so problematic about Griffin's position 
however, is that he insists that there is still a strong case for saying that the order of 
explanation is from desire to value. And even though he parts company with flume 
in seeing understanding (cognition) and desire (appetite) as distinct existences, he 
denies that 'one can explain our fixing on desirability-features purely in terms of 
understanding:52 Desire is, after all, an essential component of our perceiving 
things in a favourable light. For there is no adequate explanation of something being 
a desirability-feature, he insists, without appeal to what he calls 'a kind of 
movement', which is another way of saying that desire is part of what it is to see 
something in a favourable light. For what it is worth, Griffin's conclusion is that 
neither desire nor value have priority over one another. I am not so sure and am 
loathe to part company with Norman whose conclusion on this is worth reiterating. 
... in that majority of cases where the possibility of wanting 
something is dependent upon already having learnt to see the thing in 
the relevant ways, the norm is both logically and chronologically prior 
to the existence of the corresponding want.' 
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Unfortunately it would require more space than this essay permits to explore the issue 
further. Sufficient has already been said to enable us to conclude with McDowell 
and McNaughton that desire as an independent element in the explanation of actions 
is altogether redundant. If it is the case that desire is not always to be thought of as 
a non-cognitive state the distinction between beliefs and attitudes is seriously 
undermined and with it the case for non-cognitivism. 
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6. INTERESTS AND WELL-BEING 
6.1 	 Interests and Preferences 
In the attempt to refute that view of freedom which sees it, and by extension human 
well-being, as being unconstrained in pursuit of desire-satisfaction, we have seen how 
both notions are very much bound up with the ability to make rational choices 
between significant alternatives and have had cause to doubt both the means-end view 
of rationality with its undue concentration on means while assuming that ends 
themselves are not candidates for rational assessment as well as being unable to 
accept that criteria of significance have much, if anything, to do with desire-
satisfaction. It is the purpose of this section to argue for a view of rational agency 
which ties it very tightly to that of interests; the extent to which our actions are in 
accordance with what may genuinely be said to be in our interests being a measure 
not only of our rationality but also providing a means whereby we can flesh out the 
third variable in our triadic schema. Interests also serve to identify, in ways which 
any desire account of well-being would disallow, criteria of well-being and human 
flourishing. 
We have already seen how anyone faced with trying to construct an objective account 
of what is of genuine value and in our real-interests is confronted with the ugly 
spectre of authoritarianism which would appear to be embedded in any such attempt. 
After all, isn't the whole point of 'real' in 'real-interests' designed to show that a 
particular policy or course of action may well be contrary to a person's interests even 
if he has an expressed interest in it. 
	 And what if those things in which he is 
interested are not actually in his interests; does it not follow that others may act 
against his will while still acting in accordance with his real-interests? I hope to show 
how such a charge may be successfully rebutted. 
Firstly, the fact that something is seen in either a favourable or unfavourable light is, 
in itself, insufficient to enable us to decide what we ought to do on a particular 
occasion. While such features provide a rational basis for choice they have to be 
independently appraised by people in the light of their particular circumstances. As 
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we have seen, it makes no sense to postulate a totally detached viewpoint from which 
such evaluations could be made. For this reason the citation of any such features is 
not necessarily a reason-terminator. (Even cruelty may be warranted in exceptional 
circumstances, such as those associated with the training of athletes.) Whether or 
not one should act in accordance with a particular characterization or state of affairs 
depends, in part, on its significance within the context of the unity of one's life. As 
we saw in Section 4 one is not entirely passive with respect to how situations are 
conceived and evaluated; there being no obvious causal relationship between the 
experience to which one is subject and the language in which one's evaluation is 
formulated. And yet it would be mistaken to assume that the only alternative to a 
passive conception is one couched in the language of choice. Given that genuine 
discoveries relating to one's values and character are possible, it is reasonable to 
suppose that one may appreciate wherein one's interests lie and how one's well-being 
is dependent on their recognition and non-frustration by reference to such discoveries. 
Another way in which we might avoid the charge of authoritarianism is by reference 
to a proper understanding of what it is to have a real-interest in something. My 
interests are subjective in at least one sense and that is in virtue of being my interests 
and not (at least not necessarily) yours. And yet they are not, and could not be, 
subjective to the point of being entirely idiosyncratic. 	 If, however a desire- 
satisfaction account of well-being were acceptable, we should have no reason to doubt 
that, as with desires themselves, I could have a legitimate interest in just about 
anything whatsoever. An objectivist has strategies for repudiating this which rely 
on being able to demonstrate that there are features of human nature which entail that 
whatever form of life we adopt we will be harmed (which is another way of saying 
that we cannot flourish) unless we find room for certain fundamental requirements 
which may be subsumed under the heading of 'real-interests'. And there is nothing 
incompatible in this with a respect for individuality and the acceptance of an 
irremediable plurality of values, which is to say that one good life may well differ in 
significant respects from other good lives. 
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A third way of dealing with the charge of authoritarianism while insisting on an 
objective account of real-interests is by trying to establish the respects in which a 
person would suffer serious harm if his interests were not met. 	 According to 
Feinberg harm should be conceived as 'the violation of one of a person's interests, 
an injury to something in which he has a genuine stake'.1 	 It would be 
counterintuitive to say that a person is harmed when he is prevented from doing 
anything whatever in which he has an interest. A millionaire may have an interest 
in not being short-changed by a waiter, but it is absurd to suggest that he has been 
seriously harmed by such dishonesty. The serious harm with which I am concerned 
is that harm to a person which seriously damages his ability to function normally. 
For this reason a person is harmed when deprived of those conditions necessary for 
a reasonable standard of living. No doubt there is an element of cultural relativity 
surrounding the idea of what is 'reasonable', but there are basic requirements the 
absence of which prevents anyone from engaging in anything whatsoever. Everyone 
needs food, sleep and exercise as well as contact with others and the sustenance that 
goes with this. Whatever is required in order to function properly as a person are 
often referred to as basic human needs. Garrett Thomson argues that harm consists 
primarily in the absence of certain primary goods - such as privacy, friendship, fun, 
beauty and such like - and an account of harm must explain why these primary goals 
are desirable. He maintains that: `If X is a primary good for P, then this is because 
of both the nature of P and the characteristics of X' .2 My thesis is entirely consistent 
with this statement but my conclusion is rather different to Thomson's. Although 
he goes to great lengths to refute the desire account of well-being, he is unwilling to 
conclude that the criteria of harm possess objective status on the grounds that 'harm' 
and 'well-being' are sensitive to variations in individual natures. I admit to the truth 
of this but am not prepared to concede that it is sufficient to cast doubt on the form 
of objectivism I wish to sustain which is that there are objectively determined limits 
to what may legitimately count as human well-being and, by parity of reasoning, to 
what may count as harm or serious damage to persons and their development. In 
spite of the difficulties associated with specifying an uncontested account of human 
flourishing (witness Brentano's alleged claim to the effect that his blindness was a 
blessing or the Catholic mother whose conception of harm does not include the idea 
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that she will be harmed by having yet more children3). In spite of such difficulties 
we can, I believe, demonstrate how things like health and autonomy are fundamental 
prerequisites of a good life. While there are reasons to suppose that autonomy is in 
a person's interests whether he wants it or not and, as such, may necessitate some 
form of paternalism in order to ensure its development, it does not follow that there 
is no more to well-being than acting in accordance with such interests unthinkingly. 
Part of what is involved in their being my real-interests is that I have sound reasons 
to care about them in order to ensure that I am neither denied the means to their 
securement nor suffer as a result of their atrophying. While real-interests are to be 
identified by reference to something far removed from personal preference we need 
to appreciate what it is about them that merits concern. While there may well be 
whole categories of people for whom we may deem certain things to be in their 
interests whether they want them or not, it is important that wherever possible they 
pursue them autonomously and with some real concern. For, as Elizabeth Telfer 
says, in so doing a person's well-being 'might be said to be his good and not merely 
a good life led by him'.4 
Before proceeding with an account of what such interests might amount to it is 
important to dispel any lingering attraction there might be towards an account of 
interests in terms of desire-satisfaction or any other form of subjective preference. 
Informed desires have been found wanting in this respect. If we were to equate 
interests with actual desires we should find ourselves in the absurd position of having 
a real-interest in securing everything that we happened to desire however harmful or 
trivial. Our interests would not only vary in accordance with our desires but also 
be of equally variable duration. We would be unable to say that education, for 
example, was in a child's interests (or anyone else's for that matter) prior to his 
actually desiring it and any attempt to persist with projects in the light of what one 
believed would contribute to self-satisfaction or fulfilment would collapse into nothing 
more than an attempt to satisfy desires. 
Attempts to reduce interests or well-being to states of mind are equally implausible. 
`Pleasurable feelings' may well be a mark of a thing's value but such a value cannot 
147 
be reduced to any such state. Robert Nozick's attempt to refute a subjective or 
mental states account of well-being is by now justifiably familiar. He invites us to 
consider the following thought experiment: 
`Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Superduper new neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing 
a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All 
the time you would be floating in a tank.' 
According to Nozick there are three considerations that make the decision to plug in 
to such a machine overwhelmingly objectionable. (i) 'We want to do certain things, 
and not just have the experience of doing them.' (The value of activity to well-being 
was clearly recognised by Aristotle. A life without the ability consciously to affect 
our circumstances by our own actions is a life so bereft of quality that it scarcely 
counts as a life worth living.) (ii) 'We want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort 
of person.' Nozick quite rightly compares the decision to plug into such a machine 
as a kind of suicide in that answers to questions relating to a person's character in 
such a state cease to have application. (The irrationality of sacrificing one's whole 
identity for the sake of mere experiences was again recognised by both Aristotle and 
Mill!) Plugging into Nozick's machine would be a truly dreadful state of loss of 
self on which any coherent account of well-being must be predicated. 	 (iii) 
`Plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality ... something 
matters in addition to one's experiences and what one is like.' What matters to us 
is to live 'in contact with reality'.' Life on such a machine would provide no room 
for the distinction between believing such and such to be the case and its being the 
case. Such a life would be the negation of a free life in that the individual would be 
denied the very conditions which distinguish ignorance from knowledge - and 
ignorance, as we saw, is a profound constraint upon someone's freedom. Again, to 
be in a position to verify or falsify one's beliefs is a necessary condition of being able 
to choose between alternative possibilities. 	 Where knowledge of reality is 
unobtainable then it is a nonsense to talk of choice as something different from 
arbitrary whim and fiat. The value of retaining contact with reality may be seen 
without recourse to Nozick's example. As Nathanson has shown, if we compare the 
lives of two people, one of whom is both loved and admired by his family and 
148 
friends, and the other who although despised is ignorant of this because of the tactics 
employed in concealing it from him, the love and admiration enjoyed by the latter is 
an illusion and as such is devoid of the value attributed to true love and friendship. 
Most of us would surely be appalled to discover that what we had taken to be the 
gestures of the beloved were empty and devoid of genuine feeling.' 
The result of a justified discontent with subjective accounts of interests led William 
Connolly to propose criteria against which his own definition of interests are to be 
assessed. These are twofold: (a) the intimate connection between interest and choice, 
albeit of a peculiarly privileged kind and (b) the fact that a person's claims regarding 
his interests are not necessarily incorrigible. 
Connolly's own definition is not without problems of its own but it is one of the 
clearest attempts to save the notion from a subjectivist fate. Connolly deplores the 
identification of interests with what he calls people's 'policy preferences' for a variety 
of reasons which need not detain us. One such reason, however, is sufficient in 
itself to invalidate policy preferences as a criterion of a person's interests. 	 As 
Connolly quite rightly says ' ... given that definition of interest, there simply cannot 
be "unarticulated interests"; those without particular policy preferences in certain 
areas must be viewed as not having an interest in a given policy result. '9 In an 
important chapter on 'Power and Responsibility' he explains how powerful sections 
within a community are able to manipulate the desires in accordance with which 
certain elements of the population conceive of their interests. I have already drawn 
attention to the fact that many of our desires may well be inauthentic. If true, there 
is every possibility that people may profess to having interests in that which is 
incompatible with their overall benefit or advantage. 	 It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that there are groups in society with vested interests in manipulating the 
means by which wants are created and interests articulated. As Benton says: 
`Suppose that powerful groups and individuals are able to affect the 
processes whereby the pattern of felt and articulated wants of the 
underlying population is formed in such a way that these wants are 
generally satisfiable within the framework of the prevailing social, 
economic and political institutions, and in such a way as not to 
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obstruct the want-satisfaction of the power-holders. In such a society, 
research which is conceptually and methodologically restricted to the 
analysis of conflicts over the satisfaction of articulated wants within 
that institutionalised framework will contribute to the legitimation of 
such a situation in at least two respects. First, it will fail to register 
unarticulated wants, potential aspirations, possible preferences, which 
might have been formed, articulated, etc., were it not for the persistent 
relationships and practices which socially shape wants and preferences 
in that society. Secondly, in taking as "given" the wants, preferences 
etc. which are articulated, the power relations implicated in the 
processes of social production of those 'given' wants are rendered 
"invisible" .'10 
But as he is at pains to remind us, it has to be clearly demonstrated that any 
alternative set of wants are both possible and preferable, which in turn gives rise to 
deeply troublesome questions relating to how their ethical preferability might be 
established. 	 An alternative (perhaps the only alternative) to admitting to the 
`essential contestability' of the relevant concepts whereby no resolution is thought to 
be possible is, as Benton suggests (albeit with what seems to me undue scepticism), 
to invoke a theory of universal human needs which incorporates certain values as 
`characteristically human'. 	 Such a possibility is similar in vein to something 
Connolly has to say in leaving us in no doubt that he recognises the normative force 
possessed by the concept of interest. 
`The idea of real interests ... is bounded by a set of core ideals we 
share ... about those characteristics particularly distinctive of persons 
... (and) any current choice whose import undermines one's capacity 
to make future choices or seriously restricts opportunities to act upon 
a range of possible future choices weighs heavily against the real 
interests of the person or class of persons involved.'" 
In this passage Connolly is clearly invoking the notion of autonomous agency, by 
reference to which choices are deemed genuine and wants acknowledged as authentic, 
as having special significance for persons. 
As far as teachers are concerned, if they are to be sure that they are acting in 
accordance with the real-interests of their pupils they must have some means of 
distinguishing these from their own, frequently arbitrarily formed, set of values and 
preferences. Connolly's definition of 'real interest' is as follows: 
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`Policy X is more in A's real interest than policy Y if A, were he to 
experience the results of both X and Y, would choose X as the result 
he would rather have for himself.'' 
For Connolly any definition of 'interest' must satisfy his choice criterion of adequacy 
where 'choice' refers to what an agent would choose retrospectively. But, as it 
stands, the phrase 'the result he would rather have' is unclear. We need to know the 
kind of choices made that are relevant to ascriptions of real interest. The appropriate 
question here, Connolly says, is not 'what does he now want?' but 'what would he 
choose if, knowing what he now knows, he could freely make that choice again?' . 
However, reference to counterfactual conditions here is more problematic than 
Connolly would have us believe. 
In his excellent critique of Connolly's position, Grenville Wall highlights the 
problem. If judgements concerning interests are used to justify a course of action 
then the concept of interest cannot be defined in terms of what someone's choices 
would be in certain counterfactual conditions. 
`Judgements of interest are not a species of prediction about merely 
contingent states of affairs. 	 If they were no more than this it is 
difficult to see how they could have the normative or evaluative 
significance which they must have if they are to serve in the 
justification and criticism of policies or courses of action .... It is not 
that an informed choice in counterfactual conditions is a condition of 
what a person's best interest is, but rather that judgements about what 
his interest (good, advantage) consists in furnish us with grounds for 
deciding what his choices ought to be. '13 
What then of Connolly's second criterion of adequacy - that of allowing for the 
possibility of mistaken choice? What if someone, after experiencing the results of a 
policy that legalises heroin, chooses that state of affairs as a result he would rather 
have? Is this apparent counter-example sufficient to undermine the proposed 
definition? If Connolly were to ask of someone who was, but is no longer a heroin 
addict whether or not he would willingly revert to his previous state of dependency 
and were told that all things considered such a state was indeed preferable and 
something to which he intended to revert, Connolly would (given the importance he 
attaches to choosing that which does not undermine one's capacity to make subsequent 
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choices) have to deny that such choices were compatible with anyone's real interests. 
However, given the agent's 'privileged choice' in the relevant counterfactual 
conditions which is, after all, Connolly's criterion of something's being in one's real 
interest, it is difficult to see how the choices under discussion could possibly be 
mistaken. The only 'mistake' allowed for here is in misidentifying what one wants 
and it is a characteristic of wanting something that the individual is in the best 
position to know what that it. 
If we are to take seriously the possibility of the objectivity of human interests we 
have to restrict the choices an actor relies upon to something other than those he 
would rather have for himself under certain counterfactual conditions. If an actor 
is to have made genuine mistakes relating to his real-interests he has to concede that 
other people may be in a better position to judge correctly, or, which is to concede 
as much, that the reasons for concluding that heroin is incompatible with anyone's 
real-interests are independent of what his (albeit fully informed) choice would be. 
And yet there are problems for what Benton calls the 'radical critic of the dominant 
tradition of power research'. Assuming that he is egalitarian and democratic he is 
caught in an unavoidable paradox of emancipation: 
`If they are to remain true to their political values they may implement 
no changes without the consent of those who are affected by them, and 
if they seek to implement no such changes, then they acquiesce in the 
persistence of a social system radically at odds with their political 
values.'" 
Benton quite rightly dismisses attempts to solve this so-called paradox by revising the 
concept of interests such that people are the sole arbiters of their own interests. Any 
such solution would preclude the possibility of being genuinely mistaken about one's 
interests in so far as others might be better placed to adjudicate. However, merely 
because of the weaknesses implicit in such a strategy as well as those associated with 
Connolly's reduction of real-interests to those chosen under certain counterfactual 
conditions, there is no reason to despair of real-interests having something to do with 
choices made under optimal conditions. It goes without saying that there are obvious 
difficulties with this. 	 According to Lear, 'they (optimal conditions) cannot be 
discriminated by the choices the agent would make in those conditions, for they are 
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symmetrical in that respect.'15 But I do not see why we should be put out by the 
dilemma to which this is said to give rise: 
`If the raison d'etre for invoking optimal conditions is that it is 
believed that the agent's current choices are distorted by the conditions 
in which he lives, then presumably his current choice of optimal 
conditions may also be distorted. If, on the other hand, we specify 
the optimal conditions - subject perhaps to the proviso that the agent 
endorses these conditions as optimal once he has realised them then we 
have presupposed what constitutes human flourishing. '16 
The whole point about optimal conditions is that they are not distorted. 	 To be 
optimal they must be conditions in which an individual is not the victim of coercion 
or manipulation in identifying certain interests to be his real-interests. Real-interests 
are those which an agent endorses when there is no mistake concerning either his 
desires or what it is that he really needs in order to flourish. Optimal conditions 
presuppose a deep understanding and knowledge of the issues involved including the 
circumstances in which one finds oneself, the circumstances one is likely to find 
oneself in in the foreseeable future, one's preferences and likely preferences, one's 
nature and predispositions and the nexus of significant personal, social and political 
relationships, as well as one's moral convictions all of which contribute to the form 
and shape of one's self-identity. 
If there is any truth in this it should serve to cast doubt on the first part of Benton's 
paradox ' ... to remain true to their political values they may implement no changes 
without the consent of those who are affected by them.' As he himself so ably 
demonstrates, we use all kinds of persuasive (not coercive or tyrannical) techniques 
to get people to recognise that particular courses of action are in their real-interests. 
He is quite right to emphasise the fact that attempts at persuasion 'play a part in the 
social constitution and/or reconstitution of (a person's) social and personal identity. 
Ideological struggles are, in general, struggles over the constitution and incorporation 
of individuals into opposed patterns of social identity, loyalty and commitment, 
together with the interests that these carry.' And he reminds us that 'such struggles 
are not exhaustively or exclusively "discursive" in content'. Should we really wait 
for the consent of what may well be the majority of a population - women for 
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example - before legislating in their favour?. If women profess to rest content with 
a position in society which reduces them to little more than chattels, legislation may 
well function to change a whole climate of thought about how they are perceived and 
about how they perceive themselves and in so doing extend opportunities for 
autonomous choice which does not undermine their ability to make subsequent 
choices. Legislation is itself frequently persuasive and, although I cannot argue for 
this here, I would suggest that if and where it succeeds in promoting autonomous 
decision-making, which means that it is genuinely emancipatory, paternalistic 
legislation has a place in a democratic society. In due course I provide arguments 
to show why autonomy has a special and particularly significant role in a satisfactory 
account of human flourishing. 	 Before turning to this I try to develop a more 
objective account of real-interests and human well-being than that associated with 
personal preference. 
6.2 Towards an Objective Account of Well-Being 
The history of philosophy is littered with accounts of human flourishing in terms of 
a single summum bonum for us all without exception; the closer one's life 
approximates towards such an ideal being the measure, as it were, of one's well-
being. We see this in countless religious groups and utopian visionaries most of 
whom invoke ingenious and often tortuous metaphysical assumptions about the nature 
of the universe and our place within it. Now it is easy to assume that if we are 
unable to rely on any form of desire-satisfaction account of well-being we are forced 
into some form of perfectionism. My answer to this is that it depends on what we 
mean by perfectionism. If it means that there is indeed only one summum bonum to 
which we should all aspire - the content of which being specifiable in advance of any 
particular life - there are reasons for maintaining a deep scepticism about any such 
possibility. If, on the other hand, it means that there are limits to what can possibly 
count as human flourishing, that there are conditions for such flourishing which, if 
not sufficient, are at least necessary in that they are required to some degree in any 
recognisably human life especially if such a life is to be lived in accordance with any 
intelligible notion of real-interests and, what is in effect the other side of the coin, 
harm avoidance, then I believe such a form of perfectionism is both sustainable and 
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unavoidable. If it is to be sustained it must rely on an acceptable account of human 
nature even if there is no simple or unitary account in the way envisaged by Aristotle 
with its reliance on the idea of a specific ergon (or function) for human beings.' 
A proper appreciation of what it is to be a person will provide us with the means of 
developing an account of well-being which is objective in so far as it is concerned 
with something other than mere desire-satisfaction while at the same time allowing 
for a diversity of goods within any one good life in particular. Whether or not the 
accusation of perfectionism has any legitimate foundation causes me no undue 
concern. 
According to Kekes the identification of natural requirements of human welfare is, 
in part, an empirical question but there are certain universal human characteristics 
relating to what he calls (i) 'facts of the body' which include the capacity to feel pain 
and pleasure, sickness, health and death, the capacity to think, will, imagine, use 
language, etc.; (ii) 'facts of the self' involving the capacity to learn from the past and 
to plan for the future, together with the fact that we want our lives to reflect our 
attitudes to friends and relations, sexual partners and those in authority etc.; and (iii) 
`facts of social life' which include scarce resources, the necessity for adjudication in 
cases of conflict and rules relating to social intercourse. Facts such as these 
`establish what must be the minimum conditions for human welfare ... 
To cause death, dismemberment, lasting physical pain, prolonged 
hunger and thirst is normally evil ... (Similarly) it is obviously good 
for us to have the opportunity to exercise our faculties, direct our 
lives, assess what we regard as important ....The facts of social life 
provide the social conditions in which physiological and psychological 
wants can be satisfied. Thus, having a stable society, guaranteeing 
security and some freedom, providing an authority and known rules for 
settling disputes and adjudicating conflicts are good, and their 
opposites evil. '18 
Not only is this indisputable, it is very much in accordance with the fact that it is 
impossible to compile a list of all the necessary and sufficient conditions of the good 
life or what it is to flourish as a human being with any degree of specificity. If we 
experience much that is disagreeable and frustrating it simply won't do to be told that 
from some so-called objective perspective our lives are perfectly satisfactory 
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irrespective of what we might think. As Raz argues, well-being is firstly and most 
importantly a matter of how good one's life is from one's own point of view; in so 
far as one is concerned with furthering anyone's well-being one cannot avoid 
reference to his goals, projects, ambitions or plans. They contribute to his well-
being because they matter to him. A person's well-being is affected by the extent 
to which he is successful in the pursuit of such goals.' And yet if it is the case that 
there are conditions to be met by any life believed to be good even from a subjective 
point of view such conditions are objective in being both universally applicable and 
independent of any particular set of beliefs. 
In order to appreciate how one's judgements concerning the goodness of one's own 
life may well be erroneous we must, according to Kekes, distinguish the belief that 
I take satisfaction in something from the belief that such satisfactions are part of what 
it is to live a good life. Once again Kekes is most persuasive in his claim that it is 
not our beliefs about our own experiences that are open to question but our 
judgements concerning the significance of those experiences. And this is sufficient 
to cast doubt on the plausibility of any wholly subjective account of well-being. 
`Whether our many satisfactions add up to good lives depends on the place these 
satisfactions have in our moral perspective ... (which) may prove inadequate on their 
own terms.'' The idea of a 'moral perspective' is crucial to Kekes's thesis. We 
may be said to possess one when we have formulated a coherent set of commitments 
within some sort of hierarchical structure.' 
Kekes suggests four respects in which a moral perspective may be inadequate.' It 
may be incoherent in that it contains incompatible commitments in the way that a life 
committed to scholarship with all that this entails in relation to respect for evidence, 
the cognizance of others' work in the same field and so on, may well be incompatible 
with the demands of one's religious sect. (Witness the pain suffered by Philip Gosse 
as a result of his commitment to Christian fundamentalism combined with his 
awareness of evidence to the contrary provided by geologists and the Darwinians). 
Secondly, there may well exist what Kekes calls an 'unrecognised impoverishment in 
moral perspectives'; where there is no place for love, playfulness, imagination and 
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the appreciation of beauty there is little likelihood of a satisfactory life. A stoical 
Robinson Crusoe may well be able to live without personal relationships or love of 
any kind and no doubt accept his fate with equanimity. But such satisfaction as he 
may find 'would not come from the presence of many good things in his life but from 
having succeeded in making the most of what misfortune left him' .23 	 If, on the 
other hand, we deprive ourselves of such valuable ingredients of a good life through 
lack of reflection or reflection that is misguided, the effect is a diminution of the 
goods moral perspectives may yield. Kekes also shows how a realistic appraisal of 
ourselves and our situation is essential if a life is not to become futile. A person 
lacking compassion is hardly likely to find the nursing profession rewarding and an 
adventurer would feel immensely frustrated working at a supermarket checkout. The 
fourth respect in which a moral perspective may be said to be inadequate is if it is 
temporarily specific. Failure to adjust to the ageing process and the demands to 
which it gives rise is incompatible with a satisfactory life. However satisfied we may 
feel with our particular lot we may well be mistaken in our assumption that we are 
living well. 
Kekes then tries to show how the goodness of our lives can be judged by standards 
that exist independently of what we think or do and proposes three criteria for 
adequate moral perspectives which are supposed to be universal, socially invariant 
and independent of psychological differences between people. Firstly, the wants 
created by the facts of body, self and social life must be minimally satisfied in that 
failure to do so leads to death or irreparable harm. Secondly, they must observe the 
prima facie case for conforming to the prevailing 'social morality'. We are social 
beings in virtue of inheriting a tradition, part of which is the social morality to which 
Kekes refers. It has to do with a whole series of conventions relating to common 
decency such as attempts to conduct one's affairs honestly and the avoidance of 
cruelty. It is the everyday morality we engage in without thinking. In growing up 
within a community we learn to 'see' what is required of us in specific situations and 
for the most part act accordingly - without reference to principles or utilitarian 
calculation. We are not private centres of consciousness who form values and 
convictions in isolation. Our values are largely provided by our tradition and we re- 
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evaluate them in terms of other values and so grow towards moral autonomy. Our 
personal morality (how to vote, whether or not to be a pacifist etc.) is a product of 
the values embodied in our social morality. 
Social morality and its concern with 'simple' moral situations where there are clear 
unambiguous answers to what counts as decent conduct - grieving, paying bills,  
considering others' feelings - is, according to Kekes, a necessary condition of well-
being because it protects the conditions in which we can make good lives for 
ourselves. Just as language provides the forms in which whatever we want to say 
can be said, so social morality provides the forms among which members of a society 
can freely choose and thereby develop their individuality. 'The relevant conventions 
of social morality guarantee the possibility of good lives partly by establishing the 
many forms good lives can take and partly by setting limits to these forms and to 
what is morally permissable to do in order to achieve them.'' 
Kekes's third condition for the adequacy of moral perspectives is that we must be 
subjectively justified in our belief that our lives are indeed good. 	 Subjective 
justification is not in itself sufficient justification for the veracity of such beliefs. My 
lover may be guilty of systematic deception in that while her behaviour leads me to 
believe that she loves me, in reality she regards me with contempt and is using me 
for her own purposes. The fact that I am oblivious to her real feelings towards me 
means that my beliefs have no objective basis and that however much I feel satisfied 
with this relationship it lacks real value. A good life is one where our beliefs in the 
goodness of our lives is not illusory. 
Acceptance of such facts would seem to imply that there are features common to any 
minimally satisfactory life whatsoever even though as individuals, within specific 
contexts and circumstances, we may well differ in the significance we need to attach 
to particular aspects of our common nature. Just as the principal aim of autonomous 
moral reflection is to achieve as tight a 'fit' as possible between individual lives and 
the moral tradition of which they are a part, so might well-being be explained in 
terms of the fit between the direction in which our individual lives are given shape 
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and purpose (in accordance with our characters and evaluations) and the presence of 
those values which are not merely self-chosen but which are objective in being 
determined by our common humanity and by reference to which we may be said to 
have a genuine stake in ensuring that they are not undermined. 
Given the physical, psychological and social characteristics of human nature there 
would appear to be very strong reasons in support of the view that there are necessary 
conditions for personal well-being and the avoidance of harm even if, in particular 
circumstances, certain conditions are no longer applicable. Suffering or even death 
may in exceptional circumstances be appropriate and their avoidance no longer 
necessary within the context of what makes a particular life good. 	 Again, the 
pluralist alternative to a single summum bonum, whereby well-being and lives of 
genuine diversity are perfectly compatible is the only view worthy of support. It is 
the only view which allows for the significance of self-determination in bestowing any 
particular life with dignity. What, then, are the implications of the facts relating to 
our physical, psychological and social selves for individual well-being'? 
In spite of several recent attempts to compile lists of prudential values, basic needs 
or criterial goods, I believe that neither a complete or even a moderately neat listing 
is possible.' Such attempts are bound to have a certain messiness attached to them. 
But this is not to say that we can avoid embarking on such a compilation if we are 
to complete the task of trying to specify those genuine interests in which we have a 
stake as human beings, given our limited resources, generosity and goodwill. We 
need look no further than our television screens to be reminded of the precarious 
nature of human existence in the face of too much or too little water for example; 
floods and drought prevent people from eating. Their energies are sapped and their 
capacity to shelter themselves is reduced. The turmoil resulting from both natural 
disasters as well as those for which people are more directly responsible such as war 
and human strife destroys the means whereby people can pursue many of the more 
'elevated' activities which contribute to their flourishing. Again, health and freedom 
from disease are vital for any sense of physical well-being on which so much else 
depends. 	 Health has more than instrumental value however, for it is a crucial 
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component of that joie de vivre which comes from feeling well. Important and 
fundamental as physical needs are, we require a great deal more if our lives are to 
be thought of as good from even a subjective point of view. While we share the 
need for food, water and health with the animal kingdom, we differ from them in 
having a much richer psychological and social life which demands satisfaction. And 
here the scope for controversy and conflict is much greater. In the final analysis the 
social and psychological aspects of human nature are so intimately related that I am 
not convinced of the desirability of trying to separate them other than for 
classificatory purposes. 
What is undeniable is that as language users we are able to think for ourselves in a 
way denied to non-language users. 	 This means that we are able to envisage 
alternatives to the status quo. We are able to adopt a standpoint in accordance with 
which alternatives may be assessed and evaluated. We have opinions on what is 
right and wrong, good and bad, achievable, to be avoided etc. We can formulate 
ambitions by reference to which our actions and choices cohere. We take delight in 
a wide variety of activities - in art, natural beauty, in our relationships, in exploration 
and in work. We find certain things uninteresting, dull and boring. We have a 
natural curiosity and seek to understand the world and our place within it. We can 
laugh and cry and are able to experience events as comical, tragic and absurd. For 
this reason we seek variety and stimulation and form conceptions of ourselves in 
terms of which we develop our self-esteem and self-respect. These in turn affect 
what we do and what we take to be important and essential. Such conceptions are, 
in large part, the result of our relations with other people. 	 And it is to our 
relationships with others that we attach particular significance. We seek affection 
and conviviality, friendship and love. We seek them, for the most part, not in a 
ruthlessly egoistical and grasping way but with a view to reciprocity. We want to 
be loved but we also have a need to express our love and affection for others. Other 
people provide much of that which infuses our lives with meaning and significance 
as indeed does our work and our sense of achievement. Our sexuality is a source 
of endless concern and we are not infrequently overwhelmed by its power. 
Perceiving the world as we do, our lives are governed by a whole catalogue of 
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emotions many of which conflict, forcing us to find the means whereby we can avoid 
being dominated by them and, instead, acknowledge their rightful place within our 
rational orderings. 
All of this requires systematic analysis if we are fully to understand human nature. 
But there is an aspect of human nature which underlies much of what is little more 
than a hopelessly untidy list and that is our desire to shape our lives in accordance 
with our beliefs and values, fears, hopes and dispositions. We demand the freedom, 
which is to say the means and opportunities, to exercise control over what we do and 
where we are going and to do this we require a degree of personal autonomy without 
which our lives would lack dignity and coherence. Autonomy has such a special 
value and is so important a feature of well-being that it merits a separate and rather 
longer discussion than the all too brief attention I am able to devote to the numerous 
and separate items on the above list. Meanwhile I would like to suggest at least two 
other candidates for inclusion on a list of values contributing to well-being. 
Regrettably my comments will be all too brief but I believe it is essential to highlight 
the importance of knowledge and understanding both of oneself and of the world. 
People are discontent, and rightly so, with mere belief and surmise; they need to 
discover answers to the questions that puzzle them. Answers to specific questions 
give rise to further speculation and wonder and the result is a whole world of learning 
enshrined in libraries, schools and universities. There is something paradoxical in 
doubting the value of truth over error. But of course, this is not to say that 
everything is a worthy subject of investigation or that children should be brought to 
understand as much as possible about anything at all. 	 Some things are worth 
knowing both for their own sake and for obvious utilitarian reasons. What exactly 
children should be brought to understand is a major issue which cannot be pursued 
here, but it is simply perverse to deny that well-being is intelligible without a 
commitment to understanding a great deal as well as a concern for what is true.' 
Again, the fact that we possess the capacity to derive enjoyment from what we do 
lends support to the Marxian view that some form of meaningful work is 
indispensable to personal well-being. 	 His various accounts of those systems of 
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production which leave a person 'alienated' from his work are an inspiring 
affirmation of the value of freedom. Secondary education must provide some form 
of vocational education which ought to provide time and opportunity for pupils to 
reflect on what counts as meaningful work - whether or not it is fulfilling, is 
compatible with self-esteem or whether or not it has any social benefit and such like. 
There is no doubt a limit to what school can do to counteract the alienation 
experienced by so many of the workforce but it is an abdication of responsibility if 
it does no more than introduce adolescents to a variety of work experiences. 
Ventures into the world of commerce and industry afford a splendid opportunity for 
critical evaluation of a host of issues relating to work such as the nature of the 
product and its distribution, its effects on society and the global environment, who 
has power and control within the organisation, how profits are distributed and much 
else. This is all part of the wider programme of economic and political education 
essential for future citizens of a democracy. 
As important as meaningful work undoubtedly is, (so much so that teachers must 
never become complacent and resigned to the fact that not only will many of their 
pupils end up in dead-end jobs from which many of them will be alienated, but that 
much of what is expected of them in the classroom may well be equally alienating in 
so far as it seems to lack point or application) a life without the opportunity to play, 
to do things just for the fun involved would lack a particularly significant dimension. 
Childhood in particular would be bleak and likely to have damaging results.' 
Suffice it to say that enough has been said to show that if one has a real-interest in 
becoming autonomous then an education system concerned with the promotion of 
individual well-being cannot specify in advance the sufficient conditions of each and 
every good life. Given the diversity of goods within possible good lives it is up to 
each and every one of us to shape our lives in accordance with our values and 
aspirations. But these again are not wholly self-chosen as the subjectivist would have 
us believe. Because talk of discovery, and self-discovery in particular, is entirely 
appropriate in this context and although it is unquestionably the case that people differ 
in the work they enjoy, the relationships in which they find succour and sustenance, 
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the things they seek to understand and the achievements in which they take pride - in 
short their interests vary - it does not follow that they could have a real-interest in 
anything whatsoever. There are limits beyond which it makes no sense to call a life 
good even from a subjective point of view and these limits are set by physical, 
psychological and social facets of human nature. 
	 In view of the plethora of 
possibilities open to us, combined with the wide range of circumstances in which we 
live with our diverse characters and backgrounds, it is ludicrous to pretend that there 
is a 'best life' to live. Nonetheless there may well be grounds for supposing that any 
life in particular could be better or worse. As Laurence Becker concludes: 
`Forms of life can be ranked according to the inclusiveness, that is, in 
terms of the quantity and quality of goods of diverse sorts that they 
can coexist with, make possible, create or sustain.' 
The sort of goods highlighted in our unavoidably disparate and untidy account of 
human nature and 
`the way in which most of them show up (in one guise or another) in 
all candidate descriptions of the good life suggests that the best life 
will be replete with diverse goods.' 
To repeat, well-being requires as comfortable a fit as possible between an autonomous 
and authentic life plan and those fundamental and inescapable interests we all possess 
in virtue of our common humanity. 
Before proceeding further, I wish to attend to an important omission, albeit an 
omission of emphasis, concerning the social nature of man, in order to avoid the 
errors associated with individualism whereby individual well-being is considered in 
total isolation from that of others. This will enable us to begin to see how the 
challenge thrown down by so-called 'rational egoists' to the effect that well-being 
requires no reference to altruism might be met. Unfortunately this discussion can 
be little more than prefatorial but it does suggest a way in which one might embark 
on the process of undermining such a depressing conclusion. 
	 The educational 
implications will become evident as we proceed and will be given particular 
prominence in the next and final section. 
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In denying that individual well-being may be construed in entirely individualistic 
terms, as though individual lives and the societies in which they are lived are 
somehow entirely separable, I am not committed to the opposite and equally 
implausible extreme whereby a person is seen as no more than a product of the social 
relations in which he finds himself which would deny him any autonomy. With 
customary clarity Stanley Benn expresses the idea in the following way: 
`... the fulfilment of an individual's intellectual and spiritual nature 
requires participation in activities that no man can originate and sustain 
on his own. We are species-beings in the sense that our enterprises 
are necessarily embedded in some continuing tradition, in terms of 
which we discover what is worth doing 
And in another essay in the same volume: 
`One's reasons for engaging in an activity as worthwhile, for accepting 
the principles and standards that refute it as constraining one's own 
performances, must already be built into one's conception of the 
world, which one must have received initially from those about one, 
as conceptual resources made available by the cluster of subcultures 
that combine to make one what one is - or rather provide the materials 
for what one can become .... Unlike the heteronomous person (the 
autonomous person) is not merely an instantiation of a cultural mould 
or form. The difference between them lies in their manner of dealing 
with their cultural inheritance, not in whether they possess one ...'' 
It is now easy to see why it is absurd to suppose that individual well-being can be 
considered in total isolation from other people. Who the 'others' are will depend on 
the context of what is at issue. It may involve my immediate family, my friends, 
my local community or nation state or something as global as the ecological fate of 
the planet. My relationship to all of these has important bearings on my goals and 
subsequent well-being. 
Our social nature is bound up with our ability and need to form and cultivate 
relationships with our fellows. We are social beings in that the complex series of 
relationships and roles in which we live in part define us as particular individuals. 
Not only am I a member of a particular family, a College community, a country, a 
political party, I am a friend to a number of people. These relationships go towards 
defining me as someone who is unique. Without such relationships I would, as 
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Sandel reminds us, lack moral depth." In discovering what is significant about these 
commitments I do not engage in a solitary exercise of self-reflection. Instead, I am 
deeply involved in a mutual exercise of appraisal and discovery.' I care about my 
commitments and relationships not for what pleasure they can provide but because 
without them I should cease to be me; my self-identity would collapse. 
If true, the consequences are pretty powerful. The first and obvious of which is the 
fact that my interest in my own well-being is not something that can be articulated as 
something independent of any mutual interests I may have. A proper understanding 
of what is involved here should go some way towards softening the not altogether 
useful boundary between actions done for altruistic reasons and those done for 
egoistic ones. 
	 If part of my definition involves reference to my constitutive 
attachments and relationships, then self-interested action is not obviously reducible 
to either pure egoism or pure altruism. The self is not something that stands isolated 
and opposed to others as individualism would have us believe. 
Richard Norman has suggested that where specific loyalties are concerned, especially 
those involving intimate personal relationships such as friendship or family, one is 
able to 'identify' with the fate of one's child and one's friend in a way such that their 
interests are part of one's own. This is not merely to assimilate the interests of 
others to one's own - Norman locates the notion of identification involved within a 
wide conceptual milieu which includes those to which I have already alluded, namely 
those of commitment and loyalty. Norman expresses this somewhat complicated 
issue in the following way: 
... "identifying" with others is part of the process of creating one's 
own "identity" (rather than presupposing a pre-given self to which 
others are then related) ... 
... when we say that a person who sacrifices something for her friend 
is not sacrificing herself to something external, part of what we are 
saying is that the sacrifice is an expression of a relationship, a 
commitment, built into the very meaning of her life ... 
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... to act out of friendship, or out of loyalty to one's class, or 
whatever, may be to act in a way which is neither egoistic nor yet 
straightforwardly altruistic.' 
For these reasons a person's interests are not always purely self-interested; they may, 
and frequently are, more accurately described as being 'extended' .34 Friendship is 
a particularly valuable feature in a good life. It is deeply satisfying to those who are 
fortunate enough to enjoy it. It cannot thrive on the basis of a purely self-interested 
motive. Indeed, if my relationship towards someone were motivated by what I could 
get out of it, the relationship would not be one of friendship. Friends act, at least 
in part, for the sake of each other; there is a mutuality and reciprocity between 
them." As someone's friend, my well-being is not something that can exclude the 
well-being of my friend. Our mutual well-being is something we share; the well-
being of each is dependent on that of the other. I doubt whether young children are 
capable of friendship in this full-blown sense of the term. It goes without saying that 
they rely heavily on their peers for fun and the exchange of mutual confidences. But 
this is far removed from action done for the sake of another. This is an ideal which 
is intrinsically valuable and no doubt relies on a level of maturity not required by 
more juvenile and to some extent instrumental relationships.' But this is simply to 
accept that there are different kinds of friendship between people. 
I have suggested that individual well-being is not to be understood individualistically. 
Some element of co-operation is an essential pre-requisite of this planet's remaining 
habitable. I have also tried to defend the view that relationships between people 
need a more generous means of classification than the limitations imposed by 
appealing solely to the language of altruism and egoism. The value of relationships 
such as those of family and friends is radically misconceived in terms of either 
categorisation. This should at least give us heart in our efforts to confound the 
rational egoist who denies that well-being requires either friendship or concern for the 
well-being of others. True, the egoist is rational to the extent that he prefers to live 
in a society where others are minimally altruistic, but he is insistent that his own well-
being requires no reciprocal altruism on his part. 
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It behoves us to remain sceptical of attempts to dismiss rational egoism as incoherent 
as some philosophers would have us believe.' I see no reason why the egoist should 
not understand what it is to act on principle or why he should remain debarred from 
understanding the moral concepts on which he pretends to act. Why shouldn't he 
have grown up as a perfectly normal member of the moral community with all the 
relevant understanding that this implies and in due course have decided to reject 
morality as so much humbug? This is hardly incoherent. True, he would, were he 
consistent, be only pretending to bestow respect and friendship on others who may 
not realise that he was not really their friend but was using them for his own egoistic 
purposes. But it is this that would render their 'friendship' a sham. The only way 
one could demonstrate to the egoist what he was missing out on would be, as 
Jonathan Lear has so ably demonstrated, by proving a posteriori that a significant 
form of human flourishing consists, partly, in promoting flourishing generally. 
`That there are forms of flourishing that partially consist in promoting 
flourishing is the truth that underlies the common belief that moral 
behaviour is in one's enlightened self-interest .... In flourishing, one 
is motivated to promote flourishing generally not because it promotes 
one's own flourishing but simply because it promotes flourishing 
generally. It is not something done in order to flourish; it is, in part, 
what one's flourishing is. It is from this perspective that such dicta 
as "Morality provides its own motivation" makes sense .... An a 
posteriori proof that there are actual cases of human flourishing which 
partially consists in promoting flourishing generally has certain 
distinctive features. It does not establish more than an actuality, so 
it does not eliminate the possibility of forms of flourishing. Thus the 
proof will not necessarily be reflectively undermining to those who 
genuinely believe that they should live their lives in some alternative 
way .... The proof is intended reflectively to reinforce those who are 
tempted to live this form of flourishing life - to render them less 
vulnerable to sceptical undressing.' 
We must remember that there is, after all, nothing 'natural' in egoism. There may 
well be occasions when the conflict between egoism and altruism (or morality and 
well-being for that matter) is real enough. But the conflict is not a conceptual one 
and in view of the fact that our well-being is bound up with the fate of those we have 
never met and never will meet, we must conclude that altruism is itself an essential 
component of the good life. 
167 
In Education and the Good Life John White has gone to considerable lengths to 
illustrate the difficulties facing those educators who, concerned as they are with their 
pupils' well-being, believe in hiving off the promotion of altruistic dispositions as 
somehow separate and unconnected with this central task. They might, for example, 
conceive of altruism as something exclusively concerned with the promotion of other 
people's well-being. 	 As White suggests, one of the consequences of such an 
education would be that children may well grow up believing that their own interests 
are independent of their friends, neighbours and community. He is quick to point 
out that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of shared goals in which 
children so frequently have to engage in an entirely individualistic way. As he says, 
people 'like being with other people and doing things with them. Even if the shared 
goal is not achieved, the fact that they are able to satisfy these social desires 
contributes to their well-being' .39 Treating well-being as if it were something totally 
discrete and quite separate from altruism would be to reduce co-operative endeavour 
to a mere means to something else. And it is indeed difficult to see how children 
could be brought up to see every shared enterprise in this way given the natural 
enjoyment and delight we find in doing things with others. 	 Indeed, as White 
reminds us, it is in an individual's interests to be altruistic and not merely for 
instrumental purposes. 'If I fail to recognise others, to reinforce their perception of 
themselves as valuable members of the group, then I, too, will fail to achieve 
recognition.' 
Secondary education has much to learn from the primary sector. Group work is not 
a prominent feature in the former and one cannot help being afraid that increased 
pressures on schools to attract pupils on the basis of test results will result in more 
competitiveness between children and parents. Although it would be a travesty to 
suggest that the demands of national tests in primary schools would necessarily result 
in strongly individualistic attitudes in young children, anything which reinforces such 
tendencies makes it more difficult for educators to ensure that altruistic dispositions 
develop and to avoid their pupils growing up with a cramped and mean-spirited view 
of personal well-being. As White concludes: 'the attempt to pare away altruism 
from one's own self-interested desires leaves the latter so impoverished - denuded as 
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they are of any trace of intimate attachments or co-operative activity - as to be 
scarcely recognisable as constituting human good at all'!" 	 It is all the more 
regrettable that where there is a conflict between self-interested and other-regarding 
desires he remains convinced that a resolution of the conflict amounts to no more than 
weighing them against each other ... depressing one desire so that the other can have 
further scope ... '42 While reflectiveness for White continues to subserve desire-
satisfaction it is nonetheless gratifying to find an educational theorist of his standing 
willing to concede that the dichotomy between personal well-being and altruism is 
artificial and that an education which reinforces the connection is to be preferred. 
6.3 Autonomy and Well-Being 
The truth of the claim that children have a real-interest in becoming autonomous is 
not self-evident; its justification depends on the value of that state. 	 Once we 
appreciate the kinds of thing that the autonomous person is able to achieve and the 
respects in which he differs from the heteronomous person, we can begin to see how 
his opportunities for flourishing are that much greater. 	 We shall see that the 
autonomous life has a value which is both intrinsic and to which attaches a deeper 
significance in ways which are completely absent in any version of the desire-
satisfaction account of well-being. 
Unlike being six feet tall, being autonomous is a matter of degree; one is 
autonomous to some extent or other. 	 The infant who prefers his trains to his 
playdoh is exercising at least minimal autonomy in deciding for himself what he will 
play with. Although he is capable of formulating intentions and successfully 
translating these into action he is, in important respects, incapable of self-direction 
or self-determination. An infant's life is largely episodic and non-directional. The 
autonomous adult on the other hand has the ability to relate what he now chooses to 
his past and his future and in so doing is capable of providing some kind of shape or 
direction to his goals and projects. It is this, the capacity to give a sense of direction 
to one's life in which one's choices and decisions, one's aspirations and life-style, 
one's values and opinions are in large part one's own in the sense that they are 
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authentic and neither adopted uncritically nor alien in origin, which captures the 
essence of what it is to live autonomously. Children are for the most part deficient 
in these respects; their choices and decisions lack the requisite degree of deliberation 
to merit the label 'autonomous'. Suffice it to say here that it is not a requirement 
of an autonomous life that each and every action should be preceded by lengthy and 
careful deliberation. The extent to which particular actions are autonomously 
executed has more to do with the extent to which they are in harmony with an 
authentic 'life plan' and one, moreover, that is not incoherent or lacking in some 
form of integration. The transition from heteronomy to autonomy is not always 
smooth nor does it correspond straightforwardly with a person's age. Moreover, 
there are numerous difficulties in identifying the autonomous person with confidence 
not to mention the problems associated with paternalistic legislation for those who 
are. There are many adolescents who, though compelled to remain at school as well 
as having to perform specific tasks while in attendance, are in relevant respects more 
autonomous than a lot of adults who are free to go about their daily lives 
unencumbered by this particular constraint. The justification of this state of affairs 
is something which will be addressed in the next section. 
What is it to determine one's life for oneself? An answer to this question would 
clearly require some means or other for distinguishing a life which was other-directed 
from one where the individual will was sovereign. A very great deal is required of 
someone before this can be said of him. At the very least he will need a great deal 
of knowledge both of himself and of the world. 	 Self-knowledge is particularly 
important if he is to understand the respects in which the agencies of socialisation 
have contributed towards shaping him in the way they have. 
The suggestion that the autonomous life is one lived in accordance with a conception 
expressive of one's own will, where manipulation, coercion and influence of others 
are, if present, recognised and resisted, appears to sit uncomfortably with the 
socialising influences familiar to us all. 	 We formulate our values, convictions, 
preferences and objectives as a result of exposure to parents, schools and the media. 
I went to some length in 5.2 to show that the formation of values relies on a shared 
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public world in which people learn to attach significance to actions of various kinds. 
While the importance of tradition cannot be minimised, there is a world of difference 
between someone whose beliefs and values are accepted merely because they are part 
of the social fabric with which he identifies, and someone who has made those beliefs 
and values his own - as a result of careful reflection on their merits. In this respect 
the growing child may increasingly take responsibility for the shaping of his values 
and beliefs upon which the course of his future life depends. The importance of an 
education which encourages the child to reflect on the extent to which a proposed 
course of action is in line with his personality, temperament and beliefs at any one 
time, as well as affording every opportunity to give some thought to those influences 
which have made him the person he is, cannot be overemphasised. The more 
opportunities that are presented to the child the more likely it is that he will develop 
confidence and strength of character to shape his own future. 	 All this is quite 
compatible with the fact that values do not arise ex nihilo.43 A child is socialised 
into a world of values and what he takes to be in his interests is not, at least in his 
early life, entirely within his control. Even so, a child is not a piece of plasticine 
to be moulded by others into a particular way of viewing the world. From his 
earliest years he is instrumental in giving his life some direction or other and, as 
Feinberg reminds us, it is an exaggeration to suggest that there can be no self-
determination unless the self that does the determining is already fully formed.' 
Having said this however, what is required of a person who is supposed to be in 
possession of the relevant degree of self-knowledge and whose life is said to be lived 
in accordance with values and desires which are authentic and not other-determined, 
is not immediately obvious. Diana Meyers is persuasive in arguing that there is a 
common error underlying a number of recent accounts of autonomy, all of which 
attempt to distinguish the autonomous life from one inescapably bound up with the 
forces of socialisation.' Robert Young, Stanley Benn and Harry Frankfurt all, in 
different ways, reduce personal autonomy to a special kind of free-will. 
Meyers concludes that while there is more to Young's account of personal autonomy 
than simply gaining information about one's past as a result of retrospective reflection 
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whereby knowledge of hitherto unconscious forces operating on one transforms their 
coerciveness thereby rendering one less heteronomous, he fails to make clear how one 
can escape the epistemological regress on the grounds that such self-knowledge may 
well itself be a product of socialisation. This is not to deny the importance of self-
knowledge for personal autonomy, it is just that it will not suffice as a sufficient 
condition. 
Benn is similarly disposed to accounting for autonomy as moving beyond 
socialisation, not in the sense that socialising forces can ever be completely 
transcended (for Benn acknowledges that our critical faculties, concepts and values 
by reference to which belief systems are assessed are themselves located within a 
social nexus) but in the sense that people come to disavow those amongst their beliefs 
that no longer cohere with other beliefs that are essential to their whole system of 
thought. The ability to formulate a belief system which is coherent is, for Benn, a 
crucial feature distinguishing autonomous people from the non-autonomous. Again 
Meyers concedes that coherence has an undeniable role to play in a proper 
characterisation of autonomy; where our projects and goals are manifestly 
incompatible our autonomy is diminished accordingly. An autonomous person must 
achieve a modicum of success in his efforts to bring some sort of order or coherence 
not only into his 'life-plan' but into those everyday actions which, if inconsistent, will 
inevitably frustrate him in his efforts to bring projects to fruition. 	 We may 
frequently appear to be doing what we want while at the same time frustrating those 
goals and projects which concern us most deeply. A self-determined life requires 
the ability to discern, as well as the capacity to take appropriate action to avoid, 
beliefs and actions of one's own which fail to cohere. Schools have a particular 
responsibility not only to ensure that the opportunities for the necessary critical 
appraisal arise but that the rules and procedures by which they are governed are 
themselves consistent and do not rely on conflicting belief systems or ideals. As he 
grows towards maturity, a child will inevitably be faced with powerful tensions 
between beliefs and perceived interests, but in his attempts to resolve these he is, in 
part, engaged in a process of self-definition and self-discovery. He is becoming 
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more deeply committed to one life-plan' rather than another in that his beliefs and 
actions bear some relation to each other (both in the past and in the future). 
It goes without saying, however, that there is more to living a coherent and 
meaningful life than consistency between belief and action. To focus exclusively on 
the coherence of a system of beliefs is to ignore the importance of a coherent 
personality which includes emotional responses and commitments and Benn says little 
to indicate what importance he would attach to this.' A coherent belief system is 
quite compatible with little or no autonomy, the beliefs being simply adopted without 
thought or concern for their veracity. Autonomous people in contrast are concerned 
about whether or not their beliefs 'fit' with the world and are prepared to discard 
those which experience dictates as no longer sustainable. Coherence of belief and 
action is only a necessary condition of autonomy, there being numerous cultures and 
sub-cultures where the lives of their members are quite coherent yet far from 
autonomous. 
There are, of course, dangers in pressing too hard for coherence so that the demand 
for coherence becomes a demand for a totally unified plan of life. That people's 
interests and aptitudes change over time is a truism and it would be absurd so to 
constrain oneself that one clung tenaciously to goals which ceased to have the 
significance they once did. 	 An autonomous life is perfectly compatible with a 
diversity of goals and projects. Furthermore, a rigid adherence to any sort of blue-
print would stand in the way of spontaneous action. Most of us, deprived of the 
opportunity to express ourselves spontaneously would feel that something of great 
importance was missing from our lives. Clearly, spontaneity that bore no relation 
at all to one's values and commitments might well be both inappropriate and 
dangerous; such behaviour would smack of lack of self-control. And yet it is 
probably true to say that someone who found spontaneous gestures impossible would 
be so (internally) constrained that, depending on his inability, we might wish to label 
him as mentally ill. The demand for coherence must guard against a too rigid and 
abstract pattern of living which, as with Young's demand that we know more about 
our past than anyone could ever know, would make it virtually impossible for all but 
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a few ever to attain autonomy. The sense in which coherence is important for 
autonomy is the way in which a personality is in harmony not only with itself as it 
happens to be at any one time but with the developing self, directed from within in 
accordance with values, goals, desires and the like which are authentic. Where these 
are in conflict one is subject to confusion and unease. 
The autonomous person is not thrown into a state of disarray or paralysed by 
indecision. Instead he is able to resolve such conflicts in a fairly structured way 
whereby his adoption of a particular value or spontaneous decision is at least in 
accord with some broadly-based conception with which he is able to identify. 
Someone who is incapable of identifying with his motivational set may well be self-
deceived in that his actions bear little relation to what he takes to be of ultimate 
significance. 	 Self-deception is a complex and deeply troublesome issue for 
philosophers but it involves a living contradiction between one's knowledge, values 
and commitments and one's actions. There is a kind of hypocrisy involved. Now 
to act contrary to one's evaluations is to lack integrity. Integrity requires a measure 
of honesty with oneself as well as with others. It also presuppose no mismatch 
between those evaluations which motivate and those with which one identifies. As 
Gabrielle Taylor so clearly puts it: 
`To be a candidate for possession of integrity the person's choices and 
evaluations must be her own: her identifications with her desires must 
neither be subject to unconsidered change nor distorted and confused. 
Her reasons for action must be genuine .... In publicly acknowledging 
her evaluations she accepts responsibility for what she does. For to 
explain away her actions or find excuses for them, is to disown what 
she sets store by. '47 
It is not surprising that Taylor goes on to suggest that where there is a mutual 
undermining of sets of identifications the prospects for flourishing are non-existent. 
There is a lack of self-control involved in that the person lacking the ability to 
identify with his motivational set is propelled, as it were, by forces over which he is 
powerless. To fail to identify with what motivates one is a serious threat to one's 
autonomy not, as Raz shows, in the sense that one merely failed to remain consistent 
to a life-plan once embarked upon; there is no reason at all why one should not 
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change one's mind about the things that matter in life. The kind of failure Raz has 
in mind is not failure of fidelity to an initial commitment - this is perfectly consistent 
with autonomy. He is concerned with the 
' ... failure to make choices through lack of initial commitment 
disguised under the flurry of an initial infatuation, (which) does 
diminish the autonomy of the agent's life. 	 It resembles self- 
deception. It is a case where the opportunity to choose is missed by 
the agent thinking that he has made a choice and that he has committed 
himself whereas in fact he failed to do so.'" 
Such a life is a failure in that it lacks meaning or significance which is the mark of 
an autonomous life.' 
Frankfurt, it will be recalled, distinguished autonomous people by reference to the 
ways in which they are able to identify with their motivational set; they identify with 
whatever it is which prompts specific actions be they character-traits, values, 
emotional responses or whatever. Difficulties in specifying what is involved in acts 
of identification notwithstanding, Meyers rehearses some of the problems associated 
with Frankfurt's thesis already encountered in 3.3. Apart from the question of 
assurance with respect to autonomous identification Meyers is right to draw attention 
to what she calls the problems of persistent identification and implicit identification. 
Mere identification would not suffice on its own as a mark of autonomy for, as she 
says: 
`People commonly vacillate in identifying with their desires. But if 
autonomy requires that people be capable of experiencing regret but 
that they not be plagued by chronic regret, and if the persistence of 
people's identification with their desires is necessary to account for 
these relations between autonomy and regret, a convincing account of 
autonomy must guarantee the stability of the autonomous individual's 
identification with his or her desires. Although Frankfurt attempts to 
address this problem by affirming that the decisions he is talking about 
are "resounding" commitments, there is nothing to distinguish a 
decision or an approving attitude that will issue in long-lived 
identification from one that will not. '' 
An agent whose identification proved ephemeral and fleeting would lack a sufficiently 
distinctive personality which is so essential to autonomy. 
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The problem of implicit identification arises because of the all too familiar fact that 
we rarely pause to consider whether or not we identify with a particular desire unless 
we have reason to question its appropriateness. Where desires cause no special 
concern our identifications may be said to be implicit. But as Meyers points out, it 
is difficult to see how Frankfurt could accommodate such implicit identification within 
his schema: 
... either people are only autonomous with respect to those parts of 
their lives in which they have overcome perceived deficiencies, 
resolved conflicts, or faced difficult choices, or people only manage 
to live autonomous lives by becoming obsessively self-conscious. 
Neither of these conclusions is acceptable. If autonomy is not to be 
a sporadic or undesirable phenomenon, implicit autonomy must be 
possible. 	 But, on Frankfurt's theory, implicit identification is not 
possible.' 
The error common to the three mentioned philosophers with whom Meyers is in 
dispute is that they are united in resisting the conclusion that there is no more to the 
authentic self than that which transcends the impact of social causes. As Meyers 
concludes, given the view that autonomy is a species of free will, the self or rather 
the true or authentic self 'is like a sunken treasure - a pre-existing, hidden entity ... 
The true self may elude a well-equipped seeker of autonomy, yet it remains intact 
awaiting the day when its secrets will be brought to light' ." The absurdity of the 
idea of pre-social or a-social self has already been referred to; any cogency it might 
once have been thought to enjoy having been thoroughly undermined by writers like 
Michael Sandel.53  
In contrast, the authentic self that emerges in Meyers's account of autonomy is one 
which interacts. There is no reason why self-direction and a due recognition of the 
socialising influences to which we are all exposed are necessarily incompatible. 
Education itself is one of the most powerful socialising agencies but, as will be 
argued in Section 7, there are reasons for believing that education in general and 
schooling in particular are both necessary and desirable if as a citizenry we are to 
become more than minimally autonomous. What has to be guarded against is an 
education system which is unmindful of the ways in which certain forms of 
socialisation occur such as racial and sexual stereotypification, for example, whereby 
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certain occupations and their attendant benefits are accepted as appropriate for some 
and not others on grounds as irrelevant as race or gender. 
If it is the case that there is more to autonomy than free-will, what is it that an 
autonomous person can do that a non-autonomous or minimally autonomous person 
cannot? He must, at the very least, be capable of choosing between a variety of non-
trivial alternatives which not only presupposes the ability to recognise available 
choices for what they are, as well as to be able to take advantage of them, it also 
requires the ability to imagine other possibilities. This is why those aspects of a 
child's education - fiction, drama, history, philosophy, political theory and so much 
more - which provide opportunities for the powers of imagination to develop - are so 
valuable as an aid to the development of autonomy. An autonomous agent has a 
whole repertoire of mental capacities which include the ability to think for oneself, 
to assess the merits of competing alternatives in accordance with one's convictions 
and to be in possession of sufficient courage and determination not only to resist the 
pressures to conform for conforming's sake but also to be able to act in accordance 
with one's judgements especially where the consequences of action or failure to act 
have a particular significance for the agent. Autonomy, then, has a great deal to do 
with being in a position to make choices which have a significant bearing on the 
direction one's life takes. The conditions of choice are both objective and subjective. 
They are objective in that whether or not a person is able to choose between 
alternatives depends on their availability, and subjective in that they presuppose some 
appreciation of the existence of the alternatives available as well as knowing how the 
adoption of one or other will affect one's future. It is all very well for a fourteen 
year old to be told that he has a wide variety of important choices available to him 
in terms of the subjects available at GCSE, but if he has no understanding of what it 
is about them that makes them genuine options and how they are likely to affect his 
future, then he simply does not merit the status of 'autonomous chooser'. 
It would be interesting to speculate on the extent to which autonomy is either 
enhanced or restricted by different political and economic systems; governments are 
profoundly important when it comes to creating opportunities or indeed frustrating 
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them. But it would of necessity require a more thorough investigation than space 
permits. Instead, I intend to restrict the discussion by concentrating on the duties 
of parents and schools to actively promote the autonomy of children on the grounds 
that failure to do so is likely to result in children being harmed. The truth of this 
claim rests on being able to demonstrate that children have a real-interest in becoming 
autonomous which requires some explanation of the value of autonomy as a character 
ideal. 
I shall return to this important question again in due course but before doing so I 
want to indicate why children in particular have a legitimate interest in becoming 
autonomous. It seems to me that the ability autonomously to conceive of and to act 
in accordance with goals of one's own is partly constitutive of normal human 
functioning and this might well be seen as something to which everyone, including 
children, has rights and in virtue of which our actions and decisions in relation to 
them should be determined.' Admittedly the child may have no particular interest 
in becoming autonomous but this is no reason to conclude that it is not in his interest 
so to become. Because there is an inseparable connection between something's being 
in someone's interest and what is good for that person I find it impossible to go along 
with Feinberg in his article on 'Harm and Self-Interest' when he appears to be happy 
with the idea of vulgarity, greed, vanity and cold-heartedness being in a person's 
interests: ... if he is clever enough to make a "good thing" in material terms out of 
dishonesty and unscrupulousness ... then it can hardly be in his interest to become 
warm, sensitive, cultured and generous; much less witty, perceptive, tactful, 
disinterested and wise' .55 This is because Feinberg emphasises an account of rational 
action which is based on mere desire-satisfaction whereby it is in virtue of our not 
wanting to rest content with dullness, vulgarity and stupidity that we think it in our 
interest not to be defective. 'Without those antecedent wants, it would not be in our 
interest to be excellent at all...'' This is very difficult to reconcile with another 
article by Feinberg with which I have great sympathy. I refer to 'The Child's Right 
to an Open Future' where he is at pains to demonstrate the right of a child to secure 
his interest (albeit his future interest) in self-determination." As Benn would have 
it, we are promoting a child's interest in educating him to be a person of a certain 
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sort.' If, as Feinberg suggests in the earlier article, good character is something 
directly in a person's interests only when the person has a want-based interest in it, 
it is puzzling to say the least, how he can subscribe to the view that children have 
future interests in being persons of a certain sort - namely autonomous persons - at 
a time in their lives when they have no desire for any such thing. 
A child's right to an open future is, according to Feinberg, a 'right in trust'. A child 
is a potential adult and it is that adult's autonomy which must be safeguarded. Given 
the obvious interest a child has in not having his future options foreclosed, it is clear 
that anything which frustrates this interest of his harms him very seriously. Children 
are not merely extensions of their parents; they are certainly not the property of 
parents. 	 This is why parents, and anyone else with responsibility for children, 
whose actions or omissions are either likely to fail to ensure or are instrumental in 
frustrating the growth of a child's capacity for making choices based on critical 
reflection which are so crucial to normal functioning, may be said to have harmed 
that child's future.' 
Although failure to create the right 'climate' for the development of autonomy may 
well leave the child incapable of self-determination in important aspects of his life, 
the parents who fail in this respect are not necessarily culpable. It may be that they 
are hopelessly inadequate at child-rearing due to their own parents' incompetence. 
It is still fair to say, however, that they have (albeit unwittingly) harmed their 
children. There is precious little that legislation can do about this although teachers 
have a special responsibility to try and compensate by providing opportunities for 
children to think for themselves. What is essential is that parents are mindful of the 
need not to foreclose the range of options available. 
Feinberg examines at great lengths the 'rights' of parents to bring up their children 
with a narrow and blinkered outlook based on religious dogma. The Old Order 
Amish, for example, were successful in 1972 in being granted by the Supreme Court 
of the USA the 'right' to withdraw their children after the eighth grade. The Court 
concluded that the parents' right to determine the religious upbringing of their 
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children outweighed the claim of the state in its role as parens patriae to extend the 
benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents. 
If Feinberg is correct, as he undoubtably is in his belief that a child has a right to an 
open future, then the member of the Court who said that 'no amount of harm to the 
parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their children could overturn the 
children's "rights-in-trust" to an open future' was also correct.' It is because there 
are limits to the ways in which parents may bring up their children that the state has 
duties to enforce those limits. 
The implementation of such a policy is not to deny parents the normal right to act 
paternalistically in promoting their children's interests; it is to deny them the right 
to act in accordance with beliefs, however sincerely held, which are likely to result 
in children being harmed. Depriving a child of a substantial amount of secondary 
schooling is, of course, likely to harm him only if what goes on there is in his real-
interests. The example of the Amish raises specific questions relating to the denial 
of a child's right to an open future in that they not only withdraw their children from 
school at a relatively early age but confine them to a particularly restricting and 
narrow way of life. When it comes to a straightforward conflict between the religious 
beliefs of parents, or for that matter a theocratic state, and the child's right to an open 
future, the child should always take precedence. 
If children are denied access to alternative belief systems and life-styles which are 
afforded amongst other things by history, literature and TV, they will find it that 
much harder to evaluate their own beliefs in ways which are essential if those beliefs 
are to be authentically theirs. Mere exposure to alternatives does not guarantee a 
person's ability to act in accordance with any critical assessment made as the result 
of such exposure. 
	 'Weakness of will' is a phenomenon that has troubled 
philosophers since Socrates and it would be an unnecessary digression to rehearse the 
issue here but it is obvious that the autonomous person must possess the requisite 
strength of will to act in accordance with his convictions. One might grant the right 
of self-determination to someone and afford him every opportunity but this is different 
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from ensuring that he possesses the necessary wherewithal. What is important is that 
teachers and parents help children develop the ability to control themselves in the face 
of desires and emotions which are inclined to divert them from acting in accordance 
with their own judgements. What is involved here is not as simple as it sounds. 
Benson illustrates the complexity as follows: 
`Courage and self-control enter into the forming of judgements as well 
as into the acting upon them. That is one complication. A second 
is that certain emotions, e.g. fear or impatience may prevent one from 
acting as judgement would dictate. But there is a more insidious and 
intimate way in which emotions may subvert thought. The fear of 
getting the wrong answer, of being thought unorthodox, may actually 
prevent a person from trusting himself to accept the truth of his own 
observations or the safety of his own inferences. There is a more 
fundamental relation between thought and emotion because whereas 
intense emotions may temporarily make thinking ineffective, the fear 
of being wrong corrupts the faculty itself .... Intellectual skills cannot 
exist without qualities of character. The fear and anxiety that subvert 
the mind in forming judgements also subvert the will in standing by 
them and translating them into action.'61  
Anyone who is a slave to his passions is what Lindley calls `conatively 
heteronomous'. 	 In this respect he is distinguishable from someone who is 
`cognitively heteronomous' whose beliefs are merely adopted without due regard to 
reasons. When confronted by pressures (either internal or external) to surrender 
one's judgement, a certain amount of courage is essential if one is to retain one's 
autonomy. 
In spite of the feminist movement there are many parents and teachers who, for 
whatever reason, fail to combat the forces which condemn so many females to adopt 
stereotypical roles. The problem is not one of 'failing to understand the situation 
they are in, and the persistence of deeply entrenched habits which may get in the way 
of what they want to do' ,63 important as this is in the curtailment of autonomy. It 
would seem an unlikely prospect that a girl who had been immersed in a system in 
which women were thought to be fit only for a life of domesticity should, by the end 
of her schooling, be able to conceive of alternative possibilities in life let alone be in 
a position to make rational choices between them. What is even more insidious is 
where girls are only too aware of their 'situation' and may, perhaps even desperately, 
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wish to do something about it but are prevented because of pressures operating on 
them which have affected their strength of will to act. A girl's self-confidence may 
have been so undermined by the attitudes and prejudices of her overpowering elders 
that she simply lacks what it takes to reject her stereotypical attitudes, beliefs and 
responses. If we are to take seriously the right of children to an autonomous life we 
must educate them so as to afford them every opportunity to develop the necessary 
courage and self-confidence to stand firm in the face of certain pressures which 
threaten to undermine their ability to forge a life of their own making based on sound 
knowledge of their traits and abilities, to discover for themselves what is satisfying 
and fulfilling and how these combine to form a life that is something in which they 
have a genuine stake or interest. 
A further multiplication of examples is unnecessary although cases of parents and 
teachers harming children's futures could easily be cited. Children are frequently 
stunted in their artistic development, their vocational orientations as well as their 
attitudes to different races, their own bodies, and interpersonal relations. As Robert 
Young says: 
`Rather than giving detailed consideration to the harm which this 
ignorance may occasion, it is more needful to stress that such authority 
as parents legitimately have where children do lack knowledge or lack 
the physical and psychological responses necessary for full autonomy 
is surely out of place when their own beliefs interfere seriously with 
the development in others of an exploratory attitude towards talents 
and aptitudes and an associated awareness of the options so critical for 
the achievement of rational self-determination. We can and should be 
critical of the morality of such "authority ,, . '64 
Now although he does not use the term 'autonomy' it is clear that Mill's idea of 'the 
full development of individuality' is, to all intents and purposes, an ideal of what we 
have characterised as 'personal autonomy'. But there is some dispute as to whether 
Mill conceived of this as being of intrinsic value or whether his justification for 
autonomy as a character ideal rests on more instrumental foundations. He is, in my 
view, correct in attributing both intrinsic and extrinsic value to autonomy. He finds 
its intrinsic value to be bound up with the notion of human dignity. Anyone who is 
a slave to custom is a lesser person in that he fails to develop within himself 'any of 
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the distinctive endowments of a human being'. And yet he goes to great lengths to 
argue for the value of autonomy in terms of the beneficial consequences that its 
cultivation and development are likely to promote. And of course this is all perfectly 
consistent. However, Mill did feel that many people would remain unconvinced 
about autonomy's intrinsic value and therefore felt the need to provide a more 
utilitarian justification. 
... what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs 
than that it brings human beings nearer to the best thing they can be? 
... (yet) it is necessary further to show, that these developed human 
beings are of some use to the undeveloped ...'' 
In order to refute any (mere) utilitarian justification of autonomy's value, however, 
all we need to do is to point to the all too obvious fact that autonomy does not 
necessarily ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 	 Happiness, 
however conceived, is not guaranteed by the promotion of autonomy. And we need 
look no further than many tribal societies, where opportunities for the exercise of 
personal autonomy are minimal, to witness the lack of neuroses and anxieties related 
to mental illness and other maladies associated with autonomy-conducive cultures. 
This is not to deny that there are all kinds of plausible arguments to show the obvious 
instrumental justification for autonomy, especially in a society such as our own. 
Such arguments need no rehearsal here however, for it is incumbent upon us to 
provide credence to the claim that autonomy has intrinsic value and there are a 
number of powerful considerations in support of this. 
Firstly, without at least a minimal capacity to select from the bewildering array of 
alternatives confronting us whereby we are able to resist the force of certain desires 
as well as remaining not entirely determined by external causal factors, our moral 
vocabulary would be rendered incoherent. The ways in which we treat others and 
react to them is in very large part determined by the extent to which they are held 
responsible for what they do. 
Secondly, and crucially, an autonomous life and the kind of life appropriate to 
persons are so intimately related that to question the value of the former is to cast 
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serious doubt on those very features which provide human life with the value and 
significance it rightfully enjoys. 	 Part of our 'distinctive endowments as human 
beings' is the capacity for self-determination - to be able to formulate 'life-plans' in 
the light of our own past actions, values and predispositions and those future states 
of affairs, including our likely choices, which may be envisaged. This at least, 
combined with the capacity to modify such plans in the light of experience and a 
proper understanding of how and why we attach significance to some things and not 
to others, is entailed in the very idea of human-being (or at least 'person'). It is part 
of our human nature and as such indispensable to the flourishing of creatures in 
possession of such capacities. A human being who was denied the opportunities for 
self-determination could no more flourish as a person than a bee deprived of its wings 
could flourish as a bee. 
While few would wish to deny the opportunity for choice - especially in regard to 
spouse, career, political and religious affiliation and the like - there is, amongst 
philosophers at least, disagreement over the importance attached to the ability to 
reflect critically on the merits of marriage, paid employment or religion. Why, it 
may be asked, should the capacity for critical reflection at that altogether deeper level 
be necessary in order to flourish? It is tempting, but too easy, to dismiss the 
challenge as disingenuous (although anyone seriously asking the question is already 
committed to the value of critical enquiry). 	 There are however a number of 
possible, albeit related, responses. 
The first is that if it is the case that people, including children, have real-interests in 
not having their future options foreclosed by being denied the opportunity for critical 
reflection at this deeper level, then it is absurdly arbitrary to stop short in refusing 
to equip them with the capacity to live a life of their own choosing and to deny them 
the wherewithal for living such a life to the fullest extent which of necessity requires 
a sensitivity and a readiness to submit one's values, commitments and decisions to 
critical scrutiny which in turn presupposes the cultivation, particularly within 
children, of a healthy scepticism. 
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More importantly however, there is a certain dishonesty attached to the refusal to at 
least attempt to provide people with as full an understanding of their 'situation' as 
possible, for although one might be capable of exercising choice between alternatives, 
full autonomy - or what is sometimes referred to as strong autonomy - requires of one 
the ability to envisage alternatives not readily available. And this is a fundamental 
requirement if one is able to withstand those manipulative forces which are all too 
manifest and to which we are all, to some extent or other, occasionally subject. 
Power, after all, accompanies knowledge and information and whenever we are 
denied access to such knowledge the opportunities for genuine self-determination are 
diminished accordingly. This is why the deliberate deprivation of access to relevant 
knowledge and information essential to the formation of life-plans which are truly 
one's own is so unacceptable and why members of religious groups who deny their 
children access to an education which, in terms of the knowledge and skills 
transmitted, is indifferent to the religion or gender of the students may legitimately 
be accused of a serious violation of human rights. There is then a certain hypocrisy 
associated with the professed aim of promoting self-determination and stopping short 
of developing it as fully as possible. 
It is often suggested that while full autonomy is a necessary feature of well-being in 
an advanced industrial society, such as our own, where a genuine concern for one's 
real-interests presupposes a great deal of knowledge and understanding of those forces 
(political, social and environmental) which threaten to undermine them, it is quite 
unnecessary for those societies which are less developed. I admit to finding this very 
difficult to accept. After all we all inhabit the same planet and however the notion 
of 'environment' is interpreted, are subject to changes therein. 	 No society is so 
remote or so 'primitive' as to be unaffected by environmental change, much of which 
is a direct consequence of the greed and imprudence of those of us in the 
industrialised world. Many societies are being forced to the edge of destruction as 
a result of plunder and conquest. Surely it is naive to assume that if their conception 
of their well-being excludes the spirit of criticism associated with full autonomy we 
must accept their account with equanimity. Just as it is wrong to pretend that a 
person, or group of people, is never in an optimal position to judge where their real- 
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interests lie it is equally wrong to suppose, as does Mill, that people are always the 
best judges of what is in their own interests. Although there is a prima facie case 
for suggesting that forcibly preventing someone from doing something against his will 
is a violation of his autonomy, even if the reasons for so interfering are supposed to 
be in his best interests - this has been the force of classical liberalism's principal 
objection to paternalism - the case is only prima facie. 	 Autonomy is such an 
important and indispensable factor in a recognisably human life that anyone 
preventing a child from acquiring it and, having once acquired it, from exercising it 
to the full, may be said to have harmed the child. 	 It follows that in certain 
circumstances the imposition of constraints may well be justified if it is reasonable 
to believe that autonomy might be enhanced. 	 This does of course raise the 
troublesome question of the justification of paternalism towards sane adults, hence the 
important reference to circumstances. There are no doubt numerous occasions when 
paternalism is in order but it is not possible to pursue the issue here. As far as 
adults are concerned there are ways and means of promoting their autonomy without 
paternalistic legislation. The existence of a free press as well as opportunities for 
adult education both contribute towards people being able to live more autonomously 
and anything with such potential must be welcomed even if these very same people 
have no desire to become, or once having so become to remain, autonomous. In the 
next and final section I shall show that paternalistic interference with a child's liberty 
in the form of compulsory schooling is justified. A child has a real-interest in not 
having his future options foreclosed by being denied the opportunity to become a self-
determining adult. 
One final point concerning the intrinsic value of autonomy (which goes deeper than 
merely alerting one, as White suggests, 'to possible ways in which one's flourishing 
may be frustrated ...'66  for there is no more to such frustration in this account than 
the non-satisfaction of informed desires), and this is the relationship of autonomy to 
self-respect. We have already seen how serious reflection about issues which are of 
ultimate significance to one is itself part of the educative process of self-definition. 
Discovering who I am and what matters to me as well as having the courage to act 
in accordance with such knowledge and convictions are bound up with self-respect 
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such that failure to achieve a degree of self-knowledge or a disposition for living 
one's life in line with what one acknowledges to be of supreme importance will 
inevitably affect one's self-respect and, accordingly, one's well-being. One's failure 
in this regard affects one's self-respect as the following example of Thomas Hill's 
bears witness.' He invites us to consider an artist of outstanding merit whose work 
goes unappreciated. Cynically, he alters his paintings for money and social acclaim 
but at the price of increasing self-disgust. It requires little in the way of argument 
to persuade us that self-contempt and personal well-being are mutually incompatible 
for self-respect, like personal autonomy, is so inextricably linked to the idea of human 
dignity that without it any sense of genuine well-being is totally without foundation. 
This is why life as a sybaritic lump attached to one of Nozick's machines is so 
horrifying. Surrendering oneself to the experiences produced would be to surrender 
one's rightful concern with oneself. 
Someone might protest that he would be rendered so insecure and fearful by the 
opportunities afforded by living autonomously that he would rather forgo the alleged 
benefits in order to retain peace of mind. But just because we would be reluctant 
to set about forcing him to be autonomous (assuming that to be possible) this in no 
way casts doubt on the claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable. It would be 
absurd to conclude that autonomy was alright for those who had the stomach for it 
but had positive disvalue for the faint-hearted. What we ought to do, I suggest, is 
to set about helping those who felt that they could not cope with the demands of an 
autonomous life to develop the courage and strength of will required. It would 
depend on the degree of fear involved whether or not we classified such people as 
mentally ill. 	 No doubt there are things we could do to force some pathetic, 
overtimorous person to face up to the demands entailed by the autonomous life, but 
unless he himself experiences such a life as worthwhile there is something very 
important still missing, namely the apprehension of a life worth living as valuable. 
All I am saying is that fear of anxiety in itself is no reason for avoiding an 
autonomous life.' 
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7. FREEDOM, WELL-BEING AND COMPULSORY SCHOOLING 
7.1 Introduction 
While there is obvious value in not being subject to the will of others it is quite 
wrong to assume that this is the only freedom worth guarding or promoting. Indeed, 
it is the excessive value attached to mere absence of constraints that leaves negative 
freedom falling short of a satisfactory explanation of why freedom is justifiably rated 
so highly. Those in a position to exercise their freedom must not only identify with 
their choices but have the opportunity to operate within a framework of objective 
choice conditions. And as we have seen, the value we attach to the freedom of 
choice between alternatives is bound up with the respect we have for persons and 
their rights to self-determination. It is not so much the value of choice as such which 
is of present concern but rather those features of personhood in virtue of which we 
identify a particular choice as a manifestation of personal autonomy. Individual 
choices merit respect to the extent that they cohere with other decisions and actions 
within a self-determined life-plan and any plausible justification of paternalism must 
recognise this. I shall return to this important point in due course but for the moment 
I wish to direct my attention to some familiar attempts at justifying paternalism, 
especially towards children. 
Compulsory schooling is clearly paternalistic in intent in that it is widely assumed that 
both children and society at large would be seriously harmed in some way if school 
attendance were entirely voluntary. There is of course a great deal of truth in this 
assumption but the nature of this harm is not always made explicit. Behind the 
insistence that children between the ages of five and sixteen should be compelled to 
attend school in the interests of harm-avoidance there is an equally widely held belief 
that schooling is instrumental in contributing to the well-being of children and to the 
society of which they are members even if it is not entirely clear in the minds of 
those who would go along with compulsion what this might involve. 
It goes without saying that whether these are necessary or jointly sufficient for the 
justification of paternalistic legislation of this kind is widely disputed. It is hoped that 
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this section goes some way towards a satisfactory answer by concentrating on a 
number of familiar attempts to justify paternalism and by exploring those respects in 
which children are supposedly sufficiently different from adults to merit attendance 
at school on a non-voluntary basis. The outcome of such on investigation should 
leave us in a much better position to construct a coherent and feasible curriculum with 
the aim of promoting individual freedom on the one hand and that wider conception 
of personal well-being which it has been the purpose of this essay to establish and 
defend and in relation to which freedom is credited with such importance. 
7.2 	 Paternalism and its Justification 
According to Rosemary Carter 
`a paternalistic act will be justified only if either: (i) prior to 
interference the subject explicitly consents to the paternalistic 
intervention; or (ii) subsequent to the interference the subject (a) 
explicitly consents to the action, or (b) is disposed to consent either 
upon request, or upon the receipt of a relevant piece of information.' 
The advantages of appeals to consent are obvious in that they accord with the 
importance we attach to individual decision as well as avoiding all the difficulties 
associated with trying to specify a set of real or objective interests an individual might 
be said to possess irrespective of his subjective preferences. 
While it is not difficult to conjure up persuasive examples of consent to paternalism 
prior to any particular intervention (Dworkin's is that of Odysseus's instructions to 
be tied to his ship's mast in order to prevent his falling victim to the song of the 
Sirens) the fact remains that instances of this kind are atypical and hopeless as a sole 
justification in that they exclude those cases where intervention seems most 
appropriate such as in the lives of the very young, the senile and the insane.2 Perhaps 
there is more mileage in the idea of subsequent consent. Dworkin would certainly 
think so as he suggests that a child coming to acknowledge the correctness of his 
parents' intervention is an important moral limitation on the exercise of parental 
power: °parental paternalism may be thought of as a wager by the parent on the 
child's subsequent recognition of the wisdom of the restrictions'3. But apart from the 
objection that such an attempted justification has no bearing on how the insane or 
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senile should be treated, such a defence is seriously flawed in a number of important 
respects. 
Where young children are concerned, the wise parent insists on a fairly strict regimen 
relating to hygiene and health such as teeth-cleaning, bed-times and the like. No 
doubt parents may wager that a child will, in due course, appreciate the wisdom of 
being treated in this way but if he dies in infancy what then of the paternalistic 
treatment? Are we supposed to conclude that his parents were unjustified in 
implementing that particular routine? On a literal interpretation of the argument from 
subsequent consent the argument would appear to be definitely not. But surely the 
child's death is irrelevant to the justification of parental decisions. Appeals to what 
it is reasonable to believe a child would have consented to (had he lived) are 
remarkably unhelpful in determining the way children should be treated. A person is, 
after all, likely to consent only to what he believes is a reasonable curtailment of his 
liberty, and that is a separate question for which the argument from subsequent 
consent can provide no guidance. In any case, if a child were to grow up refusing to 
concede that his parents had been justified in their treatment of him - perhaps he is 
wilfully perverse or stupid - it does not follow that his parents behaved unreasonably. 
Another very serious difficulty for the argument from subsequent consent is that it 
would seem to allow for all sorts of manipulative possibilities. Without invoking 
anything so extreme as brainwashing or hypnotizing, the phenomenon of the parent 
intent upon instilling a rigid and inflexible set of dispositions and beliefs is all too 
familiar. Given certain child-rearing practices there is almost a guarantee that the 
requisite consent will be forthcoming. In other words we are faced with the problem 
of having to determine what is to count as genuine consent. 
Rosemary Carter tries to overcome this difficulty by suggesting three classes of cases 
in which consent is not sufficient to justify a paternalistic act. These include: (i) 
cases of brainwashing someone to conscientiously accept a new set of beliefs and as 
a result approve of the brainwashing that brought them about; (ii) those in which 
consent results from a distortion in the subject's values, beliefs or desires (as a result 
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of religious indoctrination a child may come to approve of the way in which he has 
been brought up and as often as not all too willingly inflict the same on his own 
children or his pupils); (iii) those cases 'where the subject's consent would have been 
withheld or would be withdrawn upon the receipt of a piece of relevant information. '4 
All this is less helpful than it might at first appear, for she nowhere provides us with 
a criterion of 'distortion' of values apparently oblivious of the fact that the very idea 
of distortion of values is itself a normative judgement. 
Appeals to subsequent consent are quite useless as a means of distinguishing between 
justified and unjustified paternalism, and where such consent is not forthcoming our 
conviction that paternalism is appropriate is not necessarily dented. The form of 
consent on which Dworkin relies is 'hypothetical' in that it refers to that to which a 
person would consent if he were rational. Dworkin is suggesting that the justification 
of paternalism requires more than acting in accordance with what it is reasonable to 
believe someone would consent to, that is to say it goes beyond his empirical will 
even if that will is 'unencumbered' . He is more concerned with what it is reasonable 
to believe someone would consent to if he were rational or fully informed or both. 
As we have seen there are different senses in which an action may be judged rational 
but the form of rational agency with which Dworkin is operating is akin to that 
defended in the previous section in relying on the idea of real-interest. According to 
this view an agent is irrational if what he does is incompatible with his interests in, 
amongst other things, continued survival and flourishing. 
As an example of such irrationality Dworkin singles out those who would rather die 
than be subjected to a blood transfusion on religious grounds. Refusals of this kind 
are not taken lightly and no doubt accord with what the agent takes to be a coherent 
set of beliefs. But presumably those who embark on what some of us might consider 
to be foolhardy pursuits such as climbing the north face of the Eiger or crossing the 
arctic alone, do so with due consideration of the dangers involved. They might 
protest that being prevented from stretching themselves in this way would threaten all 
that gave their lives significance and purpose. The difficulty lies in determining 
where exactly paternalistic impositions are authoritarian and out of order and where 
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they are morally defensible. Circumstances differ and we have to rely on the 
rationality of the beliefs in question. Clearly a 'bird man' equipped with nothing 
more than a pair of condor wings who attempted to fly to the ground from the top of 
the Eiffel Tower would be doomed to fail because his beliefs are manifestly 
erroneous. The adventurer is more difficult to deal with because while there are no 
doubt circumstances in which such feats are almost certain to end in death, there is 
nothing self-evidently absurd in wishing to stretch oneself to the limit when there is 
some chance of success. When it comes to respecting people's religious beliefs 
however, we have a choice. We can either go along with them simply because they 
are religious however daft and dangerous they might appear (it might well be in 
accordance with a particular religion that one should subject oneself to the will of 
another), or we can assess the rationality of the beliefs in question and act 
accordingly. I have no hesitation in commending the latter as the only defensible 
premise on which to proceed. 
The significance of Dworkin's appeal to hypothetical consent is that he relies on the 
idea of human well-being in determining the justifiability of paternalistic interventions 
which of course renders the whole idea of consent utterly redundant. If paternalism 
is acceptable only in those circumstances when it is reasonable to believe that a 
rational agent would consent then, as Lively says, 'the legitimating consent 
necessarily follows from the rationality of the intervention and the burden of 
justification for intervention rests on the claim that it will prevent self-harm. (Thus) 
it is difficult to see what force the secondary appeal to consent adds to the 
justification. '5  
It is because we attach such importance to being able to act in accordance with our 
choices and preferences that we have a natural reluctance to intervene in the decision-
making of others where the associated harm is relatively minor. But when it is of an 
indisputably serious nature it is counterintuitive to deny the appropriateness of 
intervention, Hobson argues that a necessary condition for justified paternalism is its 
prevention of serious harm where the harm avoided outweighs any other harm, such 
as loss of liberty brought about by the interference. '6 Even though the prediction 
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required to determine the circumstances in which someone is likely to suffer serious 
harm is rarely straightforward it is, I believe, an indispensable starting point. 
There are, as we have seen, a variety of ways of classifying basic needs by reference 
to which the notion of harm gains application. Hobson himself operates with a 
threefold distinction between physical needs (including things like food, air, freedom 
from fatal injury), psychological needs (such as security and contact with other 
people) and what he calls personal needs (things like religious convictions, career 
aspirations and the need for education). Whether we accept this classification or not 
we have to concede that where fundamental human needs are not met, serious harm 
will result. There is thus a very strong case for preventing someone from embarking 
on something which is manifestly in direct contravention of his real-interests. 
While harm avoidance for Hobson is a necessary condition of justified paternalism 
it is not sufficient. The additional condition is the inability to make a rational 
decision about one's own best interests in virtue of some special feature which 
prevents rational deliberation about the case in question or due to general ignorance 
of relevant facts.' While he is correct to point out that none of this requires us to 
make a judgement concerning the rationality or otherwise of the subject's behaviour 
in a particular case, but only one concerning whether he is incapable of rational 
choice, he operates solely with a means-end view of rational choice which renders his 
criteria less helpful than it might be. 
I shall return to the relevance of harm-avoidance and the absence of rationality as 
justifying conditions in what follows as they are particularly relevant to how we may 
treat children. Before this however it is incumbent upon us to be as clear as possible 
about what distinguishes children from other categories of human beings. Only then 
shall we be in a position to decide whether or not they should be compelled to go to 
school. 
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7.3 	 Children and Paternalism 
Mill is quite clear that his opposition to paternalism does not extend to certain 
categories of people including those who are not 'in the maturity of their faculties' 
and 'children ... or young persons below the ages which the law may fix as that of 
manhood or womanhood.'8 Unfortunately he is remarkably unhelpful in indicating 
how the 'mature' are to be distinguished from the 'immature' and fails to differentiate 
a legal/institutionalized conception of childhood (where age is the distinguishing 
criterion) from a normative characterization (where maturity is the criterion). No 
doubt there are dangers in placing too much emphasis on either one or the other in 
demarcating childhood but it is reasonable to assume as Kleinig suggests that a 
normative concept has conceptual priority in that there would be no justifiable point 
to the institutionalized contrast were there not thought to be differences of some 
normative significance.9 
My principal concern is not so much with the conditions of childhood but with the 
justification of compulsory schooling. Why should anyone be made to go to school? 
How do we distinguish those who should be made to go from those for whom 
schooling should be optional? What, if anything, is the basis for the convention of 
compulsory schooling for those below a certain age? Satisfactory answers to such 
questions must not only address issues relating to what is harmful and beneficial to 
both individual children and to the society of which they are members, they also rely 
on the utility of the inescapably normative notion of 'maturity' because of the intimate 
connection between the ageing process and intellectual and emotional maturity. 
References to schooling should not be taken too literally. I am not concerned here 
with the wider debate about whether or not institutionalised schooling is appropriate 
for all children. It will suffice for our purposes if the expression 'schooling' is 
interpreted quite broadly. I am happy to refer to the practice of intentionally bringing 
about learning - especially where this is concerned with essential skills such as the 
ability to read - as schooling. The point to emphasise is that if allowed to remain 
illiterate in our society children would, in all probability, suffer adversely in being 
unable to benefit from alternative viewpoints which the printed word in its various 
manifestations efficiently conveys. 
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Although the correlation between age and maturity is not perfect there are many 
respects in which young people below a certain age must, for practical purposes, be 
regarded as immature. Any justifiable paternalistic legislation relating to compulsory 
schooling for children must rest on the validity of the connection between age and 
maturity and it is therefore with an exploration of this relationship that I have decided 
to begin this section. While there may well be reason to deny that the three features 
of maturity singled out for consideration are the only respects in which a person may 
be considered mature, they are particularly important for our purposes. Although not 
in themselves sufficient to distinguish children from adults the fact remains that 
children are for the most part less intellectually, emotionally and sexually mature than 
adults. What this means however is not self-evident and so in order to clarify what 
it means it is necessary to invoke the more determinate and objective notion of 
`competence' . 
With regard to a decision of a particular kind a person may be incompetent, according 
to Murphy, in three important respects; he may be ignorant, compulsive, or devoid 
of reason.' Now it is a fair generalization to maintain that the younger a person is 
the less knowledgeable he is and, accordingly, less competent in arriving at relevant 
conclusions derivable from particular facts and circumstances. The younger a child 
is the less likely is he to be aware of those facts and circumstances which, if ignored, 
are likely to result in injury to himself and others and it is in exactly those 
circumstances when we feel that paternalism is most appropriate. We intervene to 
stop a child from playing behind a parked vehicle and we would not think twice about 
preventing someone from drinking what we know to be lethal or noxious. Although 
there is more to intellectual maturity than mere knowledge, the possession of both 
propositional knowledge and skills of various kinds is a prerequisite of informed 
judgement and the ability to make such judgements is the mark of a person's 
intellectual maturity and overall competence. Again, this is not something which 
correlates perfectly with age but the younger a person is the likelihood of his being 
less competent at making informed judgements in accordance with which his decisions 
are made is that much greater. 
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Children are, in general, less emotionally mature than adults in the sense that they 
lack the wherewithal to understand and control their emotions. This is hardly 
surprising given their limited experience of life. Emotions, as far as they are 
concerned, are experienced with a peculiar freshness and intensity. This is not to deny 
that adults are not capable of experiencing them with equal intensity but they have, 
in virtue of their age, had greater opportunity to recognise them for what they are and 
to be able to keep them in some sort of perspective. 
The second respect in which Murphy believes a person may be deemed incompetent 
is where his action is the result of compulsion, where the compulsion is some form 
of external duress or internal neurosis. It is precisely because children are frequently 
driven by their emotions that their actions may be thought of as in some sense 
compelled and not entirely free. An emotional education worthy of the name must 
address the question of how best to equip the young to recognise emotions for what 
they are and to appreciate the circumstances in which they are appropriate or 
misplaced in order that they might avoid being dominated by them. 
I have suggested that the connection between the ageing process and intellectual and 
emotional maturity is not entirely tenuous. The connection between physical growth 
and sexual maturity is obvious on the one hand while presenting problems for the 
would be paternalist on the other. While adolescents may be physically capable of 
reproducing it may well be unwise to lower the age for legal intercourse to correlate 
with physical maturity. This is partly because of the emotional stresses and strains 
associated with sex and partly because childrearing in an advanced industrial society 
presents problems with which most adolescents under the age of sixteen would find 
it difficult to cope. 
According to Murphy people are also incompetent if they are either non-rational or 
irrational. In the case of the former it would make no sense at all to attribute choice 
or the ability to make decisions. If someone were in a catatonic state for example it 
would make no sense to suggest that he could choose or decide between alternative 
courses of action. Irrational behaviour on the other hand is either rooted in a belief 
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system which is either manifestly absurd or systematically mistaken or it arises out 
of the agent's failure to appreciate the significance of the relevant factors. While 
incompetence of this kind is likely to result in major and not easily reversible harm 
to the agent some form of paternalistic intervention is, according to Murphy, justified 
provided that it is controlled, carefully specified, limited and explicitly tailored to the 
kinds of incompetence manifested. Mill, of course, would not have found this 
acceptable. For him the only circumstances in which interference with an individual 
`in the maturity of his faculties' has any legitimacy are when other people are likely 
to be harmed. However, he would have had no qualms about classifying children, 
without exception, as incompetent and accepting this as a sufficient condition of 
paternalistic treatment in order to combat their natural tendency to behave in ways 
which would endanger them. 
At this stage we are confronted with a positive torrent of questions. Are children 
more likely than adults to harm themselves? If so is this a sufficient condition for 
paternalistic intervention'? Are children less rational than adults? How are irrational 
choices to be identified? Is there a difference between harming oneself and failing 
to promote one's own good? Is paternalism justified if it avoids harm but not if it is 
designed to ensure the promotion of a person's well-being or is it equally justifiable 
in both cases? Do our answers to such questions vary in accordance with the age of 
those subject to paternalism'? 
Before discussing some of the complex issues involved let us return to the question 
of children's supposed lack of rationality by reference to which we are invited to 
consider them incompetent. Consider the case of a child who decides that he will go 
to a particular school and while there opts for one course of study rather than another 
because his friend has chosen likewise. How would we decide whether or not his 
choices were rational? There is no doubt that his decisions were reasoned in that 
when asked why he chose as he did he is able to provide an explanation of his actions 
by reference to non-arbitrary criteria. But this is not to say that his choices were 
necessarily reasonable in the sense that they were sound or sensible. The sorts of 
thing that would count against a choice being considered reasonable would be the 
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extent of the ensuing harm or the loss of a particular benefit, advantage or good. 
These are objective in being unlike one's inability to defer gratification for any length 
of time. We could say, therefore, that a choice is unreasonable to the extent that it 
either (a) results in some harm befalling the agent or that it is counterproductive when 
it comes to securing his overall good or well-being on the one hand or (b) is a mark 
of a definite lack of strength of will or character where the desire for instant 
gratification takes precedence over considerations relating to harm-avoidance or good-
promotion. Our schoolboy may well be making an unreasonable choice in spite of 
the fact that his choice is a reasoned one. Indeed it is in matters relating to 
education, where a person may well be a poor judge of his real-interests, that Mill 
is willing to countenance a degree of paternalism." It goes without saying that pre-
school children are likely to find it difficult and frequently impossible to make even 
reasoned choices. 
In spite of the fact that it is possible to identify very young children who are able to 
defer gratification, who possess relevant knowledge as well as the ability to grasp 
complex issues, and in spite of the difficulties associated with identifying with 
precision a specific age when most children may be expected to possess such 
capacities, not to mention the problems associated with distinguishing the mature from 
the immature and the competent from the incompetent, there are good reasons for 
sticking with age as an acceptable criterion for distinguishing between children and 
adults. The alternative of introducing 'maturity tests' the passing of which would be 
a mark of one's competence to vote, marry and such like is morally unacceptable. 
Not only is the idea of distinguishing between children and adults by a process of 
certification intrinsically objectionable, the whole thing is open to all kinds of 
manipulative possibilities. In any case the decision to identify children by reference 
to age is not as arbitrary as it might first appear and it is perfectly compatible with 
maintaining a variety of ages at which people should be allowed to do certain things -
drive cars, marry, serve on a jury, undergo voluntary sterilization or whatever. 
Recognizing that the developmental stages through which children are said to pass do 
not correlate perfectly with age, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that a child 
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who possessed the necessary competence in a particular area had been harmed in 
being discriminated against on grounds of age. However insulting he might find such 
discrimination there is little or no fear of any long-lasting damage to self-esteem. The 
child knows that the discrimination will cease upon reaching a specific age and that 
the prohibition on his performing certain tasks applies to everyone else in that society 
below that age. If maturity tests were to become a standard means for the allocation 
of rights and privileges they would no doubt be accompanied by a variety of 
manipulative and controlling techniques. If adolescents had to pass such tests before 
being allowed to marry or vote it is more than likely that the pass rate of those from 
working class and ethnic minority backgrounds would be lower than for those who 
are wealthy, educated and articulate. Questions relating to who would set the 
questions and what they should be notwithstanding, it is plausible to assume that some 
would never pass however low the standard and the resulting humiliation would 
significantly damage self-esteem. 
If the age criterion is more acceptable than any form of maturity test (and it is 
difficult to envisage any other alternative) the problem arises of determining the age 
or ages at which children cease to be minors. There are certainly no a priori reasons 
why one age in particular should be all-embracing but as Schrag has argued it is 
important that an age be set which does not diverge too much from the range 
reflected in the prevailing beliefs of the population.' Beliefs of this kind alter from 
time to time and legislation should recognise this; it is incongruous that an adolescent 
may be allowed to marry at sixteen but be refused the purchase of alcohol in pubs. 
If political education were given its rightful place in the curriculum it is possible that 
public perception of the political competence of the young might change and the age 
at which one may vote be lowered accordingly. After all there is something to be said 
for trying to identify one particular age - say sixteen or seventeen - where adolescents 
are permitted to take on most of the rights and privileges enjoyed by adults especially 
where these are associated with respect for personal autonomy. This still leaves room 
for tests of competence such as those involved in driving lorries or flying fighter 
planes. 
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Meanwhile, it is important to remember that there are features of childhood relating 
to ignorance, immaturity and inability to make rational choices which, if 
unrecognised, would result in children causing untold misery to themselves and 
others. For this reason I am sceptical of the claim by Rosemary Chamberlin that 
`paternalism for children is justified...on the same grounds as for adults.' She is 
naive in her optimism that children possess the requisite strength of character and 
foresight to form life-plans. Of course children decide that they want to follow certain 
careers, become parents, develop particular talents and aptitudes and so on, but their 
relative lack of experience in what Scarre calls 'the ways of the world' means that 
such plans do not attach the same weight to them as those people aged thirty-five. It 
is in virtue of his lack of relevant experience that a child's decision to act in certain 
ways must be treated with more circumspection than that of a mature and sane adult. 
It is simply disingenuous of Chamberlin to suggest that inexperience counts for 
nothing on the grounds that 'a person of twenty-five is likely to be relatively 
inexperienced compared with a person of sixty' and that paternalism would otherwise 
be justified 'for all but the elderly' .15 There is a world of difference between a five 
year old and a twenty-five year old that does not exist between most adults of 
whatever age. 
Of course the justification of paternalism towards children depends in part on the 
rationality of the desire or decision in question, the extent to which it is 'informed', 
whether or not it will frustrate the possibility of future options, whether or not it is 
part of a coherent system of values or is likely to result in the child suffering serious 
harm. All this is indisputable but at the same time it is easy to forget that if we take 
seriously the respect to which children are rightly entitled we have to satisfy ourselves 
that children are not always able to 'locate' their choices and decisions within a life-
plan of their own. In one sense of course Chamberlin's comment to the effect that 
children are 'unique persons with purposes and plans of their own and whose 
individuality we value...' is indisputable but there is an equally important sense in 
which their life-plans are in significant respects uncoordinated, of limited duration and 
based on a limited knowledge of themselves and their real interests. Although there 
is no neat and convenient line distinguishing adult from child, the greater our 
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assurance to the effect that such autonomy possessed by the latter is dispositional as 
opposed to merely occurrent in nature the more cautious must our approach be 
concerning paternalistic actions towards them. 
No doubt some form of compulsory schooling for sane adults would increase their 
overall freedom by providing them with the knowledge and wherewithal for wider 
choice, but respect for their (presumed) autonomy requires other means of making 
education attractive. Only when their personal integrity is at stake, when their actions 
manifestly jeopardise their prospects and life-plans, do we feel justified in acting 
paternalistically towards them. It is easy to forget that there is little value in choice 
as such. As Kleinig says: 'It is not to voluntary choice as such that liberalism is 
committed, but to the persons who express themselves in their choices. Where choices 
having marginal significance to a persons settled life-plan and values threaten serious 
disruption to their realization, we do not violate their integrity in interfering with 
them. '16 
Choices made without reference to a background of values and commitments with a 
measure of integration and coherence are largely capricious and arbitrary. And as I 
have been at pains to argue, our values and commitments are only partly chosen; we 
identify them for what they are as much by a process of discovery of who and what 
we are and wish to become and we do this by appreciating the significance that 
certain values possess by reference to an evaluative contrastive vocabulary. As 
Kleinig reminds us: 
`Not only do we have a diversity of aims, preferences, wants and so 
on, but they vary in the status we accord them as far as our core 
identity and life-plans are concerned. We can differentiate passing and 
settled desires, peripheral concerns, valued and disvalued habits and 
dispositions. Our conduct and choices may reflect any of these, though 
not necessarily in a way that matches their ranking in our hierarchy of 
values and concerns .... Where a course of conduct would, in response 
to some peripheral or lowly ranked tendency, threaten disproportionate 
disruption to highly ranked concerns, paternalistic grounds for 
intervention have a legitimate place.' 
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Given the absurdity of regarding personhood as entirely episodic and unconnected, 
respect for persons cannot stop with concern for them as they are here and now; 
respect demands that we consider what they might well become. For this reason the 
obvious retort to Kleinig's argument from personal integrity, in the form of 'Who do 
you think you are'?' has little force where the intervention in question is not in conflict 
with a person's life-plan or projects. The paternalist is not trying to impose his own 
conception of the good if he is doing his best to stop someone from embarking on a 
self-defeating course." 
7.4 Well-Being and Curriculum Planning 
The avoidance of harm and the promotion of good present problems of their own for 
the paternalist and it is only when these are recognised that we shall be better placed 
to determine whether or not failure to make reasonable choices is a sufficient 
condition for paternalistic interference. There is a widely held belief that if children 
were not made to go to school they would suffer serious harm and it is this that 
legitimates compulsory schooling. But people are not only concerned with preventing 
harm to themselves and to their children; they have a proper concern with securing 
opportunities which are necessary for at least a minimal degree of flourishing. That 
these are by no means the same thing is sometime forgotten. Failure to obtain that 
which is compatible with my overall long term interests does not always entail that 
I have been harmed. Furthermore, we must guard against the possibility of too much 
elasticity attaching to the notion of harm. John White may legitimately be accused of 
this in his early attempt to justify compulsory mathematics, physics and philosophy 
for fear that those who opted out of such activities ab initio might well be harmed in 
virtue of their ignorance of whole areas of possible wants. It is an exaggeration to 
suggest that ignorance of a possible want is necessarily harmful.' Having said this 
however, 'good promotion' and 'harm avoidance' may be seen as two sides of the 
same coin which makes it impossibly difficult at times to justify paternalistic 
intervention in the interests of one as something entirely separable from the other. 
The idea that one could devise an education system which would concentrate 
exclusively on one or the other is thus absurd. 
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If the prevention of harm is at least a necessary condition of justified paternalism 
what of the legitimacy of paternalistic interventions designed to promote human 
flourishing? The answer depends on whether or not we are talking about constraints 
devised with the intention of ensuring that people do indeed flourish or of those, less 
ambitious in intent, which are imposed in order to prevent people from embarking on 
courses of action likely to frustrate any possibility of flourishing. Legislation relating 
to seat belts in cars and crash helmets for motor cyclists is paternalistic but its 
purpose is to prevent people from ruining their lives unnecessarily. It is not 
suggested that restricting liberty in this way will ensure that people do in fact 
flourish. The justification underpinning legislation designed to prevent serious injury 
and unnecessary deaths depends on the truth of the assumption that most of us (with 
the exception of Sikhs perhaps) care more about loss of life than we do about freedom 
not to wear safety gear. Similarly, Jehovas Witnesses are notorious in refusing to 
accept blood transfusions even when their own children's lives are at stake. To force 
an adult Jehovas Witness to have a blood transfusion would indeed be a violation of 
his individuality but one can take respect for religious conviction too far. To presume 
that a child in desperate need of a blood transfusion would, were he to survive 
without it, conceive of his well-being in Jehovas Witness terms is to presume too 
much. As we saw when discussing the so-called rights of Amish parents to withdraw 
their children from school, the child's future interests and well-being take precedence 
over parents' wishes even where these are inspired by the dictates of religion. 
Education is in many ways very different from all this. Being educated and 
autonomous unlike being in possession of a crash helmet or having enough blood, is 
both a condition of flourishing as well as partly constitutive of flourishing. To 
flourish in our society presupposes a measure of autonomy, the wherewithal to 
participate fully in democratic decision-making procedures, the capacity to 
discriminate, to imagine alternatives, to develop a sense of who one is and what one 
possesses in terms of abilities and character traits. And if this is to be anything more 
than a pipe dream some kind of formal education is essential. Consent theories of 
justification for paternalism have been seen to be seriously flawed. Their flaws are 
particularly apparent where children are concerned. The justification of compulsory 
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schooling cannot hinge on anything so unpredictable as consent. Indeed it is largely 
because children are incapable of meaningful consent (in virtue of their relative 
incompetence) that there is a need to invoke the notions of real-interest, well-being, 
or flourishing to which children have a right. And if they have such a right it is 
wrong to deny them the opportunity of acquiring the means whereby they can 
exercise that right. As Amy Gutmann says: 
`A child's right to education is a necessary precondition for the 
development of capacities to choose a conception of the good life and 
to enjoy the political freedom of democratic citizenship... the value (of 
which) ... is in large part contingent upon the ability of its citizens to 
exercise their political rights intelligently as well as to choose among 
alternative conceptions of the good life'20 
To deprive a child of a liberal education is to adversely affect his chances of being 
able to discover where his well-being lies and to choose accordingly. It is to restrict 
his conception of the good to the immediate and familiar or what Postman and 
Weingartner call the tyranny of the present.' None of this lends support to those 
who would accuse us of enforcing our own conception of what the good life amounts 
to on those who may have a different set of values. For we are not imposing 
anything. And yet we are not operating with a totally neutral conception of the good 
life. Although our conception of the good life includes amongst its components the 
capacity to choose from competing conceptions of what such a life might amount to -
and it is difficult to see how one could impose any such thing - it is far from being 
a neutral conception. 
A liberal education is the very antithesis of something narrow and blinkered. It is 
necessarily concerned with widening children's horizons, with getting them to 
appreciate the significance of different modes of reasoning and to respect evidence 
which supports and refutes particular judgements. In helping them to recognise that 
not just anything counts as a reason for believing in something it is necessarily non-
neutral when it comes to the value of competing ways of life. A life consisting of a 
particularly limited number of options is, as we have seen, of less value than one 
offering a rich diversity and paternalism is frequently assumed to be justified if it 
contributes to freedom maximization. Such an argument is likely to have more 
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weight where children are concerned. The older people become the more difficult 
it is to be sure that paternalistic interventions are justified even if a greater degree of 
freedom results.' 
In our haste to defend paternalism we must not forget that it should be used only 
when there are no alternative strategies. There is much to be said for leaving people 
alone and letting them learn from their own mistakes - at least for most of the time. 
But if they cannot be persuaded to put on safety belts the results of which may be 
catastrophic we are justified in making it mandatory. It is simply disingenuous to 
compare the wearing of seat belts in cars with preventing someone, whose whole 
sense of self-worth and self-identity is bound up with challenging the elements, from 
climbing mountains or sailing round the world alone. We may not be able to go 
along with Feinberg's insistence that present autonomy should always take precedence 
over future good, but we can agree with him when he says that children are different 
and that respect for a child's future autonomy as an adult frequently necessitates 
preventing him from doing as he pleases. And it is by reference to future autonomy 
that compulsory schooling is largely warranted. Concern for dispositional autonomy 
is not the same as trying to ensure that future options remain open. While an 
education that failed to increase a child's awareness of the multiplicity of options open 
to him in life would of necessity be a very bad education, it would be absurd to 
pretend that it is possible to keep one's options open indefinitely. Decisions to study 
one thing rather than another with its associated steps towards a particular career, or 
to travel instead of staying put or to live alone and celibate, are all necessarily 
restrictive. An education which was obsessed with increasing the number of options 
available would be nothing short of grotesque because as we saw in Section 1 
reference to numbers counts for nothing as a measure of freedom without reference 
to their significance or value. Once a course of action is acknowledged as having 
some value or purpose within one's scheme of things it would be absurd to remain 
forever on the fence refusing to commit oneself in the fear that such commitment 
would foreclose possible future options. Refusing to act in accordance with one's 
values is the very antithesis of rational agency. 
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Critics of compulsory schooling either ignore the distinction between occurrent and 
dispositional autonomy or refuse to accept that the liberty of an untutored and largely 
heteronomous child to stay away from school is not as worthy of the same respect as 
that of an autonomous adult to leave the Civil Service. It is absurd to pretend that 
all restraint qua restraint is an evil.23 As Callan argues, the freedom that compulsion 
takes away from most children counts for very little because the possibility of choice 
it forecloses could not instantiate more than negligible autonomy.' But what about 
an adolescent who, having attended school for several years and having discovered 
something about his own talents and aptitudes as well as having had his horizons 
extended, is autonomous enough to cause little concern if he were either to leave 
school prematurely or to refuse to take up a place at University? For reasons already 
stated I would be reluctant to introduce a flexible leaving age but would agree with 
Callan that if he were in the sixth form it would be going beyond the bounds of 
legitimate paternalism as it would result in a major loss of freedom for the sake of 
future benefits that are far from guaranteed. While enhancement of freedom may 
well warrant some form of paternalistic intervention in people's lives it is not in itself 
a sufficient condition for its justification short of a convincing account of freedom 
which shows it to be more valuable than anything else. 
Throughout this section children have been referred to as if that is all they are. But 
all the time they are growing towards adulthood with its associated responsibilities 
and duties. If they are to be made to go to school there needs to be some assurance 
that attendance will foster commitment to democratic institutions and decision-making 
procedures as well as a degree of moral, sexual, and emotional literacy combined 
with a healthy scepticism towards the status quo. It could be argued that by attending 
schools committed to an education of this kind, albeit on a non-voluntary basis, 
children are making a substantial contribution of their own to the well-being of the 
community. 
Some form of schooling is absolutely essential if children are to develop the 
wherewithal to transcend the familiar and the parochial and so be able to take 
advantage of alternatives open to them in their private and public lives. Exactly how 
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much schooling is required will no doubt vary from society to society and depend to 
some extent on the prevailing economic circumstances. But according to Peter 
Hobson certain general criteria are universally applicable. They include the 
acquisition of sufficient knowledge and skills to enable young people to choose a 
career for which they are fitted and interested, the ability to fulfil their social and 
political responsibilities adequately and not to be hampered significantly by lack of 
those specific abilities that school can provide for living the kind of life they wish.' 
Acceptable as this is, it remains to be seen whether all this can be achieved by the 
age of sixteen; if anything it would seem to require the raising of the school leaving 
age to eighteen or nineteen. But the educational diet offered by most sixth forms with 
its narrow and specialised curriculum could not possibly merit compulsion. It would 
require a separate and lengthy essay to construct a relevant and coherent curriculum 
for sixteen to nineteen year olds. In view of the fact that different considerations 
apply to curriculum construction for those attending school on a voluntary basis I 
shall say no more about it here. 
The beginnings of an attempt to construct an appropriate curriculum for five to 
sixteen year olds has been eloquently rehearsed by John White in two recent 
publications. His Education and the Good Life concludes with a major attempt to pin 
point what is wrong with our National Curriculum as it stands. Although its stated 
aim is to promote 'the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of 
pupils' it is, as White says, remarkably unclear how the identification of ten so-
called foundation subjects are supposed to realize these aims. There is nothing in it 
to suggest a concern for the well-being of individual pupils or our society and its 
concern for meeting people's needs - for fulfilling relationships, personal autonomy, 
variety, pleasure, fun, co-operative endeavour, meaningful work and suchlike. It is 
detailed in content but sees content in terms of subjects and knowledge to be acquired 
with little or no reference as to how it is supposed to contribute to human flourishing. 
One cannot help feeling that there is more truth than paranoia in White's surmise that 
its rationale 'corresponds with traditional right-wing educational objectives all over 
the world: to shape pupils for their destinations in the socio-economic system' ,26 
207 
where reference to autonomy, empowering people to give shape and purpose to their 
lives, positive freedom and participatory democracy are given very short shrift. 
White reminds us that the central aim of education in a liberal democracy should be 
to prepare people for a life of autonomous well-being and he is wise to caution those 
responsible for school timetables by referring to the awesome complexities involved. 
Oversimplification notwithstanding, White is without doubt correct to insist that 'the 
general direction must be from the top downwards, from the most general aims 
through further specification of them down to more detailed objectives at school 
level. '2' Only by starting with the clearly stated aim of promoting autonomous well-
being can any form of knowledge, subject or area of experience have any credibility 
or claims to space on a timetable. What this entails is spelled out with considerable 
ingenuity in the book and in an inspiring pamphlet written in collaboration with Philip 
O'Hear.' 
In their pamphlet O'Hear and White are right to emphasise the priority of personal 
qualities required for autonomous well-being since it is only from these that a 
coherent framework for the kinds of knowledge and understanding, experience of the 
arts and practical competencies can be derived. The personal qualities they highlight 
as meriting special concern include: (i) personal concerns such as attentiveness to 
one's basic needs as an autonomous person (health, liberty, options and such like), 
the qualities of character necessary for one's own flourishing (courage, self-control, 
confidence etc), commitment to personal projects pursued for their own sake and 
enjoyment of physical pleasures; (ii) social involvement and concern for others which 
involves amongst other things working with others for shared goals, enjoying others' 
company, promoting and protecting the well-being of those to whom one is closely 
connected as well as more general altruistic concerns with the wider community. 
Concern for others extends to refraining from harming others as far as one is able and 
a degree of impartiality between one's own and other people's claims; (iii) critical 
and reflective awareness about priorities among one's values, obstacles to self-
determination and human nature in general as well as the possession of intellectual 
virtues necessary for practical reasoning. And they are careful to point out that the 
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distinction between (i) and (ii) is one of mere convenience in view of the intimate 
relationship between concern with self and others and the ways in which our own 
well-being is bound up with that of other people. 
Of course there are always dangers in any schematic compilation of aims and values 
in education but O'Hear and White's list reflects much of what was said in Section 
6. It recognises the importance of our social nature and the way in which our own 
flourishing in an advanced industrial society is inseparable from that of other people 
and that the cultivation of altruistic dispositions is a legitimate and desirable task of 
the educator. 
O'Hear and White go on to show how all this serves to inject coherence into 
curriculum planning. They demonstrate how knowledge and understanding of 
geography, sociology, politics, history, science and maths are essential to anyone with 
a concern for beneficence or playing an active role as a citizen in a democracy. 
Again, choosing between options and giving a direction to one's life requires 
knowledge and understanding of the options available, the means of achieving them 
and the obstacles likely to cause frustration. If students are to begin to develop the 
personal qualities outlined they will require a great deal of knowledge and 
understanding in order to enable them to discover who they are and what matters to 
them in life, as well as what contribution they might make to their community. In 
order to achieve this, a degree of specialist teaching is unavoidable - especially at 
secondary level. But unless and until such teaching (which need not be entirely 
subject based) can justify itself by reference to something like the values and concerns 
outlined by O'Hear and White it will lack credibility and at worst could result in little 
more than time-filling. This is not to say that the traditional grammar school 
curriculum was entirely irrelevant, it is just that it was never clear why children 
should be so concerned with amassing vast amounts of propositional knowledge. 
There is no reason to suppose that such a curriculum was of much help in promoting 
the highly prized personal qualities required of citizens in a democracy. 
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O'Hear and White conclude their aims of a new National Curriculum with a list of 
practical competencies which should be the concern of those responsible for 
implementing and delivering a school curriculum. These include communication and 
numeracy as well as competencies relating to physical movement, health and safety, 
planning and organisation and social interaction. And they quite rightly remind us 
of the dangers associated with treating such competencies as discrete items or areas 
of study within a curriculum as something totally unconnected with the personal 
qualities suggested. 
How all this translates into timetables for specific age groups is a task which is 
fortunately not the concern of this essay. It is to their credit that O'Hear and White 
point us in the right direction. Anyone with an hour or two to spare can draw up a 
National Curriculum on the back of an envelope. Indeed the speed with which ours 
was introduced combined with its shoddy philosophical underpinning leaves one 
wondering if it were constructed in exactly this way. O'Hear and White do not 
pretend to have completed the complex theoretical task required before a National 
Curriculum can be written, but a curriculum premised on concern for well-being 
would be genuinely liberating and one which any society with a concern for freedom 
dispenses with at its peril. 
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CONCLUSION 
Any attempt to overcome the limitations imposed by the insistence that values are 
ultimately preference-dependent is confronted with the task of rebutting the charge of 
authoritarianism and in those cases where a particular vision of the good life or, when 
freedom is at stake, the removal of constraints is designed to serve a particular life-
plan, the charge might well have some justification. But the form of objectivism 
which it has been the purpose of this essay to sustain is quite compatible with 
radically different conceptions of well-being or life-plans. Nothing follows from the 
fact that a set of circumstances are evaluated in one way rather than another that a 
rational agent's options are foreclosed in some ways; rational agency itself 
presupposes that an action stems not only from an appreciation of what it is that is 
chosen but also has a sound basis in terms of self-knowledge and understanding by 
reference to which the question 'Is it right for me?' (as opposed to 'Do I want it?') 
is both intelligible and answerable. 
While human nature provides limits to what could conceivably be compatible with 
human flourishing, it allows scope for an enormously wide variety of differing life-
styles all of which may result in personal well-being. Liberal democrats have nothing 
to fear in conceiving of freedom in positive terms. Neither should they feel 
threatened by surrendering their attachment to the priority of desire over value. 
While recognising the difficulties associated with any attempt to refute non-
cognitivism, it is the proper appreciation of the social nature of man which leads 
inexorably to a justified scepticism concerning subjectivism. If such scepticism can 
be channelled into a re-examination of what it is to genuinely flourish as a person, 
there is cause for optimism that our children might be brought to appreciate the extent 
to which their own well-being is not only inextricably linked to that of their fellows 
but requires an abiding concern with freedom's promotion and defence. 
The need to be free to chose from a variety of alternatives is an unavoidable feature 
of human nature and an education system has to recognise this. It is indefensible, 
therefore, so to constrain children that they leave school with little or no awareness 
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of the possibilities before them. Where the constraints are such as to prevent them 
taking advantage of such possibilities, schools are duty bound to try and equip them 
with the determination to refuse to accept oppressive constraints with equanimity; 
which is to say that they need amongst other things self-knowledge, imagination and 
courage. In this respect schools are directly concerned with political and moral 
education, not in the sense of mere providers of information important as this 
undoubtedly is, but in the deeper sense of character building such that knowledge and 
understanding has an impact on what people do. 
We live in troublesome times, where freedom and opportunities of various kinds are 
increasingly exposed to the chilling rhetoric of right-wing ideologues who seem to 
care little for the gains made by freedom fighters from the early trade-unionists to 
contemporary feminists. If the next generation is to understand the forces of reaction 
it needs to be educated to appreciate the significance of freedom within the lives of 
civilised people. But if educators are to be remotely successful in this wholly 
admirable and crucially important task they must themselves have some understanding 
of the nature of freedom and the respects in which the good life depends on its 
securement. It is naive to expect that such concern would be forthcoming if the 
measure of individual liberty were nothing more than unconstrained pursuit of desire-
satisfaction, and a moral education which concentrated on helping young people to 
work out hierarchies of desire by reference to nothing more than subjective and 
individualistic considerations would be a hopelessly attenuated version of what is 
required. Such an education would force upon children a kind of moral myopia far 
removed from the moral vision that we need. 
For too long teachers have been wedded to the idea of ethical subjectivism or, what 
is in many ways just as bad, the assumption that morality is dependent upon religion. 
Teachers have a right to expect a lead from moral philosophers in helping them 
overcome the despondency and lethargy associated with subjectivism. This is why 
it is important to continue to persevere in trying to overcome the enormous problems 
associated with the attempted refutation of non-cognitivism. If some form of moral 
realism is sustainable and we can demonstrate that moral motivation is not necessarily 
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dependent upon desire then we might break through a significant barrier which is 
holding up all kinds of exciting experiments in political education for citizenship. 
Children have a right to what Feinberg calls an 'open future', but if this is to be 
anything more than mere rhetoric philosophers must not rest content with the 
scepticism associated with moral non-cognitivism. If values are simply up for grabs, 
where desirability is ultimately reducible to preference, then all talk of discovery of 
value by reference to the language of contrastive evaluation would be impossible. If, 
on the one hand, we come to want things in virtue of being able to classify them in 
terms of such evaluations, we have the beginnings of a strategy for providing an 
account of well-being by reference to more objective criteria than desire-satisfaction 
theories would admit. 
Educationalists, especially curriculum planners, need to take this on board and begin 
from a standpoint far removed from a mere listing of subjects. Not only children, 
but society as a whole has a right to expect of those responsible for a system of 
schooling that they have a more inspired and altogether clearer vision of the nature 
of well-being than is currently on offer from both the Department for Education and 
philosophers wedded to desire-satisfaction accounts. If we seriously want a society 
in which all of its members stand a reasonable chance of being able to flourish, we 
have to plan for it. It is just not the sort of thing that is likely to arise by osmosis 
from a subject-based national curriculum so hastily conceived as that in accordance 
with which teachers are currently forced to operate. 
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that desires should be subject to rational evaluation. The only place for 
reason in moral judgement is the extent to which it can render desires 
consistent with one another. 
37. Wall is also swift to point to the difficulties implicit in Hare's individualism 
for his account of the universalizability of moral judgements. In order for 
moral judgements to be universalizable in a strong, non-conditional sense, 
they must be related to public criteria which are more than fortuitously shared; 
a possibility which cannot be accommodated within Hare's theory because the 
only criteria allowed are those based on the contingent desires and inclinations 
of the individual. 
38. Wall, G., op. cit. p. 229. 
39. Taylor, C., 'What is Human Agency?' in his Human Agency and Language, 
pp. 30ff. 
40. Ibid. pp. 124-125. He continues: 'A self decides and acts out of certain 
fundamental evaluations ... This is what is impossible in the theory of radical 
choice. The agent of radical choice would at the moment of choice have 
ex hypothesi no horizon of evaluation. He would be utterly without identity 
... The subject of radical choice is another version of that recurrent figure 
which our civilization aspires to realise, the disembodied ego, the subject who 
can objectify all being, including his own, and choose in radical freedom. 
But this promised total self-possession would in fact be the most total self-
loss.' 
41. Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice p. 55. 
42. Murdoch, I., 'The Idea of Perfection' in The Sovereignty of Good. 
43. Ibid. pp. 39-40. 
44. Op. cit. p. 52 (my italics). 
45. Op. cit. p. 59. 
46. Op. cit. p. 54. 
47. As Roger Scruton says: 'If there is such a thing as practical knowledge it 
applies to all aims and emotions, and it is a knowledge that in all possibility 
cannot be achieved by individual fiat, but depends on concepts, activities and 
perceptions made available in a common culture. If I am right in thinking 
that practical certainty is an integral part of rational fulfilment, and that it 
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comes only through perceptions that are shared, then it becomes difficult to 
see how we might form a coherent picture of the well-being of the individual, 
except in terms of the health of the community of which he forms a part. 
There is something already deeply contentious in the idea of a fulfilled rational 
agent whose style of life is entirely of his own devising. Certainly the cult 
of 'authenticity' should not lead us to accept its ideal of freedom as an obvious 
one.' 	 The Significance of a Common Culture' Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 
207, January 1979, p. 66. 
48. Maclntyre, A., After Virtue Chapter 15 of which is entitled 'The Virtues, The 
Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition'. 
49. Kekes, J., 'Moral Sensitivity' Philosophy, Vol. 59 No. 227, January 1984, 
pp. 3-19. 
50. Op. cit. p. 194. 
51. Ibid. pp. 200-201. 
52. Ibid. p. 207. 
53. Ibid. p. 209. 
54. Op. cit. p. 7 (my italics). 	 As McNaughton says: 'We can extend our 
sensitivity by suitable training and practice so that we can come to appreciate 
whole areas of human experience to which we were previously blind. 
Aesthetic sensitivity provides a striking example. We can extend our range 
of appreciation to include music, painting and drama of cultures very different 
from those of our own. Once someone has extended his range ... he can 
make reasoned comparative assessments which do not merely reflect the 
unexamined prejudices of his own society .... In the moral case it does not 
seem so easy to extend our appreciation of the merits of some other way of 
life without abandoning, or at least modifying, our commitment to our own 
.... It is easy to exaggerate these difficulties .... One may become sensitive 
to the good points of some other way of life without revising one's assessment 
of the value of one's own. In order to be in a good position to judge it is not 
necessary to adopt the evaluative stance of the other culture; it is enough that 
one has insight into its strengths and weaknesses.' 
McNaughton, D., Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics pp. 157-158. 
The importance of this cannot be overemphasised and it is taken up again 
below in 5.4. 
55. 'Breadth involves understanding that conventional morality is only the form 
of morality one happens to be born into .... Conventional morality will 
inculcate habits and breadth of understanding will open possibilities .... 
Depth, the inwardly directed understanding of the significance of moral 
idioms, provides a perspective from which a moral agent can transform 
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9. 
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57. Hollis, M., Models of Man. 
58. In Radical Philosophy 1, 1972. pp. 6-14. 
59. Ibid. p. 11 (my italics). 
60. In a footnote to the last chapter of his book The Moral Philosophers (p. 253), 
Norman no longer wishes to maintain that a plurality of world views may be 
equally valid - which he claimed in the Radical Philosophy article. 
61. Cf. Kekes, op. cit. p. 12. 	 'The question of what I ought to do has a 
straightforward answer once the situation has been understood by the agent to 
come under the provenance of a moral idiom. The selection of idioms, 
therefore, is a far more important and problematic matter in morality than the 
choice of action.' 
62. Op. cit. pp. 35-36. 
63. Cohen, G.A., 'Belief and Roles' in Glover, J. (ed.) The Philosophy of Mind 
pp. 53-63. Cohen provides a convincing example from the Mikado where the 
Lord High Executioner asks his lieutenant Pooh-Bah how much public money 
he should spend on his forthcoming marriage. Pooh-Bah occupies the dual 
role of the Lord-Lieutenant and Chancellor of the Exchequer and his advice 
differs accordingly - or rather it does not. The whole point of the example 
is to show that because Pooh-Bah is open to bribery, the advice so readily 
offered as a mere official is not really his advice at all. Pooh-Bah's actions 
result from entirely different beliefs from those he feigns as a court official. 
As Cohen says: 'When the individual is thought of as a set of roles, he may 
receive the callous treatment appropriate to a thing: he may be shifted from 
role to role, without any regard to the impact change of station has on him. 
If the other direction of the assimilation is stressed, and sets of roles are 
conceived as persons, the social status quo is then protected: when roles 
constitute selfhood, to change society is to mangle human beings.' (p. 66). 
64. Op. cit. p. 12. 
65. Montefiore, A., 'Self-Reality, Self-Respect and Respect for Others' Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy Vol.III, 1978, pp. 195-208. 
66. Ibid. p. 196. 
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70. Ibid. p. 202. 
71. Ibid. p. 205. 
72. As Joseph Raz says: ... a person's life is ... a normative creation, a creation 
of new values and reasons. It is the way our past forms the reasons which 
apply to us at present .... The fact that one embraced goals and pursuits and 
has come to care about certain relationships and projects is a change not in the 
physical or mental circumstance in which one finds oneself, but in one's 
normative situation. It is the creation of one's life through the creation of 
reasons. 'Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom pp. 387-8. 
73. See Education and the Good Life esp. pp. 28-31. The idea has a long and 
distinguished history. Henry Sidgwick argued as much in his Methods of 
Ethics and Rawls makes much of the idea: ... the best plan for an individual 
is the one that he would accept if he possessed full information. It is the 
objectively rational plan for him and determines his real good.' (A Theory of 
Justice p. 417) and again, ... our good is determined by the plan of life that 
we would adopt with full deliberative rationality if the future were accurately 
forseen and adequately realized in the imagination' (p. 421). The most recent 
defence of well-being as informed-desire-satisfaction is to be found in James 
Griffin's Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance 
Sections I-IV. 
74. 'Information is what advances plans of life, information is full when more, 
even when there is more, will not advance them further.' Well-Being p. 13. 
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`although "utility" cannot be equated with actual-desires, it will not do, either, 
simply to equate it with informed-desires. It is doubtless true that if I fully 
appreciated the nature of all possible objects of desire, I should change much 
of what I wanted. But if I do not go through that daunting improvement, yet 
the objects of my potentially perfected desires are given to me, I might well 
not be glad to have them; the education, after all, may be necessary for my 
getting anything out of them. That is true, for instance, of acquired tastes; 
you would do me no favour by giving me caviar now, unless it is part of some 
well-conceived training for my palate. Utility must, it seems, be tied at least 
to desires that are actual when satisfied. (Even then we should have to stretch 
meanings here a bit: I might get something I find that I like but did not want 
before because I did not know about it, nor in a sense want now simply 
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because I already have it; or I might, through being upset or confused, go on 
resisting something that, in some deep sense, I really want.)' Ibid. p. 11. 
76. Brandt. R.B., A Theory of the Good and the Right p. 250. 
77. Op. cit. p. 16. 
78. Thomson. G., Needs pp. 46-47. 
79. Ibid. p. 49. 
80. Op. cit. p. 22. 
81. As Thomson says in a footnote on p. 132: 'the relative value of primary goods 
is not constituted by the fact that they would be desired or chosen under ideal 
conditions. This is because the reason why they would be desired is that the 
subject would appreciate or perceive their relative worth. In other words, the 
informed-desire theory already assumes what it sets out to explain. 
82. Op. cit. pp. 33-34. 
5. 	 DESIRE-SATISFACTION, RATIONALITY AND VALUE 
1. The present section is not directly concerned with the rationality of beliefs as 
such but with the rationality of action and with what makes a choice of one 
course of action more rational than that of another. While it is true that no 
action would be rational unless the beliefs underpinning it are themselves 
rational, it would require a lengthy and complex discussion to demonstrate 
what exactly it was in which the the latter would consist. In particular it 
would require an unnecessarily lengthy digression involving discussion of 
highly disputable concepts such as 'truth' and 'relevance' as well as a 
consideration of the claim that there are no universal criteria of rational belief, 
such criteria as there are being supposedly culture dependent. 
2. Some people would have it that an action is rational if the agent has good 
grounds for believing that the adoption of certain means with optimally satisfy 
his desires irrespective of whether in actual fact they will do so. All that is 
required for rational choice is a rational estimate of the probabilities of 
outcomes. 	 According to Walton there is the additional requirement of 
adopting means appropriate to one's ability to execute the action, it being 
irrational to adopt means, however instrumental in accomplishing a particular 
aim, which one cannot oneself employ. See Walton, K., 'Rational Action' 
Mind Vol.LXXVI 1967, pp. 537-547. 
3. Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice p. 14. 
229 
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on the notion of best, or satisfactorily, realising the agents' aims whatever 
they are.' Richards, D.A.J., A Theory of Reasons for Action p. 230. Cf. 
Weale, A., 'Rational Choice and Political Principles' in Harrison, R.(ed.) 
Rational Action pp. 93-114. In other words, rationality is not a feature of the 
ends pursued. As Gauthier puts it: 'Reason does not assess a man's end in 
relation to some standard beyond his passions (in the Humean sense). Rather, 
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attitude.' Gauthier, D.P., 'Reasons and Maximisation' Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy Vol.IV, No. 3, March 1985, p. 415. 
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affairs (s) is an end attributable to a person (x): (a) x has a pro-attitude 
towards s (a pro-attitude being something very broadly conceived to include 
desires, preferences, attitudes of approval), (b) s is a state of affairs which x 
is in principle prepared to allow to weigh as a reason for or against certain 
choices (in order to rule out those states of affairs such as impulses or wishes 
to which he is not prepared to give reflective weight in choices, from his 
`ends') Mortimore, G.W., 'Rational Action' in Benn, S.I., and Mortimore, 
G.W. (eds.), Rationality and the Social Sciences pp. 95-96. 
6. As Mortimore says: 'A ... factor in the development of a man's rationality 
is his learning to assess comparatively his ends in choosing what to do. This 
requires more than the capacity to order the objects of his inclination at the 
moment of choice. Rationality requires the development of the hierarchy of 
ends independent of the individual's immediate inclinations. There are other 
things that the rational man knows he wants, even though he may feel no 
immediate inclination towards them. And he can distinguish his reflective 
ranking of these things from the comparative strength of the inclinations he 
may momentarily feel towards them.' Ibid. p. 107. All of which is part of his 
claim that there is a good case to be made for treating rationality as a complex 
trait superimposed on a person's basic status as an end-pursuing agent. 
7. Hare, R.M., 'What Makes Choices Rational?' Review of Metaphysics 
Vol. XXXII June 1979, p. 631. 
8. Nowell-Smith, P.H., Ethics p. 113-114. Cf. 'Unless (someone) has a con- 
attitude towards getting-X-by-doing Y, it is irrational for him not to do Y. 
Ibid. pp. 167-168. 
9. Woods, M., 'Reason for Action and Desires' Aristotelian Society Proceedings 
Supplementary Volume 19. 1972, p. 191. Before examining some of the 
more important questions to which this theory gives rise, in particular the 
status of the expression 'Because I want to' as a reason for action, it is worth 
pausing to consider the attraction that such a thesis has had for so many 
philosophers. In her book Intention Elizabeth Anscombe states that 'the 
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primitive sign of wanting is trying to get'. 'Trying', in other words, is an 
outward criterion of `wanting'; if it were not for the fact that people tried to 
do things we should have no means of making sense of what it was to want 
something. None of this is to suggest that whenever X wants something he 
tries to do it or obtain it, but it does mean that his failure so to try needs 
explaining; i.e. we would consider the fact that he was too ill to get out of 
bed sufficient. The fact remains that if no explanation could be provided we 
should refuse to accept that he wanted it at all and (which is the same thing) 
that his claim to want it was unintelligible. When all answers to the question 
`But why do you want that?' have been provided and the only thing left to say 
is 'Because I just do' it seems pointless and perverse to demand a reason for 
trying to get it or do it over and above the fact that the thing is desired; the 
connection between the one and the other being a necessary one. Further 
demands for reasons are, apparently, out of place. Another reason why 
wanting is supposed to provide (at least a necessary) condition for action is the 
fact that the term 'reason' is often used when 'explanation' would be more 
precise. We often ask for the reasons why he did such and such when what 
we are really after is an explanation of his behaviour. To be told why a 
person behaved in the way that he did, to be given an explanation of his 
behaviour, is not to be provided with a reason. When we ask for a reason 
for someone's behaviour, especially if that behaviour is extraordinary or 
outrageous, we are, as often as not, asking for a justification and not a mere 
explanation. 	 In so far as such behaviour is explicable in terms of the 
language of motivation, it is to be understood in purposive terms and not 
causal terms with its associated involuntariness. 	 This is of course highly 
disputable and I cannot provide here the defence it requires. (All I can say 
is that I accept Melden's reasoning to the effect that a motive for a voluntary 
action logically presupposes the independence of its effect, and the motive of 
an action is part of the way in which we identify it. 'As motive it ... tells 
us what the person was doing.' Melden, A.I., Free Action p. 77). 
10. 	 The view which attempts to derive all reasons from desires denies, according 
to Nagel, 'the possibility of motivational action at a distance, whether over 
time or between persons ... Prudence cannot on this view be explained merely 
by the perception that something is in one's future interests if the perception 
is to have an effect ... It may be admitted as trivial that, for example, 
considerations about my future welfare or about the interests of others cannot 
motivate me to act without a desire being present at the time of action. That 
I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these 
considerations motivate me; .... But nothing follows about the role of the 
desire as a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of those 
considerations. It is a necessary condition of their efficacy to be sure, but 
only a logically necessary condition .... If we bring these observations to bear 
on the question whether desires are always among the necessary conditions of 
reasons for action, it becomes obvious that there is no reason to believe that 
they are. Often the desires which an agent necessarily experiences in acting 
will be motivated by reasons stemming from certain external factors, and the 
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desire to perform it is motivated by those same reasons .... The fact that the 
presence of a desire is a logically necessary condition (because it is a logical 
consequence) of a reason's motivating, does not entail that it is a necessary 
condition of the presence of the reason; and if it is motivated by that reason 
it cannot be among the reason's condition. Nagel, T., The Possibility of 
Altruism pp. 27-30. 
11. Rorty, A.O., 'Wants and Justifications' Journal of Philosophy Vol LXIII 
No.24, December 1966, pp. 765-772. David Gauthier provides a similar 
defence as does Philippa Foot and, in places, R.M. Hare. Gauthier is careful 
to distinguish prudential from moral reasoning; in the former an individual's 
own desires are supposed to provide ultimate reasons for doing something, 
whereas in the latter the desires and wants of everyone are thought to be 
relevant. Foot may well be an opponent of Hare concerning what kinds of 
desire could count as providing reasons for action; she would not accept 
Hare's assertion that the object of desire can be anything whatever but, like 
him, she does ground moral reasoning in psychological states of individuals. 
12. As Woods says: 'Sometimes whether a suggested reason is a reason for a 
particular action is not independent of what reasons there are against it. If 
the reasons against doing something i.e. the reason for not doing it are 
overwhelming, they tend to be regarded as obliterating what would otherwise 
count as a reason in favour. If a house is on fire, we are inclined to say that 
I have no reason for staying if the only reason for staying that could be given 
is that I want to examine further the pictures on the wall.' Op. cit. p. 192. 
13. Op. cit. 
14. Rachels, J., 'Wants, Reasons and Justifications' Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol.18, 1986, pp. 299-309. It is worth noting that `BIWT' and 'for no other 
reason at all' are not equivalent. We do a great number of things for no 
reason at all without having any accompanying positive desires. 
15. `(Rorty's) confusion arises from a failure to distinguish the explanation of his 
act as resulting from his wants, from the justification of his act - two things 
which can be, and are, quite different. `BIWT' may tell us why he did it, 
but it does not justify what he did. 	 The justification is in terms of his 
approaching death.' Ibid. p. 308. 
16. As Nagel says: 'There must already be a connection which renders the 
interest intelligible and which depends not on his present condition but on the 
future's being a part of his life. A life is not a momentary episode, nor a 
series of such episodes.' The Possibility of Altruism pp. 38-39. 
17. Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention p. 68. 
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18. Griffiths, A.P., and Peters, R.S., 'The Autonomy of Prudence' Mind 
Vol.LXXI (April 1962) p. 168. 
19. Esp. Chapter 3. 
20. The reasons why this is so are complex and need not detain us, but are to do 
with reasons given by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations especially 
para. 241ff concerning the impossibility of a private language. I reject the 
possibility of such a language and hence 'private meaning' with respect to 
both words and actions and if I am right in this it follows that a want cannot 
be intelligible or meaningful to one person only. 
21. Op. cit. p. 63. 
22. Ibid. pp. 73-77. He continues: `...I would agree that a child does want 
things before it ever learns general standards of evaluation. Obviously we 
can say, for example, that the baby wants the breast simply on the basis that 
it reaches for it or cries until it is satisfied. Moreover, its wanting the breast 
is one of those shared "natural reactions" like crying or reacting to the gesture 
of pointing, which are a precondition of the possibility of rational behaviour, 
such that a baby who shared none of these natural reactions could never learn 
the use of public language or the applicability of impersonal public standards. 
But for all that, it remains true that in a very important sense the child learns 
how to want things. It learns the normal use of the phrase "I want ..." and 
this is very much more than just a matter of learning to use a particular word 
.... Out of all the many such movements which a baby makes, only those like 
reaching for the breast which we understand in terms of existing human norms 
of intelligible action do we treat as wants and respond to as such. Therefore, 
for the baby, the process of learning to use the words "I want ..." is 
inseparable from the process of learning to act rationally. And although we 
ascribe wants to the baby prior to his having learnt this, we do so only 
because we can see certain elements in his behaviour as potentially the actions 
of a rational agent .... Unless (a background of rational wants) is 
presupposed, there is no room for the concept of wanting to operate at all ... 
we can conclude that in that majority of cases where the possibility of wanting 
something is dependent upon already having learnt to see the thing in the 
relevant ways, the norm is both logically and chronologically prior to the 
existence of the corresponding want ... What counts as a want, even at a 
biological level, is determined by the system of rational norms within a 
culture, and that one is able to ascribe wants to a baby at all because one can 
see its actions as potentially those of a rational agent. 
	 Our paradigm of 
wanting is not wanting at the biological level of stimulus and response, but 
wanting at the level of rational reflection and assessment.' 
23. Mackie. J.L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 38. 
233 
24. As Nagel points out: 'The claim that certain reasons exist is a normative 
claim, not a claim about the best causal explanation of anything. To assume 
that only what has to be included in the best causal theory of the world is real 
is to assume that there are no irreducibly normative truths.' The View From 
Nowhere p. 144. 
25. McNaughton, D., Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics p. 90. 
26. Strawson, P.F., Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties pp. 35-36. 
27. Ibid. p. 38. Although he continues by saying that: 'Relative to the detached 
naturalistic standpoint which we can sometimes occupy, they have no 
properties but those which can be described in the vocabularies of naturalistic 
analysis and explanation (including, of course, psychological analysis and 
explanation)', it seems to me that McNaughton is correct in reminding us that 
is only from within a particular perspective that we can ask what is really 
there and the answer will be determined by the frame of reference which that 
particular perspective provides. It is the misguided attempt to elevate the 
perspective into a dominant position that creates the problem. It would, he 
says, 'be as absurd to conclude that values were unreal merely because they 
did not figure in a scientific account of the world as it would be to try to 
refute the claim that a painting has depth by measuring the thickness of the 
pigment.' Op. cit. 
28. See Williams, B., Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry p. 245. 
29. McDowell, J., 'Aesthetic value, objectivity and the fabric of the world' in 
Schaper, E. (ed.), Pleasure, Preference and Value: studies in philosophical 
aesthetics p. 11. 
30. Op. Cit. p. 244. 
31. Ibid. p. 295. 
32. McDowell, J., 'Values and Secondary Qualities' in Honderich T. (ed.), 
Morality and Objectivity p. 112. 
33. Ibid. pp. 113-114. 
34. Ibid. p. 118. 
35. Op. cit. p. 41. 
36. Platts, M., Ways of Meaning pp. 244-245, Cf. p. 253 ff. 'While non-moral 
facts fix moral facts such that two circumstances cannot differ in a moral 
respect while being alike in all non-moral respects, still moral judgements are 
not analyzable (or translatable) into non-moral terms; the making of a moral 
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judgement is not an inference from non-moral facts. The problem now is that 
that picture appears to be in tension with the role usually accorded to non-
moral differences in accounting for differences in moral judgement, 
accounting in a reason-giving way. If I make different moral judgements 
about situations that appear indistinguishable to you, then, the thought is, I 
have to justify that difference by pointing to a non-moral difference, I have to 
give a non-moral reason for the difference in moral judgement. Indeed, this 
non-moral reason-giving is the foundation of moral consistency: such 
consistency precisely requires (because it is constituted by) the principle that 
if two situations are non-morally indistinguishable, we have to give the same 
moral judgement in each case, together with the principle that if a difference 
in moral judgement is given, it has to be justified by a non-moral reason'. 
37. Ibid. p. 254. 
38. Ibid. p. 255. 
39. Ibid. 
40. McDowell, J., 'Virtue and Reason' Monist, Vol.62, 1979, p. 336. 
41. Arrington, R.L., Rationalism, Realism and Relativism: Perspectives in 
Contemporary Moral Epistemology p. 151. He continues: 'It might be asked 
why the constitutive base characteristics, considered in relation to a particular 
context, cannot be said to entail the moral character of an act in that context. 
Why, for instance, cannot the social, historical, military and psychological 
features constituting Washington's courage in crossing the Delaware be said 
to entail this instance of courage? We can answer these questions by 
reminding ourselves that entailments reflect universal logical rules or 
propositions. The base characteristics constituting Washington's courage in 
crossing the Delaware do so only in this particular context. It makes no 
sense to speak of one set of properties as occasionally, or on a single 
occasion, entailing another set. Hence base characteristics cannot be said to 
entail a moral property in a particular context, even though they constitute it 
on that occasion.' Ibid. 
42. Ibid. p. 162. Cf. McDowell's claim that when confronted by the competing 
and not necessarily reconcilable moral demands of a particular situation, we 
need to identify the salient fact about a situation so that we may be 'moved to 
act by this concern rather than that one.' (`Virtue and Reason', p. 344), and 
`the relevant notion of salience cannot be understood except in terms of seeing 
something as a reason for acting which silences all others.' (Ibid. p. 345). 
43, 	 Ibid, p, 332. 
44. 	 Ibid. p. 334. Cf. Platts's Ways of Meaning p. 248. 'The simple fact of 
differences in moral judgement does not yet imply the falsity of moral 
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realism. In moral judgements, as in others, people can, and do, make 
mistakes. 	 What realism requires is that their errors be explicable - in 
realistic terms. 	 It is not, for example, difficult to explain the erroneous 
moral judgements of many ... South Africans. 	 Their perspectives are 
clouded by their desires and fears in just the same way that many of our own 
factual judgements are clouded: of course my wife is completely faithful to 
me, of course my son is quite exceptionally talented!' 
45. Ibid. p. 258. 
46. Op. cit. p. 153. 
47. Ibid. 
48. McDowell, J., 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?' 
Aristotelian Society Proceedings Supplementary Volume LH 1978, pp. 15-16. 
The Nagel quote is from Nagel, T., The Possibility of Altruism pp. 29-30. 
According to McNaughton 'what is objectionable is not the claim that 
motivation requires desire, but that a desire must always be a non-cognitive 
state.' Op. cit., p. 107. 
49. Well-Being pp. 28-29. 
50. Ibid. p. 27. 
51. Ibid. p. 29. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Reasons for Action p. 76. 
6. INTERESTS AND WELL-BEING 
1. Feinberg, J., Social Philosophy p. 26 (my emphasis). Cf. his 'Harm and 
Self-Interest' in Hacker, P.M.S. and Raz, J. (eds), Law, Morality and 
Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart p. 288 where he explains that to 
have a stake in Y is to stand to gain or lose depending on the condition or 
outcome of Y. 
2. See Thomson, G., Needs pp. 19 ff. 'A has a basic need for X if and only 
if he needs X but not in virtue of his needing something else .... All 
fundamental needs pertain to the avoidance of serious harm ... the question 
"Do you need X?" is akin to the question "Is not X harmful?". Cf. also 
Miller, D., Social Justice p. 130 and Wollheim, R., 'Needs, Desires and 
Moral Turpitude' in Peters, R.S. (ed.), Nature and Conduct pp. 162 ff. 
236 
3. Such examples are taken from Mounce, H.O. and Phillips, D.Z., 'On 
Morality's Having a Point' in Hudson, W.D. (ed.), The Is-Ought Question 
pp. 228-40. 
4. Telfer, E., Happiness. 
5. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia pp. 42-43. 
6. 'No-one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone 
else ...' Nicomachean Ethics Book 9, Ch. 4. Cf. Clark, S.R.L., Aristotle's 
Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology p. 19. As Mill said, 'It 
is of importance not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are 
that do it.' On Liberty, Ch.3. 
7. Nozick, R., op. cit. p. 44. (my emphasis). 
8. See Nathanson, S., The Ideal of Rationality p. 141. 
9. Connolly, W., The Terms of Political Discourse p. 49. 
10. Benton, T., 'Realism, Power and Objective Interests' in Graham, K. (ed.) 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies pp. 10-11. 
11. Op. cit. pp. 68-69. 
12. Ibid. p. 64. 
13. Wall G., 'The Concept of Interest in Politics' in Politics and Society Vol. 5., 
No.4, Fall 1975, p. 500. 
14. Op. cit. pp. 31-32. 
15. Lear, J., 'Moral Objectivity' in Brown, S.C. (ed.), Objectivity and Cultural 
Divergence p. 154. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Op. cit. 
18. Kekes, J., Moral Tradition and Individuality pp. 28-29. 
19. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom pp. 289-298. Raz also maintains, quite 
properly in my view, that a person's well-being depends on the extent to 
which the goals he has chosen to pursue are valuable. A life devoted to 
trivial or harmful pursuits would adversely affect the capacity of the pursuant 
to flourish. Conversely, failure to achieve an altogether worthless goal would 
not adversely affect one's well-being (pp. 299-303). As Raz puts it: 'It is 
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part of the very notion of having a reason for a goal that one's endorsement 
of the goal is conditional on the reason being a good one.' (p. 303). The 
truth of this depends on the truth of the earlier claim that we pursue things for 
reasons which have more to do with their perceived value than with any 
desires we might have. Raz also insists that what happens to people is as 
important as their success in achieving their goals; thus well-being is affected 
in this way largely, illness and accident apart, through the way in which their 
goal-directed actions are adversely affected (p. 305). 
20. Op. cit. p. 206. 
21. Ibid. p. 166. 
22. Ibid. pp. 207ff. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid. p. 212. 
25. The following are examples of attempts to compile lists of this kind: 
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Rights, and Becker, L., 'Good Lives: 
Prolegomena' in Social Philosophy and Policy Vol. 9, No. 2 Summer 1992. 
26. John White has, in recent years, made a significant contribution to the debate 
of what should be included in a common or national curriculum and his 
suggestions are briefly outlined in the final part of the next section. 
27. Two moving accounts of childhood where opportunities for play were virtually 
non-existent are to be found in John Stuart Mill's Autobiography and 
Edmund Gosse's Father and Son. 
28. Becker, L., op. cit. p. 37. 
29. Benn, S.I., 'Human Rights and Moral Responsibility' in A Theory of Freedom 
p. 259. 
30. Ibid. pp. 220-221 in an essay entitled 'Autonomy, Association and 
Community'. Cf. his 'Autonomy and Positive Freedom'. 'How can anyone 
be the author of his own nomos? Surely everyone is governed by the basic 
presupposition of the culture which has furnished the very conceptual structure 
of his world, the traditions into which he has been inducted, the demands of 
roles he has internalised? The very canons of rationality that he employs 
when he thinks himself most independent in his judgement have been learned 
as part of his cultural heritage. One's range of options, both in belief and 
action, is as much circumscribed by such mental furniture as the highest speed 
at which one can travel is governed by the prevailing technology.' Ibid. p. 
179, 
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31. Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits of Justice p. 179. 
32. As Sandel says: 'Where seeking my good is bound up with exploring my 
identity and interpreting my life history, the knowledge I seek is less 
transparent to me and less opaque to others. Friendship becomes a way of 
knowing as well as liking. Uncertain which path to take, I consult a friend 
who knows me well, and together we deliberate, offering and assessing by 
turns competing descriptions of the person I am, and of the alternatives I face 
as they bear on my identity'. Ibid. p. 181. 
33. Norman, R., 'Self and Others: the Inadequacy of Utilitarianism' Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy Supp. Vol. 5, 1979, pp. 193-197. 
34. The idea of 'extended interests' on which Norman relies is taken from a paper 
by Richard Kraut in which he explicates the term as follows: 'Consider a man 
who loves his child. His feeling for it may be such that he regards it as an 
extension of himself, so that anything that benefits the child ipso facto benefits 
him. And if anything happens that is to the disadvantage of the child, then 
it is also to the man's disadvantage, whether he knows about the event or not. 
Such a person, when he considers his interests, takes into account the things 
that profit the child, not because whatever profits it ultimately affects him, but 
because the child's profiting is his profiting .... Let us say that when such a 
person considers the child's interest, he is consulting his own extended interest 
..., 
	 See Kraut, R., 'Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato', 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 82, 1973, p. 333. 
35. 'Anyone who values friendship for itself values the occurrence of a reciprocal 
relationship between two conscious and affective minds. True love is not to 
be confused with even the most admirable altruism, for it seeks a certain sort 
of reciprocal affect, not merely the engendering of happiness in the loved 
one.' Wolff, R.P., The Poverty of Liberalism p. 182. 
36. According to Aristotle, ' ... when it is young people who form a friendship the 
object of it ... is the pleasure they get from it ... But it is only between those 
who are good, and resemble one another in their goodness, that friendship is 
perfect. Such friends are both good in themselves and, so far as they are 
good, desire the good of one another. But it is those who desire the good of 
their friends for their friend's sakes who are most completely friends, since 
each loves the other for what the other is in himself and not for something he 
has about him, which he need not have.' Nicomachean Ethics Book 8, Ch. 
4. 
37. See e.g. Mayo, B., 'Moral Integrity' in Vessey, G. (ed.), Human Values 
pp. 27-43. 
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38. Lear. J., op. cit. p. 162. 
39. Education and the Good Life p. 62. 
40. Ibid. p. 63. 
41. Ibid. p. 68. 
42. Ibid. p. 69. 
43. See Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom p. 387. Cf. Brandon, R., 'Freedom 
and Constraint by Norms' American Philosophical Quarterly Vol.16, No.3. 
July 1979 pp. 193-4. 
44. Feinberg, J., op. cit. p. 290. 
45. Meyers, D.T., Self, Society and Personal Choice Part 2, Sec. 1. 
46. As Meyers surmises, perhaps Benn would say 'that a rationally constructed, 
coherent personality is one in which the individual has amalgamated all of his 
or her traits, feelings, inclinations, desires, values, beliefs about the world, 
and the like into a practicable life plan. But this proposal seems too stringent 
as an account of a rationally constructed coherent personality. Consider the 
case of Max's unrequited, yet enduring love for Alice. Max loves Alice 
despite knowing that Alice does not return his affection. Moreover, Max 
realises that he can never express his feelings as he would like to express 
them. In this predicament, Max can choose to sustain his love and worship 
Alice from afar, or he can choose to look for someone else to love. Neither 
of these options blend all of Max's beliefs and feelings into a practicable life 
plan. But whereas the former option does not rule out Max's having a 
rationally constructed, coherent personality, it does rule out his being 
autonomous. 
`Choosing to cherish and nurture an unreciprocated love seems compatible 
with a rationally constructed, coherent personality. That Max holds a factual 
belief - namely, that Alice does not and never will love him - that would lead 
most people, but not Max, to modify their goals does not entail that his 
personality is irrational and incoherent. A personality that harboured such 
competing constituents as loving Alice and wanting to make her miserable 
would seem irrational and incoherent. 
	 Likewise, if Max felt perfectly 
ridiculous nursing this hopeless amour but persisted just the same, his 
personality would seem irrational and incoherent. But Max's personality can 
compass feelings that are pragmatically irreconcilable with one of his true 
contingent beliefs without succumbing to irrationality and incoherence. 
People can have - indeed, they can rationally choose to have - coherent 
personalities which they know they must suppress. 
240 
In contrast, it is doubtful that an autonomous person would pine away 
nurturing an unreciprocated love. Unlike coherence, autonomy requires self-
direction - that is, expressing oneself in ways that one deems fitting and 
worthy of oneself'. Ibid. pp. 31-32. 
47. Taylor, G., Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment p. 126. 
48. Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom pp. 384-385. 
49. Eamonn Callan has recently drawn our attention to the dangers involved in 
self-deception. 'The individual who deceives herself about her interests or 
her natural affinities, for example, is surrendering to a mental tendency 
which, by its very nature, is largely unavailable to conscious control, and the 
frequency with which one surrenders to it will weaken the capacity to resist 
in the future. This makes surrendering a very dangerous business, at least 
in conditions where others cannot be expected to intervene benevolently when 
things go wrong. Today it may just protect our peace of mind from the 
disruption of disagreeable facts; tomorrow it may insulate us from truths 
essential to the meaning of our lives. Self-deception is like falling asleep 
while driving. The dreams may be nice but the risks are hardly worth it.' 
Callan, E., Autonomy and Schooling pp. 37-38. 
50. Op. cit. pp. 36-37. And she adds in a footnote: 'Much of the appeal of 
Frankfurt's identification criterion is that meeting it means that an individual 
has a self-chosen and well-defined identity ... to have a well-defined identity 
is not to have a different identity every other day. Whatever the cause of 
transitory identification, a theory of autonomy must exclude it. The trouble 
with Frankfurt's theory of autonomy is that the device he fixes on to stabilise 
identification - namely, decisions - will not do the job.' Ibid. p. 263. 
51. Ibid. p. 38. 
52. Ibid. p. 45. 
53. See his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 
54. Philosophers such as H.L.A. Hart are sceptical about the appropriateness of 
`rights talk' in relation to children on the grounds that rights are discretionary 
powers and as such are inapplicable to those who are incapable of waiving 
them or enforcing them. 
	 See Hart, H.L.A., 'Are There Any Natural 
Rights?' Philosophical Review Vol.64, 1955, pp. 175-191. Hart distinguishes 
his own theory of rights - something he calls the 'will theory', a theory which 
requires the legal recognition of an individual's will or choice as having pre-
eminence over that of others in relation to a given subject matter. The 'will 
theory' insists that a right-holder has the legal power to waive or enforce the 
duties of others. However, as MacCormick has so forcefully argued, such 
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a theory gives rise to paradoxical conclusions. 
	 Given the unproblematic 
nature of the claim that one has a right (legal and moral) to one's freedom it 
is difficult to see how the 'will theory' could accommodate such a right. To 
quote MacCormick: 'A's right to personal freedom involves B in having (a) 
a duty not to reduce A to servile conditions, e.g. by clapping him in irons; 
and (b) a disability to impose upon A the status of a slave; and (c) a disability 
to change the relation (a) and (b) even with A's consent. A does not himself 
have power to waive his immunities in these respects ... (yet) it appears that 
his legal dispensation, be it ever so advantageous from the point of view of 
serving liberty, is so forceful as to thrust liberty beyond the realm of 'right' 
altogether. If there be no power to waive or assert the immunity, the claim, 
or whatever, upon some matter, upon that matter there was by definition no 
right either. 	 In the matter of non-enslavement no person in any 
contemporary western legal system can de jure waive his immunity 
(MacCormick, D.N., 'Rights in Legislation' in Hacker and Raz, op. cit. p. 
196). In contrast to the 'will theory' MacCormick wishes to subscribe to 
what is commonly referred to as the 'interest theory' whereby a right is the 
legal or moral protection or promotion of one person's interests against others, 
by the imposition on the latter of duties or liabilities in respect of the former. 
55. Op. cit. p. 288. 
56. Ibid. 
57. In Aiken, W., and La Folette, H. (eds.), Whose Child? Children's Rights, 
Parental Authority and State Power, pp. 124-153. 
58. Benn, S.I., "Interests" in Politics' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Vol. 60, 1960, pp. 130-1. 'His desires are beside the point, for it is often 
a question of whether he is to be encouraged to have desires of some 
appraised sort instead of undesirable ones. It might be in the child's interests 
to deny him satisfaction of some of his desires to save him from becoming the 
sort of person who habitually desires the wrong thing!' 
59. There is evidence that children who are reared in homes where there is little 
predictability relating to how people, especially parents, are likely to behave, 
are likely to end up with beliefs unreflectingly held and where forward 
planning has limited application. On this see e.g. Klein, J., Samples from 
English Cultures Vol. 2: Child-rearing Practices. 
60. Quoted by Feinberg in Whose Child? p. 135. 
61. Benson, J., 'Who is the Autonomous Man?' Philosophy, Vol. 58, 1983, 
p. 14. 
62. Lindley, R., Autonomy. 
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63. Richards, J.R., The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry, p. 109. 
64. Young, R., 'The Interests of Children and Adolescents' in Aiken, W., and 
Lafollette, H. (eds.), op. cit. p. 183. 
65. Mill, J.S., On Liberty Chapter 3. 	 For a fuller discussion of the issues 
involved see e.g. Friedman, R.B., 'A New Exploration of Mill's Essay on 
Liberty' Political Studies Vol. XIV, 1966, pp. 281-304 and Bogen, J., and 
Farrell, D., 'Freedom and Happiness in Mill's Defence of Liberty', 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28, 1978, pp. 325-338. The latter presents a 
convincing argument to show that Mill's justification of autonomy as 
something possessing intrinsic value is not incompatible with his utilitarianism 
on the grounds that Mill took 'happiness' to be something far removed from 
a mere 'mental state'. An argument which is critical of the view that Mill's 
defence of individuality is straightforwardly utilitarian may be found in Ten, 
C.L., Mill on Liberty Ch. 5. 
66. Op. cit. p. 102. 
67. Hill, T.E., Autonomy and Self Respect p. 19. 
68. As Raz says in an important footnote: 	 `... dependence of well-being on 
absence of pain, disappointment, anxiety, frustration, and like emotions and 
feelings is often exaggerated. 	 Anxiety, worry, disappointments, are an 
integral part of many valuable pursuits, relationships, careers, creative 
endeavours etc. Therefore, if you like, their presence contributes to one's 
personal well-being inasmuch as the pursuits of which they are an essential 
part do so'. Op. cit. p. 303, n.1. 
7. FREEDOM, WELL-BEING AND COMPULSORY SCHOOLING 
1. Carter, R., 'Justifying Paternalism' Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 
VII No.1 March 1977, p. 136. 
2. Dworkin, G., 'Paternalism' in Wasserstrom, R.A. (ed.), Morality and the 
Law. p. 147. 
As to whether such interventions are paternalistic is a matter of some dispute. 
Gardner, and Lively have doubts. Underpinning Gardner's objection is the 
view that 'where we have paternalism, the initiative and responsibility rest 
with those who encroach.' (Gardner, P. 'Liberty and Compulsory Education' 
in Griffiths, A.P. (ed.), Of Liberty, p. 117). Lively believes that it is 
`misleading' to picture such restriction as paternalistic in character, preferring 
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to call them self-imposed constraints decided upon by the individual with the 
object of avoiding self-harm.' (Lively, J., Ibid. p. 152). 
For my part I see nothing wrong with the idea that paternalism is the apposite 
term here. For the grounds on which I am motivated to consent to someone's 
making it difficult or impossible for me to act in accordance with a particular 
desire are paternalistic. 	 The fact that I have consented to another's 
interference with my liberty on a subsequent occasion does nothing to render 
the term inappropriate. 
3. Op. cit. p. 150. This argument has obvious application to whole categories of 
people in addition to children. 
4. Op. cit. p. 137. 
5. Op. cit. p. 156. 
6. Hobson P., 'Another look at Paternalism' Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 
1, No. 2, 1984, p. 297. 
7. Ibid. 
8. On Liberty p. 78. 
9. Kleinig J., Paternalism Ch. 6. 
10. Murphy, J.G., 'Incompetence and Paternalism' Archiv fur Rechts and Sozial 
Philosophie Vol. 60, 1974, pp. 482ff. 
11. See his Principles of Political Economy. 
12. Schrag, F., 'The Child's Status in the Democratic State' Political Theory Vol. 
3, No. 4, November 1975, p. 455. Cf. his 'From Childhood to Adulthood: 
Assigning Rights and Responsibilities' in Strike, K.A. and Egan, K. (eds.), 
Ethics and Educational Policy pp. 69ff. 
13. Chamberlin, R., Free Children and Democratic Schools: a philosophical 
study of liberty and education p. 81. 
14. Scarre, G., 'Children and Paternalism' Philosophy Vol 55, 1980, p. 121. 
15. Op. cit. p. 78. 
16. Kleinig, J., op. cit. p. 72, 
17. Ibid. p. 68. 
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18. A similar defence of strong paternalism is made by Robert Young in his 
Personal Autonomy where he relies on a distinction between what he calls 
`occurrent' and `dispositional' (or 'global') autonomy. Only by reference to 
dispositional autonomy does it make sense to talk of an individual life having 
coherence, order and the avoidance of conflict which is likely to lead to 
fragmentation and loss of integrity. If such states are to be avoided some 
form of strong paternalism will sometimes be necessary. Respect for persons 
is respect for temporally extended agents the significance and values of whose 
day to day decisions is accepted by reference to the wider canvas of ongoing 
projects and life-plans which is why paternalism may well be perfectly 
compatible with respect for another's individuality and integrity. 
19. White has more recently admitted to having failed to distinguish clearly 
between them in his Towards A Compulsory Curriculum. See White, J., 
`Compulsion and the Curriculum' British Journal of Educational Studies Vol. 
XXXII, No. 2, 1984, p. 149. 
20. Gutmann, A., 'Children, Paternalism and Education' Philosophy and Public 
Affairs Vol. 9, No. 4. Summer 1980. 
21. Postman, N., and Weingartner, C., Teaching as a Subversive Activity. 
22. It is far from certain that adults should be prevented from smoking tobacco 
even if such action were to enhance freedom. While the deleterious 
consequences of smoking are well known, it may well be a requirement of 
respect for someone's autonomy not to intervene on his behalf. This is 
certainly the view of Joel Feinberg. 'when a mature adult has a conflict 
between getting what he wants and having his options left open in the future, 
we are bound by our respect for his autonomy not to force his present choice 
in order to protect his future liberty. Feinberg, J., 'The Child's Right to an 
open Future' in Whose Child? p. 127. 
23. Cf. Gardner, P., op. cit p. 122. 
24. Callan, P., op. cit. 
25. Hobson, P., 'Paternalism and the justification of compulsory education' 
Australian Journal of Education Vol. XXVII, Pt. 2, 1983, p. 144. 
26. Op. cit. p. 138. 
27. Ibid. p. 148. 
28. O'Hear, P., and White, J.P., A National Curriculum for All: Laying the 
Foundations for Success. 
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